UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
June 18, 2012
DEBRA HEVNER, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
VILLAGE EAST TOWERS, INC., BARBARA MCLOUGHLIN, DAVID BARON, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (George B. Daniels, Judge).
Hevner v. Village East Towers, Inc.
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to summary orders filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court's Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation "summary order"). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of June, two thousand twelve.
PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, JOSE A. CABRANES, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Debra Hevner, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees, dismissing her housing discrimination complaint. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
We review orders granting summary judgment de novo, focusing on whether a district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass'n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 1995)). Summary judgment is appropriate "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Following our review, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Hevner's complaint for substantially the same reasons articulated by the District Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order of February 7, 2011. See Hevner v. Village East Towers, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 3983, 2011 WL 666340 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2011).
We have considered all of Hevner's arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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