BIA Balasquide, IJ A094 044 947
BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 28th day of January, two thousand eleven,
PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, REENA RAGGI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.
Petitioner Junaedy Tjitajaya, a native and citizen of Indonesia, seeks review of a January 20, 2010 decision of the BIA affirming the March 27, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge ("IJ") Javier Balasquide denying Tjitajaya's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). In re Junaedy Tjitajaya, No. A094 044 947 (BIA Jan. 20, 2010), aff'g No. A094 044 947 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 27, 2008). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ's decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 157- 58 (2d Cir. 2008).
The only issue before us is whether the agency erred in finding that Tjitajaya failed to demonstrate a pattern or practice of persecution of ethnic Chinese Christians in Indonesia. In order to establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant is not required to demonstrate that he would be individually singled out for persecution if he demonstrates a "pattern or practice" of "persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to" him on account of a protected ground and establishes his own "inclusion in, and identification with," that group. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). However, the BIA has found time and again that there is no such pattern or practice of persecution of Chinese Christians in Indonesia. See, e.g., In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (BIA 2005). We have found no error in such decisions. See, e.g., Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2009).
Because the agency reasonably found that he did not demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, Tjitajaya's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief fail as they were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance ...