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Crystal M. Gonyou and Scott A. Gonyou v. Roberta D. Mclaughlin
March 25, 2011
CRYSTAL M. GONYOU AND SCOTT A. GONYOU,
ROBERTA D. MCLAUGHLIN, DEFENDANT, JUSTIN M. SANMARTIN AND ROBERT F. NOVAK,
Appeal from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Cayuga County (Mark H. Fandrich, A.J.), entered April 30, 2010 in a personal injury action. The order and judgment granted the motions of defendants Justin M. Sanmartin and Robert F. Novak for summary judgment.
Decided on March 25, 2011
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, CARNI, GREEN, AND GORSKI, JJ.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order and judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the
motions are denied and the complaint is reinstated against defendants Justin M. Sanmartin and Robert F. Novak, and the
matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Cayuga County, for further proceedings in accordance with the following Memorandum:
Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking damages for injuries allegedly sustained by Crystal M. Gonyou (plaintiff) while she was
operating a vehicle that was involved in a multi-vehicle accident. Supreme Court erred in granting the motions of Justin M. Sanmartin
and Robert F. Novak (defendants) seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them. "On a motion for summary
judgment dismissing a complaint that alleges serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102 (d), the defendant bears the initial
burden of establishing by competent medical evidence that [the] plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury caused by the accident"
(Howard v Espinosa, 70 AD3d 1091, 1091-1092 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, defendants failed to meet that burden
inasmuch as, by their own submissions in support of their motions, they raised triable issues of fact whether plaintiff sustained a
serious injury within the meaning of the statute (see Phoung Le Nguyen v Wilson, 8 AD3d 1036). Because defendants failed to meet
their initial burden, we do not consider the sufficiency of plaintiffs' opposing papers (see Swartz v Kalson, 78 AD3d 1553, 1554). We note,
however, that the court in its order determined that plaintiffs' cross motion was moot in light of the dismissal of the complaint against defendants.
Because we are reinstating the complaint against defendants, we remit the matter to Supreme Court to determine plaintiffs' cross motion.
Patricia L. Morgan Clerk of the Court
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