The opinion of the court was delivered by: John G. Koeltl, District Judge:
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Basheen Rush, who is currently incarcerated at Sing Sing Correctional Facility ("Sing Sing"), brings this motion for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a). The plaintiff seeks an injunction enjoining the defendants from denying him an effective course of medical treatment for the chronic wrist and back pain he suffers and ordering the defendants to reinstate his prior medication regimen, which included the prescription of Percocet.
The plaintiff, Basheen Rush, is currently incarcerated at Sing Sing. The plaintiff suffers from extreme and chronic pain in his back and wrist. (Aff. of Basheen Rush in Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. ("Rush Aff.") ¶¶ 2-3.)
The plaintiff arrived at Sing Sing on October 6, 2011, after being transferred from Coxsackie Correctional Facility ("Coxsackie"). (Rush Aff. ¶ 1; Decl. of Razia Ferdous, M.D. in Opp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. ("Ferdous Decl.") ¶ 7.) At Coxsackie, the plaintiff had been prescribed Percocet to manage his pain and was taking 5/325 mg twice a day, with instructions that the medication be administered in liquefied form and consumed by the plaintiff in front of medical staff. (Ferdous Decl. ¶ 6.) Upon his transfer to Sing Sing, the plaintiff was initially continued on Percocet. (Ferdous Decl. ¶ 7.) However, on October 11, 2011, the plaintiff had a follow-up appointment with a medical provider, who explained that the plaintiff would be weaned off Percocet over a two-week period. (Ferdous Decl. ¶ 8.) On October 27, 2011, the plaintiff was discontinued from Percocet. (Ferdous Decl. ¶ 9.)
The defendants submit a declaration from Dr. Razia Ferdous who states that, to replace Percocet, the plaintiff was given Baclofen twice a day in combination with Ibuprofen. (Ferdous Decl. ¶ 8.) Dr. Ferdous states that Baclofen is a non-narcotic pain medication used to treat back pain and muscle strain which is effective in managing pain when used in combination with Ibuprofen. (Ferdous Decl. ¶ 8.) The plaintiff contends that he is no longer receiving the Baclofen and Ibuprofen and that he is currently not being provided with any pain medication. (Letter of Basheen Rush dated Nov. 23, 2011.)
The plaintiff brings this motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from denying him an effective course of medical treatment to manage his pain. In particular, the plaintiff seeks to have his prior course of treatment, in which he was prescribed Percocet, reinstated.
The standards that govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction are well established. Ordinarily, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must show: "(1) a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction; and (2) either a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation, with a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the movant's favor." Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 2008). However, "[w]here a moving party challenges governmental action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme," as does the plaintiff here, "the moving party cannot resort to the 'fair ground for litigation' standard, but is required to demonstrate irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits." Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Moreover, where the plaintiff seeks a mandatory injunction -- one that "alter[s] the status quo by commanding some positive act" -- an even higher standard applies. Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm't, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1995). Namely, the plaintiff must make a "clear" or "substantial" showing of likelihood of success on the merits or show that "extreme or very serious damage" would result in the absence of preliminary relief. Jolly, 76 F.3d at 473; Tom Doherty, 60 F.3d at 33-34; Cherry River Music Co. v. Simitar Entm't Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 310, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). In this case, the relief sought by the plaintiff is properly characterized as a mandatory rather than a prohibitory injunction. The plaintiff seeks an injunction that would alter the status quo by departing from his current course of treatment and ordering the reinstatement of his prior medication regimen which included the prescription of Percocet. See Jolly, 76 F.3d at 474 (injunction sought by prisoner was properly characterized as mandatory injunction where relief requested would have required shift in established Department of Correctional Services policy). Accordingly, the plaintiff must meet this more stringent standard.
Because the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his submissions must be "read liberally and should be interpreted 'to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
The plaintiff claims that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by providing him with inadequate medical treatment. "The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment imposes a duty upon prison officials to ensure that inmates receive adequate medical care." Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 2006). "In order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim arising out of inadequate medical care, a prisoner must prove 'deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs.'" Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). In order to prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a prisoner must satisfy a two-part test: first, the "objective" prong requires that the deprivation be "sufficiently serious"; and second, the "subjective" prong requires that the charged official act with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." See, e.g., Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 279-80; Johnson v. Wright, 412 F.3d 398, 403 (2d Cir. 2005); Chance, 143 F.3d at 702. With respect to this second prong, the prisoner must show more than mere negligence in diagnosis or treatment. See Estelle, 429 ...