The opinion of the court was delivered by: Seybert, District Judge:
Pro se plaintiff Rodney Chestnut ("Plaintiff") commenced this in forma pauperis declaratory judgment action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 2201 and 2202. By Order dated February 22, 2012, the Court granted the Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis, but sua sponte dismissed the Complaint for lack or subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). However, Plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to file an Amended Complaint in accordance with the Court's Order, within thirty (30) days from the date that the Order was served upon Plaintiff. On April 16, 2012, Plaintiff filed the instant Amended Complaint.*fn1 For the reasons that follow, the Amended Complaint does not provide a proper basis to invoke this Court's subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Amended Complaint fails to state a plausible claim, and is thus dismissed.
As was set forth in detail in the Court's February 22, 2012 Order, the instant action (the "2011 action") is the second in forma pauperis case filed by Plaintiff pro se in this Court against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") concerning a foreclosure dispute. The first action, 10-CV-4244 (JS)(ARL), Chestnut v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (the "2010 action"), was dismissed on the Defendant's motion because the claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, collateral estoppel and res judicata. See Mem. & Order, dated March 3, 2011, Seybert, D.J. The Court further found that even in the absence of a procedural bar, Plaintiff's claims were insufficiently pled.
Plaintiff's original Complaint the 2011 action again sought to challenge the foreclosure of his home and claimed that there was fraud involved in the transfer of his mortgage loan. The original Complaint, brought pursuant to Sections 1983 and 1985 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, named twelve (12) private-actor defendants, including Wells Fargo, as well as Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C. ("Rosicki"), Shapiro, DiCaro & Barack, LLC ("Shapiro"), Hogan Lovells US LLP ("Hogan"), Edgeton C. Monroe ("Monroe"), Jeffrey R. Szymendera ("Szymendera"), OCWEN, Richard J. Kaufman, Esq. ("Kaufman"), Barclays Bank PLC ("Barclays"), HomEq Servicing Corporation, Securitized Asset Back Receivables LLC ("Securitized Asset"), and Fremont Investment & Loan (collectively, "Defendants"). The Amended Complaint continues to name each of these Defendants, and has added the New York State Security Exchange Commission and Mortgageramp, Inc., as Defendants.*fn2
Like the 2010 Complaint, and the original Complaint in the 2011 action, the Amended Complaint contains limited factual information. Plaintiff does not allege any facts concerning conduct by any of the Defendants. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that the defendants did not have legal rights or standing to sue the plaintiff in a foreclosure procedure in which a judgment of foreclosure was rendered illegally. The constitutional rights of the plaintiff were violated and that because of the diversity of these defendants and the fact that over 3500 pages of evidence from the Security Exchange Commission was never brought before a court of justice. The attached exhibits and material evidence must be reviewed by this court in order for the rights and due process right can be protected and that the plaintiff can show that the defendants never had a legal right to commence an action or sue the plaintiff in foreclosure.
Amended Complaint at pages 5-6. Though Plaintiff has annexed some eighty-eight (88) pages of exhibits to his Amended Complaint, he does not identify any of them in the body of his Amended Complaint and apparently expects the Court and the Defendants to parse through them in an effort to figure out their relevance, if any. This, the Court declines to do. Plaintiff seeks to recover, inter alia, the sum of $2,825,000.
DISCUSSION I. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Pursuant to Section 1915 of Title 28, a district court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint upon determining that the action is "(1) frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b);
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). This obligation applies equally to prisoner and non-prisoner in forma pauperis cases. Awan v. Awan, No. 10-CV-0635, 2010 WL 1265820, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010); Burns v. Goodwill Industries, No. 01-CV-11311, 2002 WL 1431704, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Courts are required to liberally construe pleadings drafted by a pro se plaintiff. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004). A "pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). Moreover, at the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must assume the truth of "all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations" in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010); see, also Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167, 171, 125 S. Ct. 1497, 161 L. Ed. 2d 361 (2005). However, a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007); see, also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953, 173 L. Ed. 2d (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citations omitted). While "detailed factual allegations" are not required, the federal pleading standard requires "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1955). If a liberal reading of the complaint "gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated," the Court must grant leave to amend the complaint. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). III. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Notwithstanding the liberal pleading standard afforded pro se litigants, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may not preside over cases if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000). Unlike lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any time by a party or by the Court sua sponte. Id. "If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the action must be dismissed." Id. at 700-01; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
The basic statutory grants of subject matter jurisdiction are set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1097 (2006). Section 1331 provides that federal district courts "shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1332 provides that federal court subject matter jurisdiction may be established where there is a diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Here, it appears that Plaintiff seeks to invoke this Court's subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331 given that the Complaint's "Statement of Jurisdiction" states that the action seeks to "protect the [Plaintiff's] rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution" and cites ...