The opinion of the court was delivered by: Richard M. Berman, U.S.D.J.
On March 16, 2012, United States Magistrate Judge Ronald L. Ellis, to whom this matter had been referred, issued a Report and Recommendation ("Report") recommending that the Court grant the Commissioner of Social Security's ("Defendant" or "Commissioner") motion for judgment on the pleadings, filed on September 20, 2011, and dismiss the pro se complaint of Hilajah S. Stover ("Plaintiff"), filed on January 3, 2011. (Report at 1.) Plaintiff's Complaint sought review, pursuant to Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act ("Social Security Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), of a September 25, 2009 decision of Administrative Law Judge Mark H. Shapiro ("ALJ") denying Plaintiff's application, dated February 16, 2006, for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). (See Compl. ¶ 7-8.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's seizure disorder did not render him "disabled" within the meaning of the Social Security Act either as an adult or as a minor. (Administrative Record, filed May 5, 2011 ("A.R."), at 24, 27-28.) On November 30, 2010, the Social Security Administration Appeals Council ("Appeals Council") affirmed the ALJ's decision. (A.R. at 1-2 (Notice of Appeals Council Action, dated Nov. 30, 2011 ("[W]e considered the reasons you disagree with the decision . . . [and][w]e found that this information does not provide a basis for changing the Administrative Law Judge's decision.")).)
In the Report, Judge Ellis concluded that the ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff was not disabled as an adult, stating that the ALJ "reached his decision by observing [Plaintiff] at the hearing and by analyzing the evidence, including medical records and expert testimony from three doctors (a psychiatrist, a neurologist, and a pediatrician)." (Report at 12.) Judge Ellis did not assess Plaintiff's childhood disorder.*fn1
On or about March 27, 2012, Plaintiff filed