The opinion of the court was delivered by: H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr. United States Magistrate Judge
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to the assignment of this case to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings in this case, including the entry of final judgment. Dkt. #25.
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, commenced this action on or about December 15, 2008. Dkt. #1. Thereafter, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Dkt. #4) and a "Supplemental Complaint" (Dkt. #8) on December 24, 2008. A second "Supplemental Complaint" was filed on February 26, 2009 (Dkt. #13) and finally, a Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. #43) was filed on February 17, 2010. The Second Amended Complaint alleges that while incarcerated at the Southport Correctional Facility, plaintiff was subjected to excessive force on March 21, 2008 and denied adequate medical care following the alleged March 21, 2008 incident. Dkt. #43. Presently pending before this Court are plaintiff's fifth and sixth motions seeking the appointment of counsel. Dkt. ##119 and 129. For the following reasons, the instant motions are denied.
This Court has, on three prior occasions, declined to appoint counsel to represent plaintiff. Dkt. ## 12, 42 and 49. Plaintiff's fourth motion seeking the appointment of counsel (Dkt. #104) was, at the request of plaintiff (Dkt. #123), found moot (Dkt. #124).
There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in civil cases. However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court may appoint counsel to assist indigent litigants. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Charles W. Sears Real Estate, Inc., 865 F.2d 22, 23 (2d Cir. 1988). Assignment of counsel in this matter is clearly within the judge's discretion. In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984). The factors to be considered in deciding whether or not to assign counsel include the following:
1. Whether the indigent's claims seem likely to be of substance;
2. Whether the indigent is able to investigate the crucial facts concerning his claim;
3. Whether conflicting evidence implicating the need for cross-examination will be the major proof presented to the fact finder;
4. Whether the legal issues involved are complex; and
5. Whether there are any special reasons why appointment of counsel would be more likely to lead to a just determination.
Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390, 392 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1986).
The Court must consider the issue of appointment carefully, of course, because "every assignment of a volunteer lawyer to an undeserving client deprives society of a volunteer lawyer available for a deserving cause." Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co. Inc., 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1989). Therefore, the Court must first look to the "likelihood of merit" of the underlying dispute, Hendricks, 114 F.3d at 392; Cooper, 877 F.2d at 174, and "even though a claim may not be characterized as frivolous, counsel should not be appointed in a case where the merits of the . . . claim are thin and his chances of prevailing are therefore poor." Carmona v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 632 (2d Cir. 2001) (denying counsel on appeal where petitioner's appeal was not frivolous but nevertheless appeared to have little merit).
The Court has reviewed the facts presented herein in light of the factors required by law. Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to excessive force and denied adequate medical care after the alleged excessive use of force incident while incarcerated at the Southport Correctional Facility. Dkt. #48. In ...