The opinion of the court was delivered by: Gary L. Sharpe District Court Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Veline Hicks commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging defendants*fn1 violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (See Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 18.) Pending is defendants' motion for summary judgment. (See Dkt. No. 25.) For the reasons that follow, defendants' motion is granted.
On January 14, 2006, Hicks, an inmate at Upstate, was assaulted by his cell mate, Darnell Cummings. (Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ("SMF") ¶ 49, Dkt. No. 25, Attach. 1.) Though Hicks "preferred having a cell mate," the same cannot be said for Cummings. (Id. ¶ 68.)
Prior to being double-celled with Hicks on December 6, 2005, Cummings filed multiple grievances expressing his desire to remain in a cell by himself. (See id. ¶¶ 21-27; Am. Compl. ¶ 12, Dkt. No. 18.) In sum, Cummings, who has a history of mental illness, threatened to harm himself and/or his cell mate if he was double-celled. (See generally Defs.' SMF ¶¶ 15-54.) These threats, which were not specifically directed at Hicks, were investigated and, on at least two occasions, referred to the Office of Mental Health ("OMH"). (See id. ¶¶ 30-31, 54.) While Cummings's cell status was not altered after his November 18, 2005 psychiatric consult-a consult Superintendent Woods requested after speaking with Cummings on his rounds-OMH recommended that Cummings be single celled on December 28, 2005 pending further evaluation. (See id. ¶¶ 27-28, 30-31.) The requisite evaluation was conducted on January 6, 2006, and thereafter OMH informed Upstate's staff that there "was no psychiatric reason to single cell Cummings" and that his threats were just attempts to manipulate the system. (Id. ¶¶ 31-33, 38, 50.)
Notwithstanding OMH's findings, Cummings filed another grievance on January 8, 2006. (Id. ¶ 34.) In accordance with institutional practice, the grievance was forwarded to Deputy Superintendent of Security and Safety Darwin LaClair, who in turn referred it to OMH for review. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 34-35.) OMH received the letter on January 10, 2006, and that same day responded with a detailed account of Cummings's history with OMH from October to December 2005. (Id. ¶¶ 35, 37.) Based on OMH's determination, Cummings was returned to his cell with Hicks four days before the assault. (Id. ¶¶ 39, 41.)
Following the attack on January 14, 2006, Hicks filed his first grievance for damages in February 2006. (See Dkt. No. 25, Attach. 7 at 6.)
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Hicks commenced the instant action for compensatory and punitive damages. (See generally id.; Am. Compl., Prayer for Relief, Dkt. No. 18.)
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2008). When evaluating the material facts, the court "construes all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all inferences and resolving all ambiguities in [its] favor." Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522, 529 (2d Cir. 2010). Thus, the movant must demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999), a burden it can meet "if [it] can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim," Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995).
If the movant satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party must offer specific evidence showing that a genuine issue of material fact warrants a trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. "A 'genuine' dispute over a material fact only arises if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Dister v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1114 (2d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Moreover, material disputes must be based on specific facts as reflected in the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise authorized by Rule 56, see St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 404 (2d Cir. 2000), and affidavits must be based on personal knowledge, see Harriscom Svenska, AB v. Harris Corp., 3 F.3d 576, 581 (2d Cir. 1993). The bald assertion of some alleged factual dispute will not defeat a properly supported motion. See Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). "Conclusory allegations, conjecture, and speculation . . . are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact." Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1998). Naturally, reasonable inferences may defeat a summary judgment motion, but only when they are supported by affirmative facts and relevant, admissible evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); Spinelli v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 160, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2009). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Defendants aver they are entitled to summary judgment because, inter alia, Hicks's Eighth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law. (See Dkt. No. 25, Attach. 10 at 2-5.) While Hicks did not contest defendants' Statement of Material of Facts or accompanying affidavits, he does oppose defendants' assertion regarding the sufficiency of his failure to protect claim. (See ...