The opinion of the court was delivered by: William M. Skretny Chief Judge United States District Court
1. Plaintiff Ruth A. Nosbisch challenges an Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") determination that she is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act ("the Act"). Plaintiff alleges that she has been disabled due to a series of conditions, including carpal tunnel syndrome, tarsal tunnel syndrome, obesity, anxiety, and depression since November 1, 2005. Plaintiff contends that her impairments render her unable to work. She therefore asserts that she is entitled to supplemental security income ("SSI") under the Act.
2. Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on December 9, 2005, alleging disability since November 1, 2005. The Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denied Plaintiff's initial application, and Plaintiff requested a hearing. An administrative hearing was then held on July 9, 2008 before ALJ Stanley A. Moskal, Jr., at which Plaintiff appeared and testified. The ALJ considered the case de novo, and on September 18, 2008, issued a decision denying Plaintiff's application for benefits. Plaintiff filed a request for review with the Appeals Council, which, on February 4, 2010, denied Plaintiff's request for review. Plaintiff filed the current civil action on April 7, 2010, challenging Defendant's final decision.*fn1
3. On September 2, 2010, the Commissioner filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff followed suit by filing her own motion for judgment on the pleadings on September 15, 2010. Briefing on the motions concluded October 7, 2010, at which time this Court took the motions under advisement without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's motion is granted, and Plaintiff's motion is denied.
4. A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Commissioner's determination will be reversed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or there has been a legal error. See Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979). Substantial evidence is that which amounts to "more than a mere scintilla," and it has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971). Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
5. "To determine on appeal whether the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining the evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from its weight." Williams on Behalf of Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988). If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's finding must be sustained "even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court's independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner's]." Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other words, this Court must afford the Commissioner's determination considerable deference, and may not substitute "its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review." Valente v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).
6. The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether an individual is disabled as defined under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The United States Supreme Court recognized the validity of this analysis in Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-142, 107 S. Ct. 2287, 2291, 96 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1987), and it remains the proper approach for analyzing whether a claimant is disabled.
7. This five-step process is detailed below: First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant has a "severe impairment" which significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who is afflicted with a "listed" impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity. Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner] then determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam); see also Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
8. Although the claimant has the burden of proof as to the first four steps, the Commissioner has the burden of proof on the fifth and final step. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5; Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir. 1984). The final step of this inquiry is, in turn, divided into two parts. First, the Commissioner must assess the claimant's job qualifications by considering his physical ability, age, education, and work experience. Second, the Commissioner must determine whether jobs exist in the national economy that a person having the claimant's qualifications could perform. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460, 103 S. Ct. 1952, 1954, 76 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1983).
9. In this case, the ALJ made the following findings with regard to
the five-step process set forth above: (1) Plaintiff has not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since December 9, 2005 (R. at
23);*fn2 (2) Plaintiff has a combination of
impairments that result in a "severe" condition (Id.);*fn3
(3) Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the criteria necessary for
finding a disabling impairment under the regulations (R. at 24); (4)
Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform
sedentary to light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 416.967(a), subject to
various limitations (R. at 25);*fn4 and (5)
considering Plaintiff's age, education, work
experience, and RFC, there are jobs in significant numbers in the
national economy that Plaintiff could perform (R. at 26). Ultimately,
the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined
by the Act from December 9, 2005, the date of her application, through
September 18, 2008, the date of the ALJ's decision. (R. at
10. Plaintiff advances three challenges to the ALJ's decision. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in not finding that her migraines constituted a severe impairment. Second, she argues that the ALJ failed to accord adequate weight to the opinion of her treating physician. Third, she asserts that the ALJ's conclusion that she would only have difficulty working under moderate or heavy stressful conditions was improper.
11. Plaintiff first argues that remand is necessary because the ALJ made no reference to the severity of her migraine headaches. Plaintiff further charges that the ALJ's decision does not take into account how such severe migraine headaches would affect her RFC.
12. At step two of the five-step analysis, an ALJ faces two distinct questions. First, an ALJ must determine whether an impairment satisfies the durational requirement. Unless an impairment is expected to result in death, an impairment must "last or  be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months" before it can be considered potentially disabling. 20 C.F.R. § 416.909. Second, an ALJ must determine whether an impairment "limits a claimant's ability to do 'basic work activities.'" Gray v. Astrue, No. 04 Civ. 3736(KMW)(JCF), 2009 WL 1598798, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2009) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.921). "An impairment or combination of impairments is 'not severe' when medical and other evidence establishes only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities that would have at most a minimal effect on an individual's ability to do basic work activities." Ahern v. Astrue, No, 09-CV-5543 (JFB), 2011 WL 1113534, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521). In making this ...