The opinion of the court was delivered by: Seybert, District Judge:
On November 24, 2010, incarcerated pro se plaintiff Dwight Jackson ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint in this Court against Suffolk County Sheriff Vincent DeMarco and Suffolk County ("Defendants") pursuant to The Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violation of his rights under the 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution. Accompanying the Complaint is an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff's request for permission to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, but, for the reasons that follow, the Complaint is sua suponte DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and with leave to file an Amended Complaint.
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff is "a qualified individual with a disability [who] was declared to be disabled by a judge in 2008."*fn1 (Compl. at ¶ 5(a)). Plaintiff complains that he was placed in medical administrative segregation during the periods July 25, 2008 to October 4, 2008 and from June 8, 2009 to an unspecified date in September, 2009. (Compl. at ¶ 5(a) and attachment thereto.) Plaintiff claims that he was confined for up to 33 hours twice a week even though Plaintiff's presence in the general population would not have posed a threat to the safety and security of others at the facility. As a result of his segregation, Plaintiff claims that he could not access the law library or communicate with his attorney. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that he was denied access to the courts because he did not receive envelopes with free postage until ten (10) days after his commissary account fell below $1.00. (Id.)
As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief directing Suffolk County "to end such practices" as well as $2,500,000 in unspecified damages. (Compl. at ¶ 6.)
Having reviewed Plaintiff's declaration in support of his application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that he is qualified to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(1). Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for permission to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
II. Application of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915, requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)&(b); Abbas v. Dixon, 480F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court is required to dismiss the action as soon as it makes such a determination. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
It is axiomatic that pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys and the Court is required to read the Plaintiff's pro se Complaint liberally and interpret it raising the strongest arguments it suggests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S. Ct. 173, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1980); Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006); (McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d. Cir. 2004) ("[W]hen the plaintiff proceeds pro se, . . . a court is obliged to construe his pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations."). Moreover, at this state of the proceeding, the Court assumes the truth of the allegations in the complaint. See Hughes, 449 U.S. at 10; Koppel v. 4987 Corp., 167F.3d 125, 127 (2d Cir. 1999). III. The ADA claims Title II of ADA provides in part that, "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity," 42 U.S.C. § 12132. This provision applies to state prisoners such as the Plaintiff.*fn2
Elbert v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Servs., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 08-CV-10998 (KMK), 2010 WL 4705145, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (citing Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 141 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1998) ("[T]he plain text of Title II of the ADA unambiguously extends to state prison inmates.")).
To state a plausible Title II claim, "a plaintiff must allege that: 1) he or she is a qualified individual with a disability; and 2) he or she is being excluded from participation in, or being denied the benefits of some service, program, or activity by reasons of his or her disability." Elbert, 2010 WL 4705145, at *3 (citing Powell v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 364 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2004)). The Second Circuit instructs that the purpose of Title II is "to eliminate discrimination on the basis of disability and to ensure evenhanded treatment between the disabled and the able-bodied." Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 1998). Thus, "[t]he second prong requires the disabled plaintiff to allege that his or her mistreatment 'was motivated by either discriminatory animus or ill will due to disability.'" Elbert, 2010 WL 4705145, at *3 (quoting Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 112 (2d Cir. 2001)). Title II claims that fail to allege that the actions complained of were motivated by discriminatory animus are not plausible and are routinely dismissed. See Elbert, 2010 WL 4705145, at *4 (collecting cases).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in medical administrative segregation and as a result was denied access to the law library, his attorney and the courts. Wholly absent from the Complaint is any suggestion that the Defendants' actions were motivated by a discriminatory animus or because of Plaintiff's claimed disability. Even affording the pro se Complaint a liberal construction, there are simply no facts alleged such that the Court can infer the Defendants' discriminatory intent. Thus, Plaintiff's Title II claims, as pled, are implausible and are dismissed without prejudice and with leave to file an Amended Complaint in accordance with this Order. Any Amended Complaint must be filed within thirty (30) days of the date that this Order is ...