The opinion of the court was delivered by: John Gleeson, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff David Carter Sr., currently incarcerated at the George R. Vierno Center on Rikers Island, brings these two pro se civil rights actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Carter's requests to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 are granted and the complaints are consolidated solely for the purpose of this order. For the reasons discussed below, the complaints are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The dismissal of the complaint in civil action 11-CV-5705 is with prejudice. In civil action 11-CV-5704, Carter is granted leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days of entry of this order, asserting claims that he was wrongfully deprived of food and naming the appropriate prison guards or other officials as defendants.
In Carter v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-5704 (JG) (LB) ("Carter I"), Carter challenges the conditions in which he and other detainees in the custody of the City of New York are incarcerated. First, he claims that detainees should be given private visits with family members and others. Specifically, he asserts that detainees at Rikers Island "should be guaranteed public relations with Girlfriends, Boyfreinds [sic], Wives, Husbands, Doctors, Family, etc. for a period of 72 hours at a location to be established." Compl. at 4, Carter I. Carter alleges that inmates in the custody of New York State are granted "private session[s] with loved ones," and so detainees in the custody of New York City should receive them too. Id. at 3. In addition, Carter asserts that "[a]ll inmates with children at Home be Allowed to visit their homes every weekend for 'Quality of life program.'" Id. at 4.
Second, Carter requests "that $[190.00] dollars be deposited through Data entry every two weeks without Delay into all and every [100%] Male/Female inmates [sic]accounts for commissary Buy priviledges [sic]." Id. at 6 (first and second brackets in original). He claims that inmates are entitled to these deposits because low income families cannot afford to provide money to inmates for use at prison commissaries because of their financial hardship and living expenses. Id. at 5--6.
Finally, Carter alleges that he has "been denied [his] Human Right to eat food provided by [the] Correction Department Deliberately on more than one occassion [sic]." Id. at 8. He alleges that, in one incident, Corrections Officers Remy and Gutierrez deprived him of food for 12 hours and then "dumped" his food. Id. at 9. He also alleges that Remy had "deliberately dump[ed]" food on a prior occasion. Id. at 11. In another incident, Corrections Officer Arias allegedly set aside the bulk of inmates' food for himself and other officers, leaving only "30 morsels" of rice per inmate. Id. at 15. According to Carter, he and the other inmates "starved that day." Id. at 16. Arias allegedly taunted the inmates regarding their lack of food and did so in retaliation for complaints made against Remy. See id.
In his second case, Carter v. Cuomo, No. 11-CV-5705 (JG) (LB) ("Carter II"), Carter complains about excessive sentencing. He states that:
It is imperative at this junction to realize that harsh sentences resulting in people [male/female] spending extrodinary [sic] Long periods of Time from Employment, college, Family members, including offspring such as children . . . . Compl. at 3, Carter II (first brackets in original). For relief, Carter asks this Court to order the release of all prisoners who have been incarcerated for six or more years. Id. at 7, ¶ V.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a district court "shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Upon review, a district court shall dismiss a prisoner's complaint sua sponte if the complaint "(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007); Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 134 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1999).
At this stage of the proceeding, the Court must assume the truth of "all well- pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations" in the complaint. Harrington v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 607 F.3d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949--50 (2009); Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009)). To survive review under § 1915A, the well-pleaded allegations must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also McGhie v. Main, No. 11-CV-3110 (NGG) (JO), 2011 WL 4852268, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2011) ("Section 1915A's third ground for dismissal -- legal sufficiency -- is identical to the dismissal standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).").
A court must construe a pro se litigant's pleadings liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010),especially when those pleadings allege civil rights violations, Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185, 191--93 (2d Cir. 2008). Moreover, a pro se complaint should not be dismissed without granting the plaintiff leave to amend "at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim ...