Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Michael A. Telesca, Judge).
Lawson v. Rochester City School District
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court's Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation "summary order"). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel 2 Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 28th day of October, two thousand eleven.
JOSE A. CABRANES,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Byron Lawson ("Lawson") appeals from the
October 22, 2010 judgment of
the District Court granting summary judgment to
defendants-appellees, Rochester City School District
(the "School District") and Superintendent William C. Cala, and
dismissing Lawson's civil rights, race
discrimination, and "stigma-plus" claims brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.
We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the
procedural history of the case,
and the issues on appeal. Briefly, Lawson was employed as a
paraprofessional at John Williams School
No. 5 ("School No. 5") until he was suspended and fired following
a December 20, 2000 incident in
which another school employee reported finding Lawson with a
10-year-old male student in a bathroom
located in the school basement. After a Monroe County grand jury
dismissed the sexual abuse charges
against Lawson on July 13, 2001, the School District continued its
internal investigation and fired
Lawson effective February 14, 2003. Lawson eventually won
reinstatement and back pay through union
arbitration, and that result was affirmed in an Article 75
proceeding in the New York state courts.
Lawson commenced this action on November 7, 2007. The District
Court granted summary judgment
in favor of defendants on October 22, 2010, holding that Lawson's
claims were barred by the applicable
statutes of limitations and that Lawson had failed to raise a
material issue of fact with respect to his
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, drawing all factual inferences in favor 32 of the non-moving party. See, e.g., Paneccasio v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 532 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2008).
33 "Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 34 non-movant, 'there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 35 as a matter of law.'" Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 344 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). 36 37 38 39
3 The primary issue on appeal is whether the District Court properly dismissed Lawson's civil 4 rights and race discrimination claims as untimely. The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising 5 in New York is three years, see Cloverleaf Realty v. Town of Wawayanda, 572 F.3d 93, 94 (2d Cir. 2009); the 6 statute of limitations for a § 1981 claim is four years, see Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 7 382 (2004). It is undisputed that Lawson's ...