The opinion of the court was delivered by: John Gleeson, United States District Judge:
On September 6, 2011, and September 7, 2011, plaintiff Ricardo Brooks Gamez filed these five pro se actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In each action, Gamez has moved for leave to proceed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The Court grants Gamez's requests to proceed in forma pauperis, and consolidates these actions solely for the purpose of this Order.*fn1
For the reasons discussed below, Gamez's complaints are dismissed.
Including the actions consolidated for purposes of this Order, Gamez has now commenced at least 38 actions in this Court, many of which have been dismissed as frivolous or duplicative.*fn2 Recently, Gamez was ordered to show cause why he should not be enjoined from filing any future actions in this district without the Court's permission. See Memorandum & Order To Show Cause, Gamez v. The White Satan, No. 11-CV-6128 (BMC) (LB) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2011); Memorandum & Order To Show Cause, Gamez v. State of New York, No. 11-CV-6132 (BMC) (JMA) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2011).
B. Allegations in the Present Cases
The allegations in the five cases addressed in this Order overlap with one another and with Gamez's filings in his many prior cases. In Gamez I, Gamez re-alleges claims that he previously raised in prior cases (case numbers 11-CV-1918, 11-CV-1921, 11-CV-2829 and 11-CV-2760). These claims include that he is a "victim of white supremacy genocide rogue unit, 'Secret Police'" who have given "'directives,'" Compl. 2, Gamez I, to unnamed private actors to deprive Gamez of his constitutional rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, through "stalking," see id. at 8, and attempts by various persons (with no apparent connection to the government or each other) to poison him, see, e.g., id. at 2 (claiming that plaintiff was poisoned with a "spiked" chocolate drink from a fast-food restaurant in 2004).
In Gamez II and Gamez V, Gamez once again re-alleges claims that he previously raised in a different set of cases (numbers 10-CV-5414, 11-CV-1918, 11-CV-2760 and 11-CV-3374). These duplicative claims included allegations that correction officers at Rikers retaliated against him for filing lawsuits against them, see, e.g., Compl. 2, ¶¶ II--IV, Gamez V, that smoking and drugs were rampant at Rikers, Compl. 2, ¶ II, Gamez II, that Probation Officer Brisbane was disrespectful towards plaintiff, id. ¶ IV, and that the New York City Police Department attempted to poison him, id. ¶ VI.
In both Gamez III and Gamez IV, Gamez once again re-alleges claims that he previously raised in prior cases (numbers 11-CV-2828, 11-CV-2829 and 11-CV-2760), specifically, that unnamed white supremacists conspired with government actors in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 to deprive him of his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. In addition, Gamez alleges that he is the victim of stalking and poisoning. See, e.g., Compl. 9, ¶¶ 23--24, Gamez IV. He seeks monetary damages for these alleged harms.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action where it is satisfied that the action is "(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." However, a court must construe a pro se litigant's pleadings liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010),especially when those pleadings allege civil rights violations, Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185, 191--93 (2d Cir. 2008). A pro se complaint should not be dismissed without granting the plaintiff leave to amend "at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
Although courts must read pro se complaints with "special solicitude," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and interpret them "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest," id. at 476 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), the complaint must plead enough facts to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). While "'detailed factual allegations'" are not required, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. ...