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The Brightonian Nursing Home, Bayberry Nursing Home, Maplewood Nursing v. Richard F. Daines

March 23, 2012

THE BRIGHTONIAN NURSING HOME, BAYBERRY NURSING HOME, MAPLEWOOD NURSING
AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LEROY VILLAGE GREEN, ELDERWOOD HEALTH CARE AT
BIRCHWOOD AND NEW YORK STATE HEALTH FACILITIES ASSOCIATION, INDIVIDUALLY AND
ON BEHALF OF ITS RESIDENTIAL HEALTH CARE FACILITY MEMBERS IN NEW YORK STATE,
PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS-RESPONDENTS,
v.
RICHARD F. DAINES, M.D., COMMISSIONER OF HEALTH, STATE OF NEW YORK AND DAVID A. PATERSON, GOVERNOR, STATE OF NEW YORK,
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.



Appeal from a judgment (denominated order and judgment) of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Matthew A. Rosenbaum, J.), entered November 10, 2010 in a CPLR article 78 proceeding and a declaratory judgment action.

Brightonian Nursing Home v Daines

Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on March 23, 2012

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, AND SCONIERS, JJ.

The judgment denied the cross motion of defendants-respondents, inter alia, to dismiss the amended complaint/petition and declared unconstitutional Public Health Law § 2808 (5) (c).

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiffs-petitioners (plaintiffs) commenced this hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the version of Public Health Law § 2808 (5) (c) in effect at that time was unconstitutional on its face. We note at the outset that this is properly only a declaratory judgment action inasmuch as plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of a statute, rather than the specific action of the administrative agency (see Greece Town Mall, LP v Mullen, 87 AD3d 1408, 1408). Supreme Court denied the cross motion of defendants-respondents (defendants), inter alia, to dismiss the amended complaint/petition pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs declaring that Public Health Law § 2808 (5) (c) is unconstitutional. We affirm.

It is well settled that "[l]egislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality" (LaValle v Hayden, 98 NY2d 155, 161; see Schulz v State of New York, 84 NY2d 231, 241, rearg denied 84 NY2d 851, cert denied 513 US 1127). Where, as here, the challenge is to a statute on its face, the challenger "bears the substantial burden of demonstrating that in any degree and in every conceivable application, the law suffers wholesale constitutional impairment" (Matter of Moran Towing Corp. v Urbach, 99 NY2d 443, 448 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Cohen v State of New York, 94 NY2d 1, 8). In this case, we conclude that plaintiffs met the heavy burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of Public Health Law § 2808 (5) (c) beyond a reasonable doubt (see generally Bordeleau v State of New York, 18 NY3d 305, 313, rearg denied ___ NY3d ___ [Feb. 21, 2012]; Matter of New York Charter Schools Assn., Inc. v DiNapoli, 13 NY3d 120, 130; Schulz, 84 NY2d at 241).

Public Health Law § 2808 (5) (c) prohibits private residential health care facilities, i.e., nursing homes, from withdrawing equity or transferring assets that in the aggregate exceed 3% of their total annual revenue for patient care services without the prior written approval of the Commissioner of Health (Commissioner). The statute affords the Commissioner 60 days to determine whether to approve a request for withdrawal of equity or assets (see id.). In reviewing such requests, the statute provides that the Commissioner "shall consider the facility's overall financial condition, any indications of financial distress, whether the facility is delinquent in any payment owed to the [D]department [of Health], whether the facility has been cited for immediate jeopardy or substandard quality of care, and such other factors as the [C]commissioner deems appropriate" (id.).

Contrary to defendants' contention, we conclude that Public Health Law § 2808 (5) (c) as written is unconstitutionally vague and improperly delegates legislative authority to the Commissioner. It is axiomatic that "the legislative branch may not constitutionally cede its fundamental policymaking responsibility to a regulatory agency" (Matter of Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v Serio, 100 NY2d 854, 864; see Boreali v Axelrod, 71 NY2d 1, 9-10; see also Matter of Citizens For An Orderly Energy Policy v Cuomo, 78 NY2d 398, 410, rearg denied 79 NY2d 851, 852). Thus, "[t]he Legislature may constitutionally confer discretion upon an administrative agency only if it limits the field in which that discretion is to operate and provides standards to govern its exercise" (Matter of Levine v Whalen, 39 NY2d 510, 515). We agree with plaintiffs and the court that the provision in Public Health Law § 2808 (5) (c) permitting the Commissioner to consider "such other factors as [he or she] deems appropriate" (hereafter, catchall provision) constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority because it grants the Commissioner unfettered discretion in assessing equity withdrawal requests. The statute provides no standards to guide the Commissioner in determining what factors are "appropriate" in reviewing such requests (§ 2808 [5] [c]; see generally Dur-Bar Realty Co. v City of Utica, 57 AD2d 51, 55, affd 44 NY2d 1002; Levine, 39 NY2d at 515). As a result, it is left to the sole discretion of the Commissioner to determine which additional factors to consider.

Defendants contend that the catchall provision is properly construed not as conferring unlimited discretion upon the Commissioner, but rather as allowing the Commissioner to consider other factors of the same type or kind as the first four factors listed in the statute, i.e., factors relating to the nursing home's financial condition and quality of care. In support of that contention, defendants rely on the ejusdem generis rule of statutory construction, which "requires the court to limit general language of a statute by specific phrases which have preceded the general language" (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 239 [b], at 407; see 242-44 E. 77th St., LLC v Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 31 AD3d 100, 103-104). The rule of ejusdem generis, however, "applies only where the specific words preceding the general expression are all of the same nature, and where they are of different genera the meaning of the general words remains unaffected by its connection with them . . . [I]n applying the rule, care must be taken to see that the words supposed to be particular or specific, and which precede the general term, really are an enumeration of individual things, for if the preceding terms are general as well as that which follows, there is no place for the application of the rule" (§ 239 [b], at 409). Here, the preceding factors are general in nature and are not all of the same kind or type (see Public Health Law § 2808 [5] [c]; McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 239 [b], at 409). Thus, ejusdem generis does not apply to circumscribe the otherwise limitless discretion the statute affords to the Commissioner (cf. Miranda v Norstar Bldg. Corp., 79 AD3d 42, 47).

We also agree with plaintiffs and the court that the catchall provision of Public Health Law § 2808 (5) (c) is unconstitutionally vague (see Russell v Town of Pittsford, 94 AD2d 410, 414), inasmuch as it does not " contain[] sufficient standards to afford a reasonable degree of certainty so that a person of ordinary intelligence is not forced to guess at its meaning and to safeguard against arbitrary enforcement' " (Matter of Morrissey v Apostol, 75 AD3d 993, 996; see Matter of Kaur v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 15 NY3d 235, 256, cert denied 131 S Ct 822). Because the Commissioner may consider "such other factors as [he or she] deems appropriate" (§ 2808 [5] [c]), the statute does not adequately apprise nursing home owners and operators of the standards ...


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