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Michele Bergeron v. Michael Astrue

December 14, 2011

MICHELE BERGERON, PLAINTIFF,
v.
MICHAEL ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, DEFENDANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Michele Bergeron brings the above-captioned action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1381 of the Social Security Act, seeking a review of the Commissioner of Social Security's decision to deny her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental social security income ("SSI").

BACKGROUND

On August 31, 2006, plaintiff filed an application for DIB. (T. 102).*fn1 On September 7, 2006, plaintiff filed an application for SSI. (T. 108). Plaintiff was 45 years old at the time of the applications with past work experience as a corrections officer (18 years) and a day care provider.

(T. 23, 31, 128, 135). From 1978 to 1993, plaintiff was in the Army/Army Reserve and was stationed for four years in Germany. (T. 192-209). Plaintiff's period of alleged disability began on August 24, 2006 and ended on August 27, 2007, when she began working at the Salvation Army Homeless Shelter. During that year, plaintiff claims that she was disabled due to AIDS, depression, anxiety, carpal tunnel syndrome, and arm/shoulder/hand and leg/hip/knee impairments.

On February 7, 2007, plaintiff's applications were denied and plaintiff requested a hearing by an ALJ which was held on October 1, 2008. (T. 17, 52-57). On November 26, 2008, the ALJ issued a decision denying plaintiff's claim for disability benefits. (T. 8-16). The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on September 2, 2009, making the ALJ's decision the final determination of the Commissioner. (T. 1-4). This action followed.

DISCUSSION

The Social Security Act (the "Act") authorizes payment of disability insurance benefits to individuals with "disabilities." The Act defines "disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). There is a five-step analysis for evaluating disability claims:

"In essence, if the Commissioner determines (1) that the claimant is not working, (2) that he has a 'severe impairment,' (3) that the impairment is not one [listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations] that conclusively requires a determination of disability, and (4) that the claimant is not capable of continuing in his prior type of work, the Commissioner must find him disabled if (5) there is not another type of work the claimant can do." The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, while the Social Security Administration bears the burden on the last step.

Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Draegert v. Barnhart, 311 F.3d 468, 472 (2d Cir. 2002)); Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).

A Commissioner's determination that a claimant is not disabled will be set aside when the factual findings are not supported by "substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Shaw, 221 F.3d at 131. Substantial evidence has been interpreted to mean "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. The Court may also set aside the Commissioner's decision when it is based upon legal error. Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999).

On November 26, 2008, the ALJ found at step one that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 24, 2006. (T. 10). At step two, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff suffered from HIV infection which qualified as a "severe impairment" within the meaning of the Social Security Regulations (the "Regulations"). (T. 10). At the third step of the analysis, the ALJ determined that plaintiff's impairment did not meet or equal the severity of any impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the Regulations. (T. 11). The ALJ found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to, "perform the full range of sedentary work". (T. 12).

At step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff did not have the residual functional capacity to perform any of her past relevant work. (T. 15). At step five, relying on the medical-vocational guidelines ("the grids") set forth in the Regulations, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the RFC to perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (T. 15). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act. (T. 16).

In seeking federal judicial review of the Commissioner's decision, plaintiff argues that:

(1) the Commissioner erred by failing to make any findings regarding whether plaintiff's leg and arm impairments were "severe impairments"; (2) the Commissioner erred in finding that plaintiff's depression was not a "severe impairment"; (3) the ALJ committed reversible error by not assessing Listing 14.08N; (4) the ALJ erroneously failed to make any specific findings concerning plaintiff's physical and mental residual capacity; and (5) the ALJ should have elicited testimony from a vocational expert. (Dkt. No. 14).

I. ALJ's Assessment of Plaintiff's Leg and Arm Impairments at Step 2

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ misapplied the relevant law in assessing the severity of her leg and arm impairments at the second step of the sequential evaluation. The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ evaluated the evidence and reasonably found that plaintiff did not have severe musculoskeletal impairments.

A "severe" impairment is one that significantly limits an individual's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. Meadors v. Astrue, 370 F. App'x 179, 182 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c)). The Regulations define "basic work activities" as the "abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs," examples of which include,

(1) Physical functions such as walking, standing, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;

(2) Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;

(3) Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions;

(4) Use of judgment;

(5) Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and

(6) Dealing with changes in a routine work setting.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b); see also Social Security Ruling 85-28, 1985 WL 56856, at *3-4, Titles II and XVI: Medical Impairments That Are Not Severe (S.S.A.1985).

Plaintiff has the burden at step two in the sequential evaluation process to demonstrate the severity of her impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (c). The severity analysis at step two may do no more than screen out de minimis claims. Dixon v. Shalala, 54 F.3d 1019, 1030 (2d Cir.1995). The "mere presence of a disease or impairment, or establishing that a person has been diagnosed or treated for a disease or impairment" is not, itself, sufficient to deem a condition severe. McConnell v. Astrue, 2008 WL 833968, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Coleman v. Shalala, 895 F.Supp. 50, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). A condition that improves and is repairable may not be considered a disability for purposes of disability benefits. See Pennay v. Astrue, 2008 WL 4069114, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. 2008).

