MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER
Plaintiffs commenced this action in the Supreme Court of New York in Albany County on March 21, 2008. Dkt. No. 1-2. On February 17, 2009, Plaintiffs then served a Complaint on Defendants, asserting claims of professional malpractice, fraudulent misrepresentation, aiding and abetting fraud, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy in violation of the Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act under section 1962(d) of that Act on February 17, 2009. Dkt. No. 1-5 ("Complaint"). Defendants then removed the action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York on March 6, 2009. Dkt. No. 1.
On May 12, 2010, the Court issued a Memorandum-Decision and Order (Dkt. No. 18) ("May 2010 Order"), granting, in part, Defendants' Motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint. See Dkt. No. 5. To the extent that Plaintiffs' negligence claim was predicated on Defendants' conduct prior to March 21, 2005, the Court found that the claim was time-barred, and dismissed it with prejudice. See May 2010 Order. The Court dismissed Plaintiffs' negligence claim without prejudice to the extent it was predicated on Defendants' conduct after March 21, 2005, and granted Plaintiffs file an amended complaint. Id. The Court also dismissed Plaintiffs' remaining claims. Id.
Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for leave to appeal, seeking either (1) entry of a final judgment with respect to the time-barred negligence claims, or (2) certification of an interlocutory appeal challenging dismissal of those claims. See Dkt. No. 20. The Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion in a Memorandum-Decision and Order issued January 4, 2011. Dkt. No. 23 ("January 2011 Order"). On January 14, 2011, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint with the Court. Dkt. No. 24 ("Amended Complaint").
Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety. Dkt. No. 25 ("Motion"). Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to this Motion on February 15, 2011, and Defendants filed a Reply on February 22, 2011. Dkts. No. 26 ("Plaintiffs' Opposition"); 27 ("Defendants' Reply"). For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion is denied.
The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the facts underlying this action. For a more complete statement of the facts, reference is made to the May 2010 Order, the January 2011 Order, and the Amended Complaint.
Plaintiffs Richard J. Abramo, Robert V. Brown, and John A. Tomassetti (collectively, "Plaintiffs") are former owners of Tougher Industries, Inc. ("Tougher"), a closely held New York corporation that operated as a general contractor. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-12, 15. Along with non-party Steven Shaw ("Shaw"), the Plaintiffs obtained all capital stock in Tougher on or around September 22, 2003. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiffs' ownership interest in the company continued until December 31, 2005, at which time Plaintiffs sold all of their shares to Shaw. Id. ¶ 18. In the intervening period, Plaintiffs held positions on the Tougher board of directors, and Shaw served as the company's president. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. According to Plaintiffs, Shaw employed Defendant Teal, Becker, and Chiaramonte, CPA's, P.C. ("TBC") to provide various accounting-related services to Tougher between September 2003 and December 2005. Id. ¶¶ 21-23. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant James W. Drislane, C.P.A. ("Drislane") was the principal accountant providing these services. Id. ¶ 23.
On April 7, 2004, Plaintiffs entered into an indemnity agreement with Zurich American Insurance Company and its subsidiary/affiliate Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland ("the Surety"), which obligated Plaintiffs, in their individual capacity, to indemnify the Surety from any liability for losses incurred with respect to bonds issued in connection with Tougher projects. Id. Pursuant to an audit of Tougher's finances for the 2004 calendar year, Defendants allegedly provided Plaintiffs with a preliminary consolidated balance sheet and statement of income and earnings for the year on or about April 7, 2005, which stated net income of $143,694 and accounts receivable of approximately $13,000,000. Id. ¶¶ 49-54. Next, Defendants are alleged to have provided Tougher and Plaintiffs with a preliminary 2004 report on April 20, 2005, which listed a net loss of $95,538 and a similarly high level of accounts receivable. Id. ¶¶ 55-58. Acting in reasonable reliance on the reports and Defendants' subsequent assurances of the accuracy of such reports, Plaintiffs allege that they allowed the Surety to issue additional bonds in connection with new construction jobs taken on by Tougher in May and June of 2005 ("May and June 2005 Bonds"). Id. ¶¶ 61-63.
On July 25, 2005, Defendants allegedly issued the final report of their audit of Tougher as of December 21, 2004, reporting substantially similar high levels of accounts receivable of approximately $13,000,000 and net income of $142,462. Id. ¶¶ 66-67. The Complaint further alleges that, on or around September 27, 2005, Defendants reported on Tougher's balance sheet as of June 30, 2005, and stated accounts receivable as now being approximately $8.9 million and net income as $148,337. Id. ¶¶ 72-73. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiffs would reasonably rely on each of Defendants' reports and assurances, and that Plaintiffs did in fact reasonably rely on the same. Id. ¶¶ 54, 59, 62-65, 69-71, 74-76.
Plaintiffs allege that, in October 2005, their personal accountant reviewed Tougher's financial records and determined that Tougher's accounts receivable were "grossly overstated, in that nearly $2.9 million of accounts receivable was over 120 days old, $1.6 million was invoiced in 2004 or earlier, and nearly $500,000 had been invoiced in 2003 or earlier." Id. ¶¶ 77-78. Plaintiffs also allege that their personal accountant found that, due to a lack of certain documentation, recognized revenue figures reported by Defendants were overstated by at least $1.4 million. Id. ¶ 80.
After Plaintiffs sold their interest in Tougher to Shaw, Tougher began to default on its obligations under the bond contracts, which resulted in claims being filed against the bonds issued by the Surety. Id. ¶ 88. The Surety has demanded indemnification from Plaintiffs' for losses in excess of $1 million resulting from claims against the May and June 2005 Bonds. Id. ¶ 92. Plaintiffs allege that, had they been apprised by Defendants of the true financial condition of Tougher, they would not have authorized the May and June 2005 Bonds and would have "taken opportunities to avoid further personal exposure and/or to limit existing personal liability to the Surety." Id. ¶¶ 94-95.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must "accept all [factual] allegations in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to" the non-moving party. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007). "Documents that are attached to the complaint or incorporated in it by reference are deemed part of the pleading and may be considered." Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility standard "is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility exists "when the pleaded factual content allows ...