The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hurley, Senior District Judge:
Plaintiff brings this action alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et. seq. ("FLSA"), and New York Labor Law ("NYLL") §§ 190 et. seq., by defendants for allegedly failing to pay plaintiff's earned wages. Plaintiff also brings a state law claim for unjust enrichment. Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted in part, and denied in part.
The following factual allegations are taken from the complaint and presumed true for the purposes of this motion.
This dispute arises from defendants' alleged refusal to pay plaintiff wages he purportedly earned while employed by New York Merchants Protective Co., Inc. ("NYMP"), a company currently in receivership. On December 30, 2010, plaintiff resigned from NYMP, at which time the company owed him "accrued wages" in the amount of $202,233.80. (Compl. ¶¶ 9, 12.) On January 19, 2011, defendant Ronald J. Friedman ("Friedman") was appointed Receiver of NYMP by this Court in a separate case bearing docket number 11-cv-38. (Civil Case 11-cv-38, docket entry 11; compl. ¶ 14). Among Friedman's alleged duties as Receiver is the payment of all "reasonable and necessary expenses of operating NYMP's business, including but not limited to the payment of wages." (Compl. ¶ 16). Plaintiff alleges that he has made more than one demand for payment from Friedman since his appointment as Receiver, but his requests have been refused. (Compl. ¶¶ 9-10, 13.)
a.Motion To Dismiss Pursuant to 12(b)(6)
Rule 8(a) provides that a pleading shall contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Supreme Court has clarified the pleading standard applicable in evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
First, in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007), the Court disavowed the well-known statement in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957) that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." 550 U.S. at 561. Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss under Twombly, a plaintiff must allege "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).
Id. at 555 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
More recently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009), the Supreme Court provided further guidance, setting a two-pronged approach for courts considering a motion to dismiss. First, a court should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." 129 S. Ct. at 1950. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. Thus, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the ...