The opinion of the court was delivered by: Paul A. Engelmayer, District Judge:
Plaintiff Pedro Juan Tavares, proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 against the City of New York, Warden Emanuel Bailey, Deputy Warden Vanessa Singleton, Captain Drain, Captain Glover, Correction Office Pennant, and Correction Officer Jean (collectively, the "City Defendants"). In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that each of these defendants violated several of his constitutional rights while he was detained at the George Motchan Detention Center (GMDC) on Riker's Island. Judge Jed
S. Rakoff, to whom this case was originally assigned, referred the action to Magistrate Judge James C. Francis for general pretrial proceedings. The City Defendants and Tavares have cross-moved for summary judgment. On October 17, 2011, Judge Francis issued his Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), recommending that the Court deny Plaintiff's motion and grant the City Defendants' motion. Plaintiff has filed objections to Judge Francis's Report and Recommendation.
The Court refers the reader to the Report and Recommendation for the background of the case, the facts, and the applicable law. In view of Plaintiff's objections, the Court sets forth the following brief analysis.
In reviewing a Report and Recommendation, a district court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). When specific objections are made, "[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also Rivera v. Barnhart, 423 F. Supp. 2d 271, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). It is not required, however, that the Court conducts a de novo hearing on the entire matter. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980). Rather, it is sufficient that the Court "arrive at its own, independent conclusion" regarding those portions to which objections were made. Nelson
v. Smith, 618 F. Supp. 1186, 1189-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoting Hernandez v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 619, 620 (5th Cir. 1983)). To accept those portions of the report to which no timely objection has been made, "a district court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record." King v. Greiner, No. 02-CV-5810, 2009 WL 2001439, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2009) (citation omitted); see also Wilds v. United Parcel Serv., 262 F. Supp. 2d 163, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Thus, as to Plaintiff's objections relating to the City Defendants' motion for summary judgment, de novo review requires application of the summary judgment legal standard.
II.Summary Judgment Standard
It is well-settled that a party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2002). Since summary judgment is an extreme remedy, cutting off the rights of the non-moving party to present a case to the jury, see Egelston v. State Univ. Coll. at Geneseo, 535 F.2d 752, 754 (2d Cir. 1976), the Court should not grant summary judgment unless "it is quite clear what the truth is [and] that no genuine issue remains for trial." Auletta v. Tully, 576 F. Supp. 191, 195 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), aff'd, 732 F.2d 142 (2d. Cir. 1984). In addition, "'the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also Richardson v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 436 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that "[w]hen considering a motion for summary judgment the court must draw all factual inferences and resolve all ambiguities in favor of the nonmoving party").
Once the moving party discharges its burden of proof under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment "has the burden of coming forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 782 F. Supp. 854, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Rule 56(e) "provides that a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 256. Indeed, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties" alone will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247 (emphasis in original). Rather, enough evidence must favor the non-moving party's case such that a jury could return a verdict in its favor. Id. at 248.
A.New Evidence Offered in the ...