The opinion of the court was delivered by: John Gleeson, United States District Judge:
Chintamani Rampersaud seeks damages and equitable and declaratory relief in this pro se action against Washington Mutual Bank ("Washington Mutual") and Chase Home Finance ("Chase Finance") for their alleged involvement in a predatory lending scheme. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("Chase"), as successor by merger to Chase Finance, moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for abstention. Oral argument was scheduled for December 9, 2011, but Rampersaud did not appear.*fn1
Because this Court lacks jurisdiction over Rampersaud's damages claims case pursuant to the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii), and because I deny her claims for injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, I dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
The dispute in this action arises out of two mortgage loans issued by Washington Mutual to Rampersaud. The loans, which were extended to Rampersaud on December 1, 2006, are for $437,568 and $54,641. Compl. Exs. 1-2; Tregarthen Aff. ¶ 4. Each is loan is secured by a mortgage on Rampersaud's property located at 116-17 127th Street, South Ozone Park, New York. Compl. Exs. 1-2; Tregarthen Aff. ¶ 3.
On September 25, 2008, almost two years after the loans and mortgages were executed, the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") seized Washington Mutual and placed it in receivership with the Federal Deposit Insurance Company ("FDIC" or the "Corporation"). Tregarthen Aff. ¶ 15. The same day, the FDIC entered into a Purchase and Assumption Agreement with Chase through which Chase acquired all of Washington Mutual's loans and loan commitments, including those pertaining to Rampersaud. Tregarthen Aff. ¶ 15; Mot. to Dismiss Ex. J.Rampersaud subsequently defaulted on her loans, and Chase initiated foreclosure proceedings, which are currently pending in New York state court. See Tregarthen Aff. ¶ 4; Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A.
Construing the complaint broadly and interpreting it to raise the strongest arguments it suggests, as I must in a pro se action, Sharpe v. Conole, 386 F.3d 482, 484 (2d Cir. 2004), Rampersaud sets forth two sets of claims. The first stems from her allegation that the defendants participated in a fraudulent scheme to induce her to execute loans and accompanying mortgages that she could not afford. As a result, Rampersaud ultimately defaulted on her loans and Chase initiated foreclosure proceedings. She appears to allege fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and unjust enrichment. Pursuant to these claims, Rampersaud seeks damages, a stay of the state foreclosure proceedings, and unspecified declaratory relief.
The second set of claims brought by Rampersaud relates to her allegations that the state court foreclosure proceedings are defective. She alleges that Chase did not properly serve her with process, that Chase lacks standing to bring the foreclosure action, and that the state court lacks personal jurisdiction over her and subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Rampersaud seeks a stay of the state court proceedings and unspecified declaratory relief on this basis as well.
Two kinds of challenges can be made on a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: facial challenges and factual challenges. Robinson v. Gov't of Malaysia, 269 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2001). The manner in which a district court resolves the motion depends on which type of challenge has been made. If a defendant makes a facial challenge -- that is, if he objects to the legal sufficiency of plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations as set forth in the complaint -- "the court must take all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff" and decide the motion based on those facts.
Id. (quoting Sweet v. Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, if the defendant makes a factual challenge -- that is, if he disputes the accuracy of the facts alleged in the complaint or otherwise suggests that the district court in fact lacks subject matter jurisdiction -- the court may consider evidence relevant to the jurisdictional question in deciding the motion. See id.
In this case, Chase appears to make both a facial and a factual challenge. I address its factual challenge and thus consider the evidence presented by the parties, including the complaint, the parties' filings and the exhibits ...