The opinion of the court was delivered by: Dora L. Irizarry, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Imad John Bakoss, M.D. ("Bakoss") initiated this action in state court against Defendant Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London Issuing Certificate No. 0510135 ("Underwriters") seeking $550,000 in disability benefits pursuant to the terms of the above-named policy. Defendant removed the instant action to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "Convention"), and Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (the "FAA"). (Docket Entry 1, Notice of Removal ¶ 7.). Defendants now move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, or, in the alternative, for an Order compelling Plaintiff to submit to arbitration pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and moves to remand this case to state court, arguing that this court lacks jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment and denies Plaintiff's motion in its entirety.
Bakoss is a licensed medical doctor specializing in pulmonary and internal medicine who claims to have retired from the practice of medicine due to permanent coronary artery disease.
(Notice of Removal ¶ 2; Bakoss Aff. ¶ 2.) Underwriters is comprised of numerous individuals and/or corporations or other juridical entities, at least one of which is a citizen or subject of a nation other than the United States, that are the underwriters and issuers of the insurance policy at issue. (Notice of Removal ¶ 1; Compl. ¶ 2.)
Defendants issued Plaintiff a Certificate of Insurance ("Certificate") against permanent total disability, with effective dates of January 20, 2005 through January 20, 2008, to provide coverage for his obligation to repay a bank loan if he became disabled. (Aff. of H. Nicholas Goodman ("Goodman Aff.") Ex. A; Bakoss Aff.., Ex. A (both, the "Certificate"). The Certificate provided for payment of a Principal Sum Benefit to Plaintiff in the event he became "Permanently Totally Disabled," which was defined in the Certificate as follows: "Permanent Total Disability means that, in the opinion of a Competent Medical Authority [y]ou will not recover from the effects of a Sickness or Injury to the extent that [y]ou will ever be able to resume the Material and Substantial duties of Your occupation." (Certificate at 3.) The Certificate was amended by Endorsement effective January 20, 2005 as follows: "Total Disability means that as a result of sickness or injury you cannot perform in any professional capacity as a medical doctor." (Certificate at 12.)
The Certificate contains the following Notice of Claim provision:
Written notice of a claim must be given to us within twenty (20) days after the date of potential qualifying loss, or as soon after that as is reasonably possible. Notice given to the Coverholder which is sufficient to identify You will be deemed sufficient notice. (Certificate at 8.)
Plaintiff communicated his intent to claim benefits under the Certificate in either late July or August 2007. (Compare Def. Local Rule 56.1 Stmt. of Facts ("Def. 56.1 Stmt.") at ¶ 4 with Pl. Resp. to Local Rule 56.1 Stmt. of Facts ("Pl. 56.1 Resp.") at ¶ 4.) In the "Insured's Statement -- Details Outlining Proof of Loss for Disability Insurance" ("Insured's Statement"), dated August 9, 2007, Plaintiff claimed October 7, 2006, as "Date First Noticed Sickness" and October 9, 2006 as "Date First Consulted Physician," as well as the date upon which he became permanently totally disabled and his last day of work. (Goodman Aff. Ex. B).
On or about August 20, 2007, Defendants received an Attending Physician's Statement dated July 10, 2007, signed by Dr. John Sayad ("Sayad") stating that Plaintiff suffered from "severe chest pain angina pectoris multiple acute myocardial infarctions" that began on October 9, 2006 and that Plaintiff was permanently totally disabled as of that date. (Goodman Aff. at ¶ 12, Ex. C.) In an accompanying letter, Sayad confirmed Plaintiff's "total permanent disability" as of October 9, 2006, opining that "the permanency of his condition is spelled out by the recurrent nature of his symptoms and the fact that his anaphylactic fish allergy does not allow for any contrast angiography, which is necessary for any interventional cardiac therapies." (Id.)
In a response to Plaintiff, dated August 30, 2007, Defendants cited the Certificate's "Notice of Claim" provision and requested an explanation for Plaintiff's delay in reporting the claim. (Goodman Aff. Ex. D.) Several subsequent letters, dated September 18, 2007, October 19, 2007, November 21, 2007, December 21, 2007, and February 15, 2008, reiterated Defendants' request for an explanation for Plaintiff's delay in reporting the claim. (Goodman Aff. Ex. E.)
On March 14, 2008, Defendants wrote to advise Plaintiff of their position. (See Goodman Aff. Ex. F.) Citing to relevant policy language, the letter explained that, because it was unclear to Defendants whether Plaintiff fell within the policy definition of permanently totally disabled, Plaintiff was requested to submit to examinations by an allergist and a cardiologist. (Id. at 7.) Citing to the Notice of Claim provision, the letter further stated that Defendants "continue to reserve their right to deny coverage for failing to give immediate advice to [Defendants] of the potential loss . . . " (Id. at 8.)
By letter dated April 2, 2008, counsel for Plaintiff addressed the notice of claim issue. (Goodman Aff. Ex. G.) Citing to the Elimination Period provision in the Certificate,*fn1 counsel maintained that, since the first day of the elimination period was October 9, 2006, Plaintiff's potential qualifying loss did not occur until October 2007, and thus Plaintiff's claim was timely filed. (Id.)
Plaintiff subsequently underwent two independent medical examinations arranged by Defendants. On July 2, 2008, Bernard A. Feigenbaum, M.D. ("Feigenbaum"), an allergist, examined Plaintiff to address his fear of a serious allergic reaction to the radiocontrast media ("RCM") used in cardiac intervention studies. (See Goodman Aff. Ex. J.) Feigenbaum reported that while Plaintiff has a history suggestive of a possible food allergy to shellfish or fish, he has not undergone any testing to confirm such results. (Id. at 4.) Feigenbaum explained that, in the past, it was believed that a food allergy to fish or shellfish significantly increased the risk of an adverse reaction to RCM, due to iodine content, but the allergy literature no longer supports this conclusion. (Id. at 5-6.) Feigenbaum further opined that, if one had further concerns about the "mildly increased risk" of adverse reactions to RCM in "allergic individuals" and wanted to decrease the risk of an adverse reaction, possible prophylactic treatment options exist. (Id. at 6.) Feigenbaum concluded: "Because of all the issues that relate to Allergy, consultation with a treating allergist, preferably one who specializes in RCM allergy, would be suggested." (Id.)
On September 25, 2008, Jeffrey Rade, M.D. ("Rade"), an Interventional Cardiologist, examined Plaintiff. (Goodman Aff. Ex. K.) Rade opined that, while Plaintiff likely has some degree of coronary artery disease, "[h]ow extensive that disease is, how likely it is to account for the severity of his symptoms and what the best treatment and/or revascularization options might be are unclear given his refusal to undergo coronary angiography out of a fear of experiencing a reaction to radiocontrast dye." (Id. at 7.) Rade concluded: "While Plaintiff appears to have some element of disability due to recurrent chest pain, at present I do not believe that he can truly be considered completely and totally unable to perform in any professional capacity as a physician." (Id. at 9.) Rade based his opinion on Plaintiff's continued treatment of patients in his office after the date the disability is alleged to have begun and continuing through the date of Rade's examination, as well the objective findings of the stress echocardiogram, which indicate that Plaintiff "likely has the physical capacity to reasonably function as a physician without objective evidence of inducible ischemia." (Id. at 10.)
A letter dated February 10, 2009 advised Plaintiff that his claim was not covered by the policy, or was excluded from coverage. (Goodman Aff. Ex. I.) More specifically, the letter advised that Defendants did not agree to coverage because Plaintiff had not satisfied the definition of Permanently Totally Disabled, "since without proper cardiac catheterization, it would be impossible to confirm the full extent of [his] alleged condition, if any, and whether it [was] permanent in nature." (Id. at 10.) Defendants maintained that Plaintiff's alleged condition, if any, can be corrected with proper medical treatment should he submit to cardiac catheterization. (Id. at 10-11.) Furthermore, the Certificate requires that, as a result of Total Disability, the insured cannot perform in any professional capacity as a medical doctor, and Plaintiff admittedly continued to work as a medical doctor up until sometime after the expiration of the policy in 2008. (Id. at 11.) Finally, ...