The opinion of the court was delivered by: William M. Skretny Chief Judge United States District Court
Presently before this Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Shane C. Buczek's amended complaint, which essentially asserts malicious prosecution and false arrest claims under Bivens against numerous employees of the United States Attorney's Office in the Western District of New York. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion will be granted and all other pending motions denied as moot.
Buczek is a criminal defendant before this Court in three separate cases. On March 5, 2010, a jury convicted Buczek of committing bank fraud and committing a crime in violation of the terms of his pretrial release. (See United States v. Buczek, 09-CR-121S.) Twenty days later, Buczek pled guilty to one count of contempt of court (see United States v. Buczek, 09-CR-141S) and one count of possession of a false identification document with intent to use to defraud the United States (see United States v. Buczek, 08-CR-54S). On November 5, 2010, this Court sentenced Buczek to concurrent terms of imprisonment in each case, which essentially resulted in a sentence of 33 months imprisonment and five years of supervised release.
Defendant Anthony Bruce is an Assistant United States Attorney. He and other members of the United States Attorney's Office investigated, indicted, and prosecuted Buczek. Buczek's amended complaint sets forth what purport to be nine claims against the defendants. But stripped of its implausible and nonsensical allegations - which run from Bruce forcing him to relocate, to Bruce being subject to "impeachment," to Bruce being an "unregistered Foreign Agent operating illegally in our De-jure Republic" - Buczek's claims boil down to his allegations that Defendants falsely arrested and maliciously prosecuted him. Buczek's amended complaint focuses almost exclusively on Bruce; nowhere in the 38-page amended complaint does he allege any individual action on the part of any other defendant but Bruce. Buczek seeks recovery of $1.719 billion in damages.
Buczek subscribes to "tax protestor" or "redemption" theories, which relate to an individual's relationship with the law.
[Redemption theory] propounds that a person has a split personality: a real person and a fictional person called the "strawman." The "strawman" purportedly came into being when the United States went off the gold standard in , and instead, pledged the strawman of its citizens as collateral for the country's national debt. Redemptionists claim that government has power only over the strawman and not over the live person, who remains free. Individuals can free themselves by filing UCC financing statements, thereby acquiring an interest in their strawman. Thereafter, the real person can demand that government officials pay enormous sums of money to use the strawman's name or, in the case of prisoners, to keep him in custody. If government officials refuse, inmates are encouraged to file liens against correctional officers and other prison officials in order to extort their release from prison. Adherents of this scheme also advocate that inmates copyright their names to justify filing liens against officials using their names in public records such as indictments or court papers.
Another tenet of the Redemptionist theory is that when the United States Government pledged the strawman of its citizens as collateral for the country's national debit, it created an "exemption account" for each citizen, identified by each person's Social Security number. When citizens contract for debt, the theory goes, their debts are collateralized by their respective exemption accounts, essentially making the U.S. Government ultimately responsible for satisfaction of their debts. Moreover, each citizens exemption account is virtually bottomless, meaning that those who understand this theory - and who file the appropriate UCC financing statements, and thereby become a free sovereign, a process known as "redemption," - never have to actually pay for anything.
McLaughlin v. Citimortgage, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 201, 210 (D.Conn. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Buczek's adherence to these theories is in part what caused him to run afoul of the law. This Court has repeatedly rejected this brand of argument, including that this Court lacks jurisdiction, that Title 18 of the United States Code was never passed into law, and that this Court is simply an administrative court.
Buczek's instant action is of a similar variety. He continues his assertions that he is "factually innocent," that "no real party and no actual original claim or charging instrument" was presented against him, and that defendants and other government actors are unregistered foreign agents "conspiring to mislead the American people." Buczek cites a number of disconnected federal statutes and regulations in support of these claims, but ultimately, his ...