The opinion of the court was delivered by: Denise Cote, District Judge:
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Stanley Jackson ("Jackson") filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on September 10, 2003, challenging his conviction at trial in 1998. That petition was denied in an Opinion dated October 11, 2006 (the "Habeas Petition Opinion"), which adopted the report and recommendation issued on April 11, 2006 by Magistrate Judge Ellis (the "Report"). Jackson v. Phillips, No. 03 Civ. 6987(DLC), 2006 WL 2930202 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2006). On October 30, 2006, Jackson filed a notice of appeal of the Habeas Petition Opinion. His motion for a certificate of appealability and in forma pauperis status was denied on May 30 2007, and the mandate issued on October 4, 2007.
Jackson filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) on March 17, 2008, that was denied on March 27, 2008 because it challenged his conviction, not his federal habeas proceeding. Jackson v. Phillips, No. 03 Civ. 6987 (DLC), 2008 WL 821831 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2008). He filed another motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) on October 19, 2009. This motion challenged both his underlying conviction and the federal habeas proceeding, but did not identify which legal precedent the Court misapplied or which facts the Court did not apprehend. It was therefore denied on November 4, 2009. Jackson v. Phillips, No. 03 Civ. 6987(DLC), 2009 WL 3644033 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2009).
On November 19, 2009, Jackson filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court's November 4, 2009 Opinion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). This motion was denied on January 19, 2010 as it failed to identify any error of law or facts that were overlooked. Jackson v. Phillips, No. 03 Civ. 6987(DLC), 2010 WL 286645 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2010).
On June 29, 2011, this Court's Pro Se Office received from Jackson a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) attacking the Court's Habeas Petition Opinion. Jackson argues that the Court did not follow Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), which found that "the allegations of [a] pro se complaint" should be "h[e]ld to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Id. at 520. He also argues that this failure to read his petition liberally resulted in an abuse of discretion when his petition was denied without holding an evidentiary hearing.
Rule 60(b) permits a court to relieve a party from judgment upon a showing of:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). "A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time -- and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). The Southern District of New York's Local Civil Rule 6.3 requires that any motion for reconsideration "be served within fourteen (14) days after the entry of the Court's determination of the original motion, or . . . after the entry of the judgment." S.D.N.Y. Local Civ. R. 6.3.
Jackson's motion must be dismissed as untimely. The June 29 motion was filed more than four years after the decision it seeks to challenge. It is therefore untimely pursuant to either S.D.N.Y. Local Civ. R. 6.3 or Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). Even if Jackson's motion were being made pursuant to the "any other reason" provision of Rule 60(b)(6), his delay of more than four years after the Habeas Petition Opinion was issued and more than three years after the mandate was issued by the Second Circuit ...