The opinion of the court was delivered by: John G. Koeltl, District Judge:
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action is a bitter intra-family dispute in which the pro se plaintiff, Norman Ackerman, sued his son, the defendant John Ackerman. The plaintiff alleges that he entrusted certain property to the defendant when the plaintiff was sent to prison. The defendant allegedly sold the property and the plaintiff now seeks to impose a constructive trust on the proceeds from that sale. The defendant has moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as time barred, and pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), based on the alleged misstatements in the plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis. Jurisdiction is alleged pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based on diversity of citizenship.*fn1
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the allegations in the Complaint are accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court's function on a motion to dismiss is "not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at a trial but merely to determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient." Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985). The Court should not dismiss the complaint if the plaintiff has stated "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). While the Court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id.
When faced with a pro se complaint, the Court must "construe [the] complaint liberally and interpret it to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests." Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). "Even in a pro se case, however, ... threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, although the Court is "obligated to draw the most favorable inferences" that the complaint supports, it "cannot invent factual allegations that [the plaintiff] has not pled." Id.; see also Mallet v. Johnson, No. 09 Civ. 8430, 2011 WL 2652570, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011).
The following allegations are assumed to be true for the purposes of this motion:
In 1968, the plaintiff purchased a brownstone building at 27 West 74th Street in Manhattan (the "Brownstone"), and he thereafter used the Brownstone to conduct his medical practice. (Compl. ¶ 7.) In September of 1991, the plaintiff, who was then under indictment for Medicaid fraud in New York County, transferred the Brownstone and its contents to the defendant. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-9.)
The plaintiff alleges that he affected this transfer because he was "concerned for his ability . . . to manage and maintain" the Brownstone if he were incarcerated. (Compl. ¶ 8.) The plaintiff alleges that he transferred the Brownstone, and its contents and furnishings, for no consideration, and in reliance on a fiduciary relationship that existed between himself and the defendant. (Compl. ¶¶ 4-6, 9-11.) The defendant was to hold the Brownstone and its contents "intrust [sic] for the plaintiff, to be returned to plaintiff" upon his release. (Compl. ¶ 9.)
The defendant sold the Brownstone while the plaintiff was incarcerated, using the proceeds to purchase other properties. (Compl. ¶ 12a.)
The plaintiff was released from incarceration in November of 1996. (Compl. ¶ 11.) Thereafter, "on various dates, plaintiff did demand from defendant" the return of the Brownstone and its contents, or the proceeds from the sale. However, these demands were refused. (Compl. ¶ 12b.)
The plaintiff filed this lawsuit in September of 2010. He seeks a constructive trust upon the Brownstone and its contents, or upon the proceeds from their sale, including the properties subsequently purchased by the defendant. (Compl. ¶ 13.) The defendant has moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) as time barred, and pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), based on the alleged misstatements in the plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis.
An action to impose a constructive trust is subject to a six year statute of limitations. See, e.g., Pate v. Pate, 791 N.Y.S.2d 849, 849 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2005); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1). In a case where, as here, the trust property was transferred to a third party in violation of the alleged trust, the statute of limitations begins to run when the defendant "convey[s] the property out of the plaintiffs' reach." Delango v. Delango, 609 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994). Here, the Complaint alleges that the property was sold to a third party some time before November of 1996. The six year statute of limitations plainly had run by September of 2010, almost fourteen years later, when the plaintiff filed this action. Dismissal is proper when a claim is time-barred based on the allegations in the ...