The opinion of the court was delivered by: John T. Curtin United States District Judge
By order of Chief United States District Judge William M. Skretny dated July 6, 2011 (Item 40), this matter has been reassigned to the undersigned for all further proceedings.
In this action, plaintiff Berlincia Easterling claims that defendant Collecto, Inc. sent her a false, misleading, or deceptive student loan debt collection letter in violation of certain provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. Plaintiff has moved pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to certify a class of student loan debtors who "were sent a debt collection letter by [defendant] . . . in a form materially identical or substantially similar to the letter sent to Plaintiff" (Item 26, p. 1), and defendant has moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint in its entirety (Item 28).
For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. Because the summary judgment motion disposes of this case, the court will not address plaintiff's class certification motion.
In or around 1987, plaintiff obtained a student loan guaranteed by the United States Department of Education (Item 28-6, ¶ 1). Plaintiff's student loan balance remained due and owing in the amount of $2,469.00 when she filed a petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on August 23, 2001 (id. at ¶¶ 2, 3, 9). She prepared her bankruptcy case with the advice of legal counsel, and listed her unsecured non-priority claims on "Schedule F" (id. at ¶¶ 5, 15; Item 28-5, pp. 7-10). On her "Schedule F" she characterized her student loan debt as "not dischargeable," and she did not attempt to obtain a discharge of her student loan debt by showing in an adversary proceeding that repaying the loan would cause her undue hardship, as required by the Bankruptcy Code (Item 28-5, p. 9; Item 28-6, ¶ 23); see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (excepting student loan debt from discharge in bankruptcy "unless excepting such debt from discharge . . . would impose an undue hardship on the debtor"); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(6) (requiring an adversary proceeding "to determine the dischargeability of a debt"). Plaintiff acknowledges that she had the right to claim undue hardship in this manner, but she did not pursue this relief during the pendency of her 2001 bankruptcy case (Item 28-6, ¶¶ 23, 31). As a result, plaintiff's student loan debt was not discharged upon the conclusion of the bankruptcy case on November 29, 2001, and the debt remained due and owing thereafter (id. at ¶¶ 35, 36; Item 28-5, p. 12).
Defendant Collecto, Inc. is primarily in the business of collecting debts, and is experienced in collecting overdue student loans (Item 28-7, pp. 7, 8). Defendant has a contract with the Department of Education to collect overdue student loans, and has assigned a manager specifically to the Department of Education contract to ensure compliance with agency guidelines and federal laws (id. at 6). The record demonstrates that defendant has specific internal procedures for its employees to follow when attempting to collect overdue student loans owed by bankrupt debtors (id. at 15, 16). When defendant's employees learn that a student loan debtor has filed for bankruptcy, the debt collectors suspend collection activity and assign the overdue account to an administrative resolution department to determine whether the student loan debt was discharged in bankruptcy (id. at 32, 33). The administrative resolution clerks examine each bankruptcy filing; and if the student loan debt was discharged in bankruptcy, defendant sends the account back to the Department of Education because the debts cannot be collected (id. at 16, 26). However, if the administrative resolution clerk finds that the bankrupt student loan debtor did not initiate an undue hardship adversary proceeding to discharge the debt, defendant recommences collection efforts by mailing a letter to the debtor indicating that the student loan debt is not dischargeable (id. at 33, 35-38).
Defendant attempted to collect plaintiff's overdue student loan debt by sending plaintiff a form letter dated September 24, 2008, that stated:
***IMPORTANT NOTIFICATION*** *****ACCOUNT INELIGIBLE FOR BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE***** Your account is NOT eligible for bankruptcy discharge and must be resolved. (Item 28-3, ¶ 16).
Plaintiff then commenced this action on July 9, 2009, alleging that this language in the collection letter violated the FDCPA (Item 1). Specifically, plaintiff claims that defendant's characterization of her student loan debt as "ineligible for bankruptcy discharge" is a false, deceptive, or misleading representation of her student loan debt because the possibility exists that she could either reopen her 2001 bankruptcy case or file a new bankruptcy case, and then seek a discharge of her student loan debt (see Item 36, pp. 1, 2). Plaintiff has moved to certify a class of student loan debtors to whom Collecto sent a debt collection letter "in a form materially identical or substantially similar to" the September 24, 2008 letter she received (Item 26, p. 1), and defendant has moved for summary judgment to dismiss this claim in its entirety.
For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
Rule 56 provides that summary judgment is warranted where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party", and facts are "material" if they "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law . . . ." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In reaching a summary judgment determination, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 574 (2d Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). ...