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Catherine Gordon, et al v. Kaleida Health

January 15, 2012

CATHERINE GORDON, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS,
v.
KALEIDA HEALTH, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: William M. Skretny Chief Judge United States District Court

DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs commenced this action on August 6, 2008, by filing a summons and class action complaint in New York State Supreme Court, County of Erie. They assert claims of failure to keep accurate records under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), estoppel, breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment/restitution, and quantum meruit. All claims are based upon Defendants' alleged failure to properly compensate Plaintiffs and other employees for all hours worked and/or for hours in excess of 40 per week at overtime rates and their failure to keep accurate records of time worked for purposes of determining benefits.

On December 23, 2008, Defendants removed the action to this Court and then moved to dismiss it in its entirety. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.

II. BACKGROUND

Prior to filing their state court action, Plaintiffs commenced an action in this Court ("the Federal Action") based on the same alleged conduct, which action remains pending. Gordon v. Kaleida Health, 08-CV-378, filed May 22, 2008. The complaint in the Federal Action originally asserted claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), ERISA-failure to keep accurate records, ERISA-breach of fiduciary duty, and RICO, and of breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, unjust enrichment/restitution, quantum meruit, fraud and deceit, misrepresentation, and estoppel.

On July 1, 2008, Defendants moved to dismiss the Federal Action in its entirety. In response, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed, without prejudice, all claims except those alleging violations of the FLSA and NYLL, and estoppel. (08-CV-378, Docket No. 112.) Shortly thereafter, on August 6, 2008, Plaintiffs filed two actions in state court which, together, "revive" the ten voluntarily dismissed claims. Both state actions also assert estoppel claims. Defendants timely removed both actions to this Court.*fn1

In the instant Complaint, Plaintiffs identify themselves as "employees" under the FLSA and NYLL, and allege that putative class members, employed by Defendants, were not paid their regular or statutorily required rate of pay for all hours worked. (Docket No. 1, Ex. A, ¶¶ 69-70.) They further allege that Defendants' were deliberately indifferent to these statutory wage and overtime requirements, and that the failure to pay overtime was willful. (Id. ¶¶ 80, 89.) Plaintiffs seek, inter alia, "an award of the value of plaintiffs' unpaid wages, including fringe benefits." Though the wage and hour statutes provide the framework for their Complaint, Plaintiffs do not assert claims under either the FLSA or NYLL. As noted, those claims are pursued in the pending Federal Action.

Defendants now rely on their prior briefing in the Federal Action (in particular, 08-CV-380, Docket Nos. 86-87) in support of the instant motion to dismiss. The motion is now fully briefed and ready for disposition.

II. THE MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2006). "In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege a plausible set of facts sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Operating Local 649 Annuity Trust Fund v. Smith Barney Fund Mgmt. LLC, 595 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). This standard does not require "heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

The Supreme Court recently clarified the appropriate pleading standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, setting forth a two-pronged approach for courts deciding a motion to dismiss. 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The decision instructs district courts to first "identify[ ] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." 129 S. Ct. at 1950. Though "legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. Second, if a complaint contains "well-pleaded factual allegations[,] a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 1949 (quoting and citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57 (internal citations omitted)).

B. The ERISA Claims

The first and second causes of action are brought under ERISA. The first, brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), alleges that Defendants sponsor pension plans for its employees and "failed to keep accurate records of all time worked by Class Members" in violation of ERISA section 209, 29 U.S.C. § 1059(a)(1). Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of this failure, Defendants' records are not sufficient to determine benefits due under the plans. (Docket No. 1, Ex. A ¶¶ 110-11, 127-28.) In their second claim, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties under 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) by "failing to credit them with all of the hours of service for which they were to be paid, including overtime to the extent overtime may be included as compensation under the Plans, or to investigate whether such hours should be credited." (Docket No. 1, Ex. A ¶¶ 112, 130.)

Defendants contend these claims must be dismissed because Plaintiffs cannot sue under ERISA section 502(a)(3) to recover monetary damages, lack Article III standing to bring a recordkeeping claim, have not yet exhausted their administrative remedies with regard to either of the ERISA claims, and have not sufficiently stated a breach of fiduciary duty claim. The Court will address the jurisdictional argument first and all others as necessary.

Defendants make a standing argument only with regard to the recordkeeping claim, and contend that standing is lacking because no named Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute.

ERISA section 209 provides, in pertinent part that: [E]very employer shall, in accordance with such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe, maintain records with respect to each of his employees sufficient to determine the benefits due or which may become due to such employees. 29 U.S.C. § 1059(a)(1). Section 209 does not provide a private right of action. For that, Plaintiffs rely on ERISA section 502, pursuant to which:

A civil action may be brought . . .by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (I) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of the plan[.] 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).