A. Medical Evidence

Right Shoulder In September 1997, plaintiff was evaluated at the Work Assessment and Conditioning Center of Eastern New York by Michele McTague, P.T. for right shoulder pain. (T. 217). Ms. McTague noted that plaintiff injured her right shoulder in August 1995 and re-injured her shoulder in February and October 1996. Ms. McTague recommended that plaintiff receive physical therapy three times a week. On October 7, 1997, plaintiff was discharged from physical therapy after completing five sessions. Plaintiff was unable to continue due to personal problems.

(T. 215-233).

On November 6, 1998, plaintiff was treated by Dr. Richard J. D'Ascoli at Regional Orthopedics.*fn2 Dr. D'Ascoli noted that plaintiff's "shoulder is doing reasonably well" and that, "the only thing she is unable to do is to pass her military physical just yet because she has to be able to do 25 pushups, and she can only do approximately 15 or so because of discomfort here".

(T. 244). Plaintiff complained of pain after using the extremity for excessive periods of time, but "generally feels fairly good with it". Upon examination, plaintiff exhibited good range of motion with a bit of weakness but no muscle spasm.

On July 22, 2002, plaintiff was seen at the St. Claire's Emergency Room complaining of right shoulder pain. (T. 231). Plaintiff was diagnosed with right rotator cuff tendinitis. Plaintiff followed with Dr. D'Ascoli on July 31, 2002. The doctor noted that plaintiff had been out of work since the 22nd and prescribed physical therapy. (T. 240). On August 5, 2002, plaintiff was evaluated at John Mack Physical Therapy. (T. 245-249). On September 30, 2002, plaintiff had a follow up visit for her right shoulder with Dr. D'Ascoli. (T. 240). Plaintiff had continued pain due to irritants at work. The doctor advised that if her pain did not resolve that she would need to consider injections and/or an MRI. On October 17, 2002, plaintiff was discharged from physical therapy after nine inconsistent visits due to lack of follow up.

On May 1, 2003, plaintiff was treated at the Ellis Hospital Emergency room complaining of right shoulder pain after an altercation at work. (T. 233). She also complained of numbness and tingling in her right hand. X-rays were negative. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a right shoulder strain and prescribed Vicodin. On May 7, 2003, plaintiff had a follow up visit at Regional Orthopedics. During the examination, the doctor, Dr. G. Robert Cooley, noted that plaintiff had "near full range of motion" and no swelling. Dr. D'Ascoli diagnosed plaintiff with a right shoulder strain and advised her to return to work on May 12, 2003. (T. 239).

On September 14, 2006, plaintiff presented at the VA Medical Center in Albany with "a new complaint of right shoulder pain".*fn3 (T. 254). Nurse Shaw noted that plaintiff's pain was only noticeable when she moved her arm in the forward position and there was no swelling present. Plaintiff was prescribed Ibuprofen and advised to apply heat.

Right Knee

On November 15, 1999, plaintiff was treated at the emergency room at St. Claire's Hospital for complaints of knee pain after "missing a step" and "twisting her knee" . The x-rays were negative and plaintiff was treated with ice, Motrin, a soft bandage and crutches. On November 16, 1999, plaintiff returned to Regional Orthopedics for complaints of knee pain. Plaintiff was treated by Glenn Jones, RPA. (T. 244). Upon examination, RPA Jones noted tenderness and swelling. Plaintiff was advised to continue her course of treatment and return if the pain continued. (T. 244). On November 23, 1999, plaintiff returned with continued complaints of right knee pain. Upon examination, RPA Jones noted effusion and that plaintiff was unable to weight bear even with crutches. (T. 243). An MRI scan was ordered.

On December 7, 1999, plaintiff had an MRI of her right knee at St. Claire's Hospital. On December 14, 1999, Dr. D'Ascoli examined plaintiff and reviewed the films and found a "bucket handle medial meniscus tear". Since plaintiff was still symptomatic, she elected to proceed with arthroscopic surgery. (T. 243). On January 6, 2000, plaintiff underwent surgery at St. Claire's.

(T. 227). Her post-operative diagnosis was a right medial meniscus tear. Plaintiff's follow up visits were normal and her range of motion was noted as "good".

Right Wrist

On March 14, 2002, plaintiff returned to Regional Orthopedics complaining of right wrist pain. (T. 242). RPA Jones noted that plaintiff "has had carpal tunnel for some time" without treatment. Upon examination, plaintiff exhibited good range of motion without pain. X-rays were negative and Dr. D'Ascoli ordered EMG nerve conduction studies. On May 7, 2002, plaintiff returned for a follow-up visit. At that time, Dr. D'Ascoli noted that the EMG scans were negative but suggested that plaintiff consider injections. Plaintiff opted to exercise. (T. 240).

On December 3, 2002, plaintiff returned to Dr. D'Ascoli complaining of right wrist pain. The doctor noted that plaintiff could have a ganglion cyst but ...


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