The opinion of the court was delivered by: Glenn T. Suddaby, United States District Judge
Currently before the Court, in this misappropriation-of-trade-secrets action filed by PLC Trenching Co., LLC ("Plaintiff") against Gary Newton, Jr., Cable System Installation LLC, and Cable System Installations Corp. ("Defendants"), is Defendants' motion to (1) bond the Court's previously issued monetary sanction against Defendants for the use of cup cutter segments pending their interlocutory appeal, and (2) stay the Court's previously issued laying box injunction against Defendants pending their interlocutory appeal. (Dkt. No. 124.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is denied.
Because the parties have, in their motion papers, demonstrated an accurate understanding of the case's procedural history, the legal standard governing Defendants' motion, and the arguments made by the parties regarding that motion, the Court will not repeat that information in its entirety in this Decision and Order, which is intended primarily for the review of the parties. Rather, the Court will recite that information only where necessary in this Decision and Order.
II. GOVERNING LEGAL AUTHORITY
Rule 62(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants a party an automatic stay to a judgment by supercedeas bond except, in pertinent part, to "an interlocutory or final judgment in an action for an injunction." Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d),(a).*fn1 In other cases, Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c) provides that, in its discretion, a court "may suspend . . . an injunction on terms for bond" while an appeal of that injunction is pending. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c).
Generally, to determine if a party is entitled to a discretionary stay of an injunction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c), a court is to consider the following four factors: (1) the strength of the applicant's showing that he will succeed on appeal on the merits; (2) the danger that the applicant will be irreparably injured if the court denies the stay; (3) whether the stay will substantially harm other interested parties; and (4) the public interest in granting the stay. LaRouche v. Kezer, 20 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1994); Frommert v. Conkright, 639 F. Supp.2d 305, 309 (W.D.N.Y. 2009).
After carefully considering the parties' motion papers, the Court denies Defendants' motion for the reasons stated by Plaintiff in its opposition memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 130, at 4-13 [attaching pages "1" through "10" of Plf.'s Opp'n Memo. of Law].) To those reasons the Court would add only nine brief points.
A. Additional Points Regarding Monetary Sanctions
Five of the Court's nine points regard Defendants' request for a stay of its monetary sanctions.
First, Defendants are incorrect that they have an absolute right, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d), to stay by bond the monetary sanctions imposed on them by the Court for violating the Court's Temporary Restraining Order. Although it is true that, generally, "a party taking an appeal from the District Court is entitled to a stay of a money judgment as a matter of right if he posts a bond in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d)" (Am. Manufs. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Am. Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 87 S.Ct. 1, 3 ), a party taking an appeal from a district court's civil contempt order issuing sanctions arising from a violation of an injunction does not have an automatic right to a stay of the monetary sanctions by bond because the civil contempt order in that scenario is an "interlocutory . . . judgment in an action for an injunction." Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(a)(1).
None of the three cases cited by Defendants required a stay from an Order imposing monetary sanctions for violating a Temporary Restraining Order. (Dkt. No. 133, at 10 [attaching page "5" of Defs.' Reply. Memo. of Law].) Indeed, more analogous cases undermine Defendants' position. See Union of Prof'l Airmen v. Alaska Aeronatical Indus., Inc., 625 F.2d 881, 882-83 (9th Cir. 1980) (dismissing appeal from district court order that, inter alia, denied the defendants' motion for stay by bond during appeal from order of civil contempt and monetary fine for violating preliminary injunction); Am. St. Gobain Corp. v. Armstrong Glass Co., 300 F. Supp. 419, 420-21 (D. Tenn. 1969) (denying defendant's motion for stay by bond during appeal from court's "order of adjudging [the defendant] in contempt"); cf. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1025, 1030-31 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that defendants had no right to stay by bond under Fed. R. Civ. P. 62[d] because they had no right to appeal an interim attorneys' fee award which must "piggyback" on injunction appeal).
The Court is persuaded by these latter cases. The Second Circuit has generally recognized that a civil contempt judgment is interlocutory in nature and has repeatedly refused to hear interlocutory appeals from those judgments.*fn2 If an appeal from that judgment is generally not permitted, it would make little sense to confer on a party an absolute right to stay by bond of the entire action pending that appeal. More importantly, allowing a party to stay a civil contempt judgment arising from a violation of an injunction would undermine and impede the ability of the Court to enforce the injunction. Cf. Wright & Miller, 16 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. ...