The opinion of the court was delivered by: Matsumoto, United States District Judge:
On December 9, 2008, Jose Urena ("plaintiff") commenced this pro se action against Robert Beaudouin, M.D. ("Dr. Beaudouin" or "defendant") and other defendants alleging injuries to his bladder, scrotum, and abdomen related to bladder cancer while he was incarcerated in 2006 at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York ("MDC").*fn1 (See ECF No. 4-3, Complaint.) After the case was transferred from the Southern District of New York to this court on March 11, 2009, an amended complaint was filed on November 2, 2009*fn2 , and discovery closed on November 23, 2009. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' respective motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment on December 6, 2010. (See ECF No. 102, Memorandum and Order ("Urena I")); Urena v. Wolfson, No. 09-CV-1107 (KAM)(LB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128423 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010).
In Urena I, the court denied the summary judgment motion of defendant Dr. Beaudouin, then a physician at MDC, on plaintiff's constitutional claim pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that Dr. Beaudouin was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution (the "Bivens claim"). (Urena I at 11-22.) Presently before the court is Dr. Beaudouin's motion for partial reconsideration pursuant to Local Civil Rule 6.3 of the court's denial of summary judgment on plaintiff's Bivens claim against him. For the reasons stated below, the court denies Dr. Beaudouin's motion for partial reconsideration.
In Urena I, the court liberally construed the pro se plaintiff's Bivens claim as alleging that Dr. Beaudouin was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment by (1) delaying and denying treatment to plaintiff prior to his initial surgery at New York Downtown Hospital ("NYDH") on November 2, 2006 to remedy his bladder cancer; and (2) failing to adequately monitor plaintiff's recovery in between his discharge from NYDH to MDC on November 3, 2006 and his re-admission to NYDH on November 13, 2006 for surgical repair of a bladder perforation. (Urena I at 16-17, 20.) The court denied Dr. Beaudouin's motion for summary judgment on the Bivens claim. (See id. at 11-22.)
On December 20, 2010, Dr. Beaudouin timely filed a motion for partial reconsideration. (See ECF No. 105, Motion for Reconsideration.) Because the case was stayed for six months from January 13, 2011 to June 15, 2011 while the court unsuccessfully sought pro bono counsel to represent plaintiff (see ECF No. 110, Order dated January 13, 2011; ECF No. 117, Order dated June 15, 2011), Dr. Beaudouin's motion for reconsideration was terminated without prejudice on April 5, 2011, and he was granted leave to re-file his motion after the stay had been lifted. (See Order dated April 5, 2011.)
Thereafter, in accordance with the briefing schedule subsequently adopted by the court, Dr. Beaudouin re-filed his motion for partial reconsideration on September 12, 2011 (see ECF No. 143, Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Beaudouin's Motion for Partial Reconsideration ("Beaudouin Mem.")) with an accompanying declaration (see ECF No. 143-1, Declaration of Dr. Beaudouin ("Beaudouin Decl.")). The plaintiff filed an opposition to Dr. Beaudouin's motion (see ECF No. 130, Reply to Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Beaudouin's Motion for Partial Reconsideration ("Pl. Opp'n")), and Dr. Beaudouin filed a reply brief (see ECF No. 144, Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendant Beaudouin's Motion for Partial Reconsideration ("Beaudouin Reply")). After considering the parties' submissions and for the reasons set forth below, the court denies Dr. Beaudouin's motion for partial reconsideration.
I. Legal Standard for Reconsideration
"The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is within the sound discretion of the district court, and 'is an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources.'" Mangino v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue, 814 F. Supp. 2d 242, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citations omitted). Local Civil Rule 6.3 provides that a party moving for reconsideration must set forth "concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked." Local Civ. R. 6.3. "The major grounds justifying reconsideration are 'an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.'" Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
"It is black letter law that a 'motion for reconsideration may not be used to advance new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the Court, nor may it be used as a vehicle for relitigating issues already decided by the Court.'" Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Las Vegas Prof'l Football L.P., 409 F. App'x 401, 403 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (citations omitted); see also Vornado Realty Trust v. Castlton Envtl. Contrs., LLC, No. 08-CV-04823 (DLI)(JO), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132086, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2011) ("Reconsideration is not a proper tool to repackage and relitigate arguments and issues already considered by the court in deciding the original motion." (citation omitted)). Undoubtedly, the "standard for granting such a motion is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked -- matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
II. Dr. Beaudouin's Motion for Partial Reconsideration
Dr. Beaudouin moves for reconsideration of the court's denial of summary judgment on the Bivens claim on three grounds:
(1) the court incorrectly concluded that Dr. Beaudouin authored a treatment note dated November 12, 2006; (2) the court overlooked the fact that plaintiff himself limited his claim to the period between November 3, 2006 and November 13, 2006; and (3) the court incorrectly concluded that there were material disputed facts related to plaintiff's failure ...