Article III standing requirements must be satisfied even where, as here, Congress grants certain individuals a right to sue. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 138 L. Ed. 2d 849 (1997). As a constitutional matter, standing involves the question of whether a plaintiff has made out a "case or controversy" between himself and the defendant within the meaning of Article III. The three basic elements of constitutional standing are: (1) the plaintiff must suffer an injury in fact; (2) that is "fairly traceable" to the defendant's conduct; and (3) redressable by the court. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-181 (2000) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992)). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of showing that these elements are present. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Consequently, if none of the named plaintiffs sufficiently allege these elements, "none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the [putative] class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S. Ct. 669, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974).

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants sponsor pension plans for their employees, and failed to keep records of time worked by class members such that their records are "legally insufficient" to determine benefits. (Docket No. 1, Ex. A ¶¶ 110-11). They rely on Fin. Inst. Ret. Fund v. Office of Thrift Supervision ("FIRF") to suggest that the violation of a statutory right such as section 209, coupled with a statutory avenue for relief such as section 502(a)(3), is sufficient to show an injury for Article III purposes. 964 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 1992). The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs' interpretation. Moreover, the FIRF holding is specific to a breach of fiduciary duty claim and involved an identifiable pool of money to which the plaintiffs had colorable claims. I find it is distinguishable from the circumstances alleged here for the reasons stated below.

It is well-settled that ERISA, and specifically section 502(a)(3), does require allegations of some individualized injury or deprivation of a right, even if that right is statutorily created. Kendall v. Employees Ret. Plan of Avon Prods., 561 F.3d 112, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2009) (plan participant suing under ERISA must identify statutory endorsement of the action and assert constitutionally sufficient injury arising from the breach of a statutorily imposed duty); see also Malkani v. Clark Consulting, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (D. Md. 2010) (rejecting proposition that mere existence of section 502(a)(3) is sufficient to grant standing for Article III purposes and declining to follow FIRF).

The Second Circuit's recent discussion in Kendall is instructive here. There, as here, the plaintiff first alleged that the defendant failed to comply with ERISA and thereby deprived her of her entitlement to such compliance. The Second Circuit concluded that such allegations "in and of themselves [are insufficient] to constitute an injury-in-fact sufficient for constitutional standing." Kendall, 561 F.3d at 121.

The plaintiff in Kendall went on to allege that the employer's ERISA violations prevented her from realizing higher benefits. Id. at 119. Although her claim was brought under ERISA section 502(a)(3) as one for injunctive relief, the Second Circuit concluded that she was effectively claiming money damages outside that provision's scope. Defendants here contend, and I agree, that notwithstanding Plaintiffs' characterization of their claim as for injunctive relief, the allegations that Defendants' records are insufficient to accurately determine benefits due to Plaintiffs ultimately seeks monetary relief. Plaintiffs cannot dispute that, if they succeed in demonstrating that Defendants' compliance with ERISA will result in the crediting of additional hours toward their pension benefits, they will realize a monetary gain. Indeed, they anticipate as much in their prayer for relief, where they seek "an award of the value of plaintiffs' unpaid wages, including fringe benefits."*fn2

(Docket No. 1, Ex. A at 26.)

The Kendall Court, upon finding that the plaintiff sought monetary relief, reiterated the Second Circuit's prior holding that "[r]equests for restitution or disgorgement under ERISA . . . require[ ] that a plaintiff satisfy the strictures of constitutional standing by demonstrating individual loss . . . ." 561 F.3d at 119 (quoting Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health and Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, 433 F.3d 181, 200 (2d Cir. 2005)). It then went on to consider whether the plaintiff's alleged injuries were sufficient to satisfy Article III.

Typically, "[t]o qualify as a constitutionally sufficient injury-in-fact, the asserted injury must be concrete and particularized as well as actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). In FIRF, the case on which Plaintiffs rely, the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff may establish standing for an ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claim based on a theoretical injury arising from the mismanagement of fund assets. 964 F. 2d at 149. The FIRF plaintiffs were found to have standing where they pointed to "an identifiable and quantifiable pool of assets to which they had colorable claims." Kendall, 561 F.3d at 121.

Even assuming a theoretical injury could also establish standing for a recordkeeping claim, I find the allegations here insufficient. Accepting Plaintiffs' allegations as true, and giving their Complaint the most favorable reading, they infer an injury from the alleged recordkeeping violation that is purely speculative. As a preliminary matter, they have not identified which defendant(s) they work(ed) for, nor alleged that the various pension plans Defendants purportedly sponsor are even subject to ERISA, nor that any one of them is a participant in any particular plan. Beyond that, their ERISA claims are based on an alleged failure to keep accurate records of all time worked by class members and to credit them "with all of the hours of service for which they were entitled to be paid, including overtime to the extent overtime may be included as compensation under the Plans, or to investigate whether such hours should be credited." (Docket No. 1, Ex. A ΒΆΒΆ 111-12 (emphasis supplied)). In short, these Plaintiffs ...


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