The opinion of the court was delivered by: Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Barbara Tryon, brings the above-captioned action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking a review of the Commissioner of Social Security's decision to deny her application for supplemental social security ("SSI") and disability insurance benefits ("DIB").
On May 23, 2007, plaintiff protectively filed an application for SSI
and DIB benefits. (Administrative Transcript at p.106-118).*fn1
Plaintiff was 42 years old at the time of the application
with no prior work history. Plaintiff claims that she suffered from
chronic back and leg pain and problems with her right arm and hand due
to a motor vehicle accident in May 2003. (T. 144). Plaintiff claimed
to be disabled as of April 27, 2005. On August 29, 2007, plaintiff's
applications were denied and plaintiff requested a hearing by an ALJ
which was held on September 29, 2009. (T. 21). On November 12, 2009,
the ALJ issued a decision denying plaintiff's claim for benefits. (T.
8-16). The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on
March 26, 2010, making the ALJ's decision the final determination of
the Commissioner. (T. 1-4). This action followed.
The Social Security Act (the "Act") authorizes payment of disability insurance benefits to individuals with "disabilities." The Act defines "disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). There is a five-step analysis for evaluating disability claims:
"In essence, if the Commissioner determines (1) that the claimant is not working, (2) that he has a 'severe impairment,' (3) that the impairment is not one [listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations] that conclusively requires a determination of disability, and (4) that the claimant is not capable of continuing in his prior type of work, the Commissioner must find him disabled if (5) there is not another type of work the claimant can do." The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, while the Social Security Administration bears the burden on the last step.
Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Draegert v. Barnhart, 311 F.3d 468, 472 (2d Cir. 2002)); Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
A Commissioner's determination that a claimant is not disabled will be set aside when the factual findings are not supported by "substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Shaw, 221 F.3d at 131. Substantial evidence has been interpreted to mean "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. The Court may also set aside the Commissioner's decision when it is based upon legal error. Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999).
Here, the ALJ found at step one that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date, April 27, 2005. (T. 10). At step two, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff suffered from degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine which qualified as a "severe impairment" within the meaning of the Social Security Regulations (the "Regulations"). (T. 10). At the third step of the analysis, the ALJ determined that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or equal the severity of any impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the Regulations. (T. 11). The ALJ found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to, "perform the full range of light work" and specifically, "during an 8-hour workday, the claimant can lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk for a total of 6 hours, and sit for a total of 6 hours". (T. 12). At step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had no past relevant work. (T. 15). At step five, relying on the medical- vocational guidelines ("the grids") set forth in the Regulations, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the RFC to perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (T. 15). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act. (T. 16).
In seeking federal judicial review of the Commissioner's decision, plaintiff argues that:
(1) the ALJ erred in failing to find that plaintiff's neck and right arm complaints were "severe impairments"; (2) the ALJ failed to properly apply the treating physician rule; (3) the ALJ failed to acknowledge the report from the state agency examining physician, Dr. Shayevitz; (4) the ALJ ignored the applicable Regulations and improperly assessed plaintiff's credibility; and (5) the ALJ's RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence. (Dkt. No. ).
A. Severity of Impairments
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when he determined that plaintiff's neck and right shoulder impairments were "non-severe". A "severe" impairment is one that significantly limits an individual's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. Meadors v. Astrue, 370 F. App'x 179, 182 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520( c ), 416.920( c )). The Regulations define "basic work activities" as the "abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs," examples of which include,
(1) Physical functions such as walking, standing, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;
(2) Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;
(3) Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions;
(5) Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and
(6) Dealing with changes in a routine work setting.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b); see also Social Security Ruling 85--28, 1985 WL 56856, at *3--4, Titles II and XVI: Medical Impairments That Are Not Severe (S.S.A.1985).
Plaintiff has the burden at step two in the sequential evaluation process to demonstrate the severity of her impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520( c ). The severity analysis at step two may do no more than screen out de minimis claims. Dixon v. Shalala, 54 F.3d 1019, 1030 (2d Cir.1995). The "mere presence of a disease or impairment, or establishing that a person has been diagnosed or treated for a disease or impairment" is not, itself, sufficient to deem a condition severe. McConnell v. Astrue, 2008 WL 833968, at *2 (N.D.N.Y.2008) (citing Coleman v. Shalala, 895 F.Supp. 50, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1995)). "Often when there are multiple impairments, and the ALJ finds that only some of the impairments, but not others, are severe, any error in the severity analysis is harmless because ...