The opinion of the court was delivered by: Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Linda Marlene Ruback, brings the above-captioned action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking a review of the Commissioner of Social Security's decision to deny her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB").
On May 14, 2007, plaintiff filed an application for DIB benefits. (Administrative Transcript at p. 103).*fn1 Plaintiff was 56 years old at the time of the application with prior work experience as an office manager. (T. 116-117). Plaintiff claimed that she was disabled, beginning on April 1, 2006 due to "clots in veins (superior vein), thick blood, and cyst/small mass (non-cancerous) in small intestine", gastrointestinal issues and back pain. (T. 116, 152). On October 23, 2007, plaintiff's application was denied and plaintiff requested a hearing by an ALJ which was held on July 8, 2009. (T. 30, 56). Plaintiff appeared with an attorney. (T. 14). On August 6, 2009, the ALJ issued a decision denying plaintiff's claim for benefits. (T. 14-27). The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on May 16, 2011 making the ALJ's decision the final determination of the Commissioner. (T. 1-6). This action followed.
The Social Security Act (the "Act") authorizes payment of disability insurance benefits to individuals with "disabilities." The Act defines "disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). There is a five-step analysis for evaluating disability claims:
"In essence, if the Commissioner determines (1) that the claimant is not working, (2) that he has a 'severe impairment,' (3) that the impairment is not one [listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations] that conclusively requires a determination of disability, and (4) that the claimant is not capable of continuing in his prior type of work, the Commissioner must find him disabled if (5) there is not another type of work the claimant can do." The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, while the Social Security Administration bears the burden on the last step.
Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Draegert v. Barnhart, 311 F.3d 468, 472 (2d Cir. 2002)); Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
A Commissioner's determination that a claimant is not disabled will be set aside when the factual findings are not supported by "substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Shaw, 221 F.3d at 131. Substantial evidence has been interpreted to mean "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. The Court may also set aside the Commissioner's decision when it is based upon legal error. Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999).
The ALJ found at step one that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 1, 2006. (T. 16). At step two, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff suffered from degenerative disc disease, gastritis and pancreatitis which qualified as "severe impairments" within the meaning of the Social Security Regulations (the "Regulations"). (T. 16). At the third step of the analysis, the ALJ determined that plaintiff's impairments did not meet or equal the severity of any impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the Regulations. (T. 19). The ALJ found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to, "perform the full range of light work" and found that plaintiff had the "ability to stand and walk for six hours per workday, sit for six hours per workday, lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently". (T. 19). At step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is capable of performing past relevant work as an office manager.
(T. 22). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act. (T. 20).
In seeking federal judicial review of the Commissioner's decision, plaintiff argues that:
(1) the Commissioner erred by failing to find that plaintiff's anxiety and depression were "severe impairments"; (2) the ALJ afforded improper evidentiary weight to the opinions of the state agency consultative physician; (3) the ALJ did not properly assess plaintiff's credibility; (4) the ALJ's RFC assessment is not supported by substantial evidence; and (5) the ALJ erred when he concluded that plaintiff could perform her past relevant work. (Dkt. No. 10).
I. Severity of Plaintiff's Impairments at Step Two
"The Listing of Impairments describes, for each of the major body systems, impairments which are considered severe enough to prevent a person from doing any gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. § 416 .925(a). If a claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals a listed impairment, the evaluation process is concluded and the claimant is considered disabled without considering the claimant's age, education, or work experience. Campbell v. Astrue, 2009 WL 2152314, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing 20 C .F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii)). A "severe" impairment is one that significantly limits an individual's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. Meadors v. Astrue, 370 F. App'x 179, 182 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520( c ), 416.920( c )). The Regulations define "basic work activities" as the "abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs," examples of which include,
(1) Physical functions such as walking, standing, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;
(2) Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;
(3) Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions;
(5) Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and
(6) Dealing with changes in a routine work setting.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b); see also Social Security Ruling 85--28, 1985 WL 56856, at *3--4, Titles II and XVI: Medical Impairments That Are Not Severe (S.S.A.1985).
Plaintiff has the burden at step two in the sequential evaluation process to demonstrate the severity of her impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520( c ). The severity analysis at step two may do no more than screen out de minimis claims. Dixon v. Shalala, 54 F.3d 1019, 1030 (2d Cir.1995). The "mere presence of a disease or impairment, or establishing that a person has been diagnosed or treated for a disease or impairment" is not, itself, sufficient to deem a condition severe. McConnell v. Astrue, 2008 WL 833968, at *2 (N.D.N.Y.2008) (citing Coleman v. Shalala, 895 F.Supp. 50, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1995)).
"When evaluating the severity of mental impairments, the regulations require the ALJ to apply a 'special technique' at the second and third steps of the review, in addition to the customary sequential analysis." Lint v. Astrue, 2009 WL 2045679, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Kohler v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 260, 265-66 (2d Cir.2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a)). First, the ALJ must evaluate the claimant's symptoms, as well as other signs and laboratory findings, and determine whether the claimant has a "medically determinable mental impairment." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(b)(1), 416.920a(b)(1); see also Dudelson v. Barnhart, 2005 WL 2249771, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). If a medically determinable impairment exists, the ALJ must "rate the degree of functional limitation resulting from the impairment [ ]." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(b)(2), 416.920a(b)(2). This process requires the ALJ to examine all relevant clinical and laboratory findings, as well as the effects of the symptoms on the claimant, the impact of medication and its side effects, and other evidence relevant to the impairment and its treatment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(1), 416.920a(c)(1). The ALJ must rate the degree of the claimant's functional limitation in four specific areas, referred to as "Paragraph B" criteria: activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace; and episodes of decompensation. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(3), 416.920a(c)(3). The ALJ rates the first three areas on a five-point scale of "none," "mild," "moderate," "marked," and "extreme," and the fourth area on a four-point scale of "none," "one or two," "three," and "four or more." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(4), 416.920a(c)(4). If the first three areas are rated as "none" or "mild," and the fourth as "none," the ALJ will conclude that the mental impairment is not severe "unless the evidence otherwise indicates that there is more than a minimal limitation in [the claimant's] ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(d)(1), 416.920a(d)(1).
A diagnosis of a mental impairment, such as depression, without more, does not suggest that a plaintiff's mental impairment severely impairs his performance of any major life activity. See Torres v. Astrue, 550 F.Supp.2d 404, 411 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). The medical evidence must show that the mental impairment precludes a plaintiff from performing basic mental work activities. See Snyder v. Astrue, 2009 WL 2157139, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). Moreover, evidence that medication provides relief from the severity of a mental condition can provide substantial evidence to support a finding that a plaintiff is not disabled. Pennay v. Astrue, 2008 WL 4069114, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. 2008).
In this matter, plaintiff claims that her anxiety and depression are severe impairments because she reported these symptoms to her treating physician, Dr. William Mayer who prescribed medication. Plaintiff also relies on the opinions of Dr. Annette Payne, a consultative examiner, in support of her argument that the ...