Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Deshawn Ferrell v. United States of America

April 20, 2011

DESHAWN FERRELL,
PETITIONER, -
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
RESPONDENT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: John G. Koeltl, District Judge:

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The petitioner, Deshawn Ferrell (the "petitioner" or "Ferrell"), appearing pro se, moves pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The petitioner also seeks an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 8 of the Rules Governing 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

I.

The petitioner was indicted with his brother and co-defendant Tyshea Mincey ("Mincey"), for participating in a conspiracy to violate the firearms laws of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 922(a)(1)(A), 922(a)(3), and 924(n); dealing in firearms without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A); traveling interstate with intent to further firearms dealing, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(n); and engaging in interstate transportation and receipt of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3). The Government alleged that over the course of six months the petitioner enlisted the help of several "straw purchasers" to purchase firearms in Georgia so that the petitioner and Mincey could then transport the firearms to New York for resale. The petitioner and Mincey could not purchase the firearms themselves because Georgia law requires the purchasers of firearms to reside in the state for a specified period of time prior to the purchase. According to the Government, the petitioner and Mincey were responsible for purchasing eighteen firearms in Georgia, seven of which were later recovered in New York, primarily from convicted felons and drug dealers.

Following indictment and arrest, the petitioner obtained affidavits from several of his alleged co-conspirators-Sherry Ferrell, Tina Jackson, and Jason Hayes-stating that they did not purchase firearms on behalf of the petitioner. The Government alleges that these affidavits are false and were part of an effort by the petitioner to obstruct the Government's pre-trial investigation.

The petitioner claims that he directed his first attorney to use the affidavits to quash the indictment but that his attorney declined to do so and told the petitioner that the affidavits would be used as part of the defense's trial strategy. (Pet'r's Mem. At 2-3.) Unhappy with this, the petitioner requested that the attorney be replaced; the court granted the petitioner's request and appointed a second attorney to represent the petitioner. (Id. at 3-4.) The second attorney allegedly told the petitioner that the affidavits could be used for trial strategy but that he would not use them to quash the indictment. Because of this, the petitioner once again requested, and was appointed, new counsel. (Id. at 4.) After discussing the affidavits with the petitioner, the third counsel informed the petitioner of the right to subpoena witnesses to testify at trial in his favor and that the affidavits could be used to bolster the petitioner's position. (Id.)

Shortly before trial was scheduled to begin the petitioner attempted to plead guilty but the court rejected the petitioner's plea offer after the Government expressed concern about the petitioner's plea allocution. The Government believed that the allocution was perjurious and was designed to set up a bogus defense for his brother and co-defendant, Tyshea Mincey. (Plea Hr'g Tr., Mar. 21, 2003, at 43, 49-50.) Consequently, the petitioner proceeded to trial.

At trial, the petitioner's third attorney did not subpoena any witnesses to testify on the petitioner's behalf and did not offer any of the affidavits that allegedly exculpated the petitioner. (Pet'r's Mem. at 4.) The Government, however, solicited the testimony of all three of the petitioner's alleged co-conspirators, the same individuals that the petitioner obtained affidavits from. (Gov't. Mem. at 3.) Indeed, the Government examined Sherry Ferrell about her affidavit during her direct examination. Sherry Ferrell testified that the affidavit, stating that she never purchased firearms for the petitioner, was false and that she only signed the false affidavit because her sister, the petitioner's mother, requested that she do so on several occasions. (Trial Tr., Mar. 26, 2004 at 273-77.)

The jury returned a guilty verdict against the petitioner on all four counts. On June 10, 2003, Judge Brieant sentenced the petitioner to 234 months' imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. (June 10, 2003 Hr'g Tr. at 37.) The conviction was affirmed on appeal and Judge Brieant affirmed the sentence after a remand pursuant to United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005). (Gov't Mem. at 10-11.) The petitioner filed this habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on September 25, 2008. The petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce in evidence his co-conspirators' affidavits and for failing to subpoena any of the co-conspirators to testify on the petitioner's behalf. The petitioner's case was transferred to this Court on November 15, 2010.

II.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show both (1) that his counsel's performance was deficient in that it was objectively unreasonable under professional standards prevailing at the time, and (2) that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial to the petitioner's case. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Bunkley v. Meachum, 68 F.3d 1518, 1521 (2d Cir. 1995).

To satisfy the first prong, the petitioner must establish that his counsel "made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. There is a "strong presumption" that defense counsel's conduct fell within the broad spectrum of reasonable professional assistance. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89). Moreover, "[i]n assessing the attorney's performance, a reviewing court must judge his conduct on the basis of the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct, and may not use hindsight to second-guess [counsel's] strategy choices." Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Strouse v. Leonardo, 928 F.2d 548, 553 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Jones, 918 F.2d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1990).

To meet the second prong of the Strickland test, the petitioner must show that "[t]here is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. It is not enough to show that the prejudice "had some conceivable effect" on the ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.