Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Employees' Retirement System of the Government of the Virgin Islands, On Behalf of Itself and All v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.

March 30, 2011


The opinion of the court was delivered by: John G. Koeltl, District Judge:


This is a securities action brought on behalf of a proposed class of purchasers of mortgage pass-through certificates issued by J.P Morgan Acceptance Corporation I ("JPM Acceptance"). The lead plaintiff, the Employees' Retirement System of the Government of the Virgin Islands (the "Retirement System"), alleges causes of action against J.P. Morgan Acceptance and three related entities, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. ("JPMC"), J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. ("JPM Acquisition"), and J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. ("JPM Securities") (collectively, the "Corporate Defendants"), along with six officers or directors of JPM Acceptance (collectively, the "Individual Defendants"), under sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a)(2), & 77o. The defendants move to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.


When presented with motions under both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must first analyze the Rule 12(b)(1) motion to determine whether the Court has the subject matter jurisdiction necessary to consider the merits of the action. See Rhulen Agency, Inc. v. Ala. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 896 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir. 1990); see also S.E.C. v. Rorech, 673 F. Supp. 2d 217, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

In defending a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the Court's jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). In considering such a motion, the Court generally must accept the material factual allegations in the complaint as true. See J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004). The Court does not, however, draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id.; see also Graubart v. Jazz Images, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4645, 2006 WL 1140724, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006). Indeed, where jurisdictional facts are disputed, the Court has the power and the obligation to consider matters outside the pleadings, such as affidavits, documents, and testimony, to determine whether jurisdiction exists. See Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 932 (2d Cir. 1998); Kamen v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir.1986). In so doing, the Court is guided by that body of decisional law that has developed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Kamen, 791 F.2d at 1011; see also Rorech, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 220-21.

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007); Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 532 F. Supp. 2d 556, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The Court's function on a motion to dismiss is "not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at trial but merely to determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient." Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985). The Court should not dismiss the complaint if the plaintiff has stated "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). While the Court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id.; see also Rorech, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 221-22.

When presented with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may consider documents that are referenced in the complaint, documents that the plaintiff relied on in bringing suit and that are either in the plaintiff's possession or that the plaintiff knew of when bringing suit, or matters of which judicial notice may be taken. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Taylor v. Vt. Dep't of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 776 (2d Cir. 2002); Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1991); Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1991); Rorech, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 221-22.


The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise indicated.


This case concerns eleven series of mortgage pass-through certificates (the "Certificates") issued by JPM Acceptance and eleven different common-law trusts (the "Trusts"), each of which corresponds to a different series of Certificates. (Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") ¶ 19.) A Certificate provides its holder with an ownership interest in the principal and/or interest payments from various pools of residential real estate loans contained within the corresponding Trust. (Id. ¶ 36.) On April 23, 2007, JPM Acceptance filed a single amended registration statement (the "Registration Statement") for the eleven series of Certificates, which expressly incorporated by reference eleven different prospectus supplements, one for each offering of a series of Certificates. (Id. ¶ 1.) Collectively, the Registration statement and the prospectus supplement for each series constitute the offering documents for that series.*fn1

The loans underlying each series of Certificates were originated by entities not party to this lawsuit and purchased by JPM Acquisition for the Trusts. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 37.) The Second Amended Complaint alleges that JPM Acquisition was also "the 'sponsor' of the Certificate offerings . . . and made certain representations concerning the loans within the Trusts." (Id. ¶ 18.) The prospectus supplements identified JPM Acquisition as the "Sponsor and Seller" of the Certificates. (E.g., Spenner Decl. Ex. B ("Prospectus Supplement") at i.)

The prospectus supplements identified JPM Securities as the "Underwriter" of the Certificates, and stated that the Certificates were "being offered" by JPM Securities. (E.g., id. at i.) The Second Amended Complaint alleges that JPM Securities also "acted as an underwriter in the sale of the Certificate offerings" and "helped to draft and disseminate the Offering Documents." (SAC ¶ 16.)

The Individual Defendants are Brian Bernard, the President of JPM Acceptance; Louis Schoppio Jr., the Controller and CFO of JPM Acceptance; and Christine E. Cole, David M. Duzyk, William King, and Edwin F. McMichael, all directors of JPM Acceptance. (Id. ¶¶ 20-25.) All of the Individual Defendants signed the Registration Statement. (Id. ¶¶ 20-25.)


On July 18, 2008, the Retirement System purchased 3,540,508 JP Morgan Mortgage Trust 2007-S3 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates ("2007-S3 Certificates"). (Id. ¶ 15.) The Retirement System did not purchase any of the other ten series of Certificates.


The Second Amended Complaint alleges false and misleading statements relating to four items: underwriting standards, appraisal standards, loan-to-value ("LTV") ratios, and investment ratings.


The Offering Documents indicated that the underlying loans were acquired directly or indirectly by loan originators through the ordinary course of business and that mortgage loans were underwritten in accordance with specified underwriting criteria. (Id. ¶¶ 67-76.) For example, the Prospectus Supplement stated:

Underwriting standards are applied by or on behalf of a lender to evaluate a borrower's credit standing and repayment ability, and the value and adequacy of the related Mortgaged Property as collateral. In general, a prospective borrower applying for a loan is required to fill out a detailed application designed to provide to the underwriting officer pertinent credit information. As part of the description of the borrower's financial condition, the borrower generally is required to provide to the underwriting officer pertinent credit information. As part of the description of the borrower's financial condition, the borrower generally is required to provide a current list of assets and liabilities and a statement of income and expenses, as well as an authorization to apply for a credit report which summarizes the borrower's credit history with local merchants and lenders and any record of bankruptcy. In most cases, an employment verification is obtained from an independent source . . . . (Prospectus Supplement at S-42.)

The Offering Documents made clear, however, that this was only "generally" the case, and that loans had also been originated under "'alternative,' 'reduced documentation,' 'stated income/stated assets' or 'no income/no asset' programs" (Id. at S-43.) The Offering Documents detailed the requirements of these programs, and stated that they were "generally limited to borrowers who have demonstrated an established ability and willingness to repay the mortgage loans in a timely fashion." (Id.) They also stated:

From time to time, exceptions to a lender's underwriting policies may be made. Such exceptions may be made on a loan by loan basis at the discretion of the lender's underwriter. Exceptions may be made after careful consideration of certain mitigating factors such as borrower liquidity, employment and residential stability and local economic conditions. (Id.) An Annex at the end of the Prospectus Supplement specified how many loans were issued under each program. (Id. at A-1 to A-25.)

The Prospectus Supplement specifically described the underwriting guidelines for two loan originators, American Home Mortgage Corp. ("AHM") and JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association ("Chase"). (Id. at S-44 to S-51.) These two originators accounted for the majority of loans contained in the 2007-S3 Trust, with AHM originating 27% and Chase originating more than 58%. (SAC ¶¶ 70, 72.) In both cases, the Prospectus Supplement stated that each originator "generally" follows the specified guidelines, although it indicated the alternative programs used in some cases. (Prospectus Supplement at S-44 to S-51.)

The plaintiff alleges that these statements were false and misleading because "AHM was lending to anyone that it could regardless of a borrower's ability to repay the loan." (SAC ¶

78.) The Second Amended Complaint alleges that AHM "was as a matter of course making loans even where 'compensating factors,' which would allow exceptions to the underwriting standards, did not exist" and that AHM "routinely fabricated 'compensating factors.'" (Id. ¶ 79.) Similarly, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that Chase's underwriting guidelines "were not applied to evaluate the prospective borrower's repayment ability" and that brokers "purposely originated loans for people they knew could not repay them." (SAC ¶ 94.) It alleges that an internal memo explained how to "cheat" or "trick" Chase's underwriting program to manipulate borrower approvals. (SAC ¶ 95.)


The Prospectus Supplement represented that every AHM loan had been "appraised by a licensed appraiser in accordance with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice" ("USPAP"). (Prospectus Supplement at S-46.) It stated that appraisers "perform on-site inspections of the property and report on the neighborhood and property condition in factual and specific terms," providing "an opinion of value that represents the appraiser's professional conclusion based on market data of sales of comparable properties and a logical analysis with adjustments for differences between the comparable sales and the subject property and the appraiser's judgment." (Id.) It ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.