The opinion of the court was delivered by: Glasser, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Noel Reyes ("plaintiff" or "Reyes") brought this action against the City of New York ("NYC"), the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"), and two unidentified police officers ("Officer Doe 1" and "Officer Doe 2") (collectively, "defendants"), pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Before the Court is defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Defendants argue: (1) plaintiff failed to timely serve Officers Doe 1 and 2 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) and those claims are now barred by the statute of limitations; (2) NYPD is a non-suable entity; and (3) plaintiff has failed to state a claim as a matter of law. For the following reasons, defendants' motion is GRANTED.
The following facts are undisputed and drawn from the complaint and
documents of which the Court may take judicial notice.*fn1
At 1:35 p.m. on May 15, 2007, police received a report of an
armed robbery of the Grand Community Laundromat at 302 Grand Street in
Brooklyn. Declaration of Sumit Sud dated March 3, 2009 ("Sud Decl."),
Ex. C (Arrest Record & Complaint Report). Officers responded to the
scene and spoke with two witnesses: Daniel Boentoro, a Laundromat
employee, and Johnny Morales, a customer. Sud Decl. Ex C (Complaint
Report). The witnesses reported that the perpetrators brandished a
silver handgun, took the Laundromat cash box, and then fled on a
bicycle. Sud Decl. Ex. C (Arrest Record & Complaint Report).
One minute later, at approximately 1:40 p.m., police officers stopped Reyes and another Hispanic male at the intersection of Roebling Street and South 1st Street in Brooklyn, New York, approximately two blocks from the Laundromat. Compl. ¶ 15; Sud Decl., Ex. C (Arrest Record & Arrest Worksheet). Shortly thereafter, officers brought the witnesses to the scene, where they made a "show up" identification of Reyes and his companion as the men who robbed the Laundromat. Sud Decl. Ex. C (Complaint Informational Report).
Reyes was taken to the 90th Precinct station house, and charged with burglary, armed robbery, and menacing in the third degree. Compl. ¶ 18; Sud Decl. Ex C (Arrest Record). Reyes was detained for two days at the station house before being transferred to the Kings County Criminal Court, where he was arraigned. Id. Because he was unable to make bail, Reyes was then jailed at Rikers Island Correctional Facility. Id. On June 13, 2007, Reyes was indicted by the Grand Jury on charges of Robbery in the First Degree, Robbery in the Third Degree, and Petit Larceny. Sud Decl. Ex. C (Indictment).
Prior to his criminal trial, plaintiff made a motion to dismiss the indictment based on the insufficiency of the evidence presented to the Grand Jury. Id. Ex. E. On September 6, 2007, the Supreme Court, Kings County, denied the motion. Id. Prior to trial, plaintiff also challenged the lawfulness of his arrest, claiming the police lacked probable cause, moved to suppress the "show-up" witness identification as unduly suggestive and a violation of his constitutional rights, and sought to suppress evidence seized at the time of his arrest (a blue bicycle). Id. Ex. F. On November 27, 2007, this motion was denied. Id.
At Reyes's criminal trial on December 12, 2007, the Assistant District Attorney called two witnesses to the crime, including Daniel Boentoro. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 23. Both witnesses testified that Reyes did not commit the crime. Id. Reyes was acquitted by the jury and released from custody on December 12, 2007. Id. ¶¶ 24-25; Declaration of David M Harrison dated April 1, 2011, Ex. 1.
Defendants argue judgment on the pleadings is warranted because: (1) plaintiff failed to timely serve Officers Doe 1 and 2 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) and those claims are now barred by the statute of limitations; (2) NYPD is a non-suable entity; and (3) plaintiff has failed to state a claim as a matter of law. Because the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim, it is unnecessary to address defendants' other arguments.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). In deciding a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(c), the Court applies the same standard as that applicable to a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), accepting the allegations contained in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Ziemba v. Wezner, 366 F.3d 161, 163 (2d Cir. 2004); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). Judgment on the pleadings "is appropriate where material facts are undisputed and where a judgment on the merits is possible merely by considering the contents of the pleadings." Sellers v. M.C. Floor Crafters Inc., 842 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir. 1988).
"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (alteration, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not 'show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief.' "
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (second alteration in original) ...