The opinion of the court was delivered by: Andrew T. Baxter, U.S. Magistrate Judge
This matter was referred to me for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 72.3(d). This case has proceeded in accordance with General Order 18.
Plaintiff filed a previous application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits that was denied following a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dated July 26, 2004. (See Administrative Transcript (T.) 63). Plaintiff alleged an onset date of March 25, 1998, and the date last insured was December 31, 2005. (See T. 63). The ALJ's denial was affirmed by the Appeals Council, and plaintiff did not pursue any appeal. (Pl.'s Mem. 2*fn1 ). Instead, plaintiff filed a new application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits on November 5, 2004. (T. 106--108 ).
Following a hearing before a different ALJ, in a decision dated October 24, 2006, plaintiff was found to be not disabled from July 27, 2004, through the date of the hearing. (T. 63--70). Plaintiff appealed the ALJ's decision, and on April 20, 2007, the Appeals Council remanded plaintiff's case for a new hearing. (T. 75--76).
A hearing was held before a third ALJ on October 21, 2008, and in a decision dated November 17, 2008, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not under a disability from July 27, 2004*fn2 through December 31, 2005, the date last insured. Id. (T. 939--51). Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council, which granted plaintiff's request for review on May 27, 2010. (T. 12--15). On July 16, 2010, after reviewing the ALJ's findings, the Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ's November 17, 2008 decision. The Appeals Council's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner from which plaintiff now appeals.
The plaintiff makes the following claims:
The ALJ's Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) determination is not supported by substantial evidence. (Pl.'s Mem. 1).
This court concludes for the reasons below, that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and recommends that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
To be considered disabled, a plaintiff seeking disability insurance benefits or SSI disability benefits must establish that he is "unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). In addition, the plaintiff's physical or mental impairment or impairments [must be] of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Commissioner uses a five-step process, set forth in 20 C.F.R. sections 404.1520 and 416.920 to evaluate disability insurance and SSI disability claims.
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant has a "severe impairment" which significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which meets or equals the criteria of an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience . . . . Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner] then determines whether there is other work which the claimant can perform.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The plaintiff has the burden of establishing disability at the first four steps. However, if the plaintiff establishes that his impairment prevents him from performing his past work, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to prove the final step. Id.
In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a court must determine whether the correct legal standards were applied and whether substantial evidence supports the decision. Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987)). A reviewing court may not affirm an ALJ's decision if it reasonably doubts whether the proper legal standards were applied, even if the decision appears to be supported by substantial evidence. Johnson, 817 F.2d at 986. In addition, an ALJ must set forth the crucial factors justifying his findings with sufficient specificity to allow a court to determine whether substantial evidence supports the decision. Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984).
A court's factual review of the Commissioner's final decision is limited to the determination of whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Rivera v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1991). "Substantial evidence has been defined as 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Williams on behalf of Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). It must be "more than a scintilla" of evidence scattered throughout the administrative record. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 197 U.S. 229 (1938)); Williams, 859 F.2d at 258.
"To determine on appeal whether an ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining the evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from its weight." Williams, 859 F.2d at 258. However, a reviewing court may not substitute its interpretation of the administrative record for that of the Commissioner, if the record contains substantial support for the ALJ's decision. Id. See also Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
A. Time Period Covered by the Commissioner's Prior Decision
Plaintiff was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome in both hands in 1998 and had surgery on her right wrist in April 1998 and November 1998. (T. 185, 206--08, 230--31; see T. 189, 203). Plaintiff also underwent right trigger thumb and index finger release surgery in January 1999. (T. 203). Occupational therapist Robert Joel Sears completed a functional capacity evaluation on March 16, 1999, concluding that plaintiff could perform light level work. (T. 186--95).
Orthopedic surgeon Dr. Edwin Mohler examined plaintiff in January 2001 and noted that plaintiff had decreased range of motion in her shoulders and right wrist, but had good grip strength and no intrinsic weakness or wasting. (T. 197--205). Dr. Michelle Antiles evaluated plaintiff in conjunction with plaintiff's initial application for Social Security benefits, and plaintiff told Dr. Antiles that she could sit and stand for up to four hours each, with breaks, could walk up to one mile, and lift up to 20 pounds. (T. 422). Plaintiff underwent arthroscopic shoulder surgery in February 2002, and afterward had minimal complaints of pain. (T. 242--44, 245--46). Dr. Kirkpatrick performed decompression of plaintiff's left ulnar nerve at the elbow in January 2003, and, in February 2003, performed surgery to repair the ulnar collateral ligament in plaintiff's right thumb. (T. 223A, 224).
Psychologist Dr. John McCloskey of Glens Falls Hospital Behavioral Health Outpatient Center evaluated plaintiff in May 2002. (T. 211). She told him that she was looking forward to camping and swimming in the summer and that she had ridden a bicycle two days before the evaluation. (T. 211). Dr. McCloskey diagnosed major depression, dysthymic disorder, panic disorder without agoraphobia, and alcohol dependence. (T. 209, 214).
B. Time Period Most Relevant to Final ALJ's Decision
Plaintiff was evaluated, at the Center for Vocational Rehabilitation on October 24, 2004, by Dr. Phillip Gara and physical therapist Cathy Krueger, who indicated that plaintiff could perform sedentary work and suggested vocational counseling. (T. 233--39). After plaintiff complained of hip and knee pain in November 2004, Dr. Kirkpatrick noted that X-rays revealed mild arthritis of the right hip with mild lateral spurring. (T. 241). Dr. Kirkpatrick also noted that ...