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United States of America v. Frances Y. Ruiz

October 7, 2011

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF,
v.
FRANCES Y. RUIZ, DEFENDANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Spatt, District Judge.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

On October 5, 2010, the United States of America ("the Plaintiff" or "the United States") commenced this action against Frances Y. Ruiz, ("the Defendant" or "Ms. Ruiz") seeking to recover the outstanding debt allegedly owed to the U.S. Department of Education on the Defendant's student loan, including pre-judgment and post-judgment interest and administrative costs. Presently before the Court is the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Ms. Ruiz made an application for and received a Direct Consolidated loan from the U.S. Department of Education for a total principal amount of $74,187.82 ("the Loan"). On June 20, 1999, in exchange for consolidating the Loan with her then-husband's loans, Ms. Ruiz and her then-husband executed and delivered a promissory note to the U.S. Department of Education in the principal amount of $74,786.84 ("the Note"). Pursuant to the terms of the Note, Ms. Ruiz was "jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the debt". (Pl.'s Ex. 1.) On June 24, 1999, the amount of the loan was disbursed in two installments at 7.75% interest per annum. After Ms. Ruiz failed to pay the Loan, the U.S. Department of Education purchased the Note from the lender as required by law and became the assignee thereof. On August 25, 2009, Ms. Ruiz defaulted on the loan obligation. This resulted in the unpaid interest of $29,283.13 being capitalized and added to the principal balance.

On July 21, 2011, U.S. Department of Education Loan Analyst Alberto Y. Francisco signed, under penalty of perjury, a Certificate of Indebtedness reflecting that, as of July 21, 2011, Ms. Ruiz owed: (1) $103,414.38 in unpaid principal; (2) $32,364.87 in unpaid interest; and (3) additional interest, at a rate of $21.94 per day. (Pl.'s Ex. 2.)

On October 5, 2010, the United States commenced this instant action against Ms. Ruiz to recover the debt owed to the U.S. Department of Education. On October 18, 2010, Ms. Ruiz, acting pro se, served an answer on the United States ("the Answer"). However, Ms. Ruiz did not file the Answer with the Court. Consequently, on July 18, 2011, the Court sent a notice directing the United States to inform the Court within ten days why an order should not be entered dismissing the action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

In response, on July 25, 2011, the United States filed Ms. Ruiz's answer with the Court, and also filed the instant motion for summary judgment. In addition, pursuant to Local Rule 56.2, the United States served on Ms. Ruiz a Notice to Pro Se Litigant Who Opposed Summary Judgment, which "alert[s] pro se litigants to the potentially serious consequences of a motion for summary judgment, and to the requirements for opposing such a motion". Local Rule 56.2, comm. note. Ms. Ruiz did not oppose the motion for summary judgment or file a statement of disputed material facts pursuant to Local Rule 56(b). Thus, under Local Rule 56.1(c), the Court deems the facts set forth in the Plaintiff's Local Rule 56.1 Statement to be admitted.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court may not grant a motion for summary judgment unless "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);Globecon Group, LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 434 F.3d 165, 170 (2d Cir. 2006).In determining whether an issue is genuine, "[t]he inferences to be drawn from the underlying affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and depositions must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S. Ct. 993, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1962) (per curiam), and Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 465 (2d Cir. 1989)).

If the moving party meets its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a disputed issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present "specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The nonmoving party may not then rely solely on "conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation" in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998). If the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is "merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477, U.S. 242, 249--50, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986) (internal citations omitted).

In an action on a promissory note, summary judgment is appropriate if there is "'no material question concerning execution and default' of the note." Merrill Lynch Commercial Fin. Corp. v. All State Envelopes Ltd., No. 09-CV-0785, 2010 WL 1177451, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.

Mar. 24, 2010) (quoting Royal Bank of Canada v. Mahrle, 818 F. Supp. 60, ...


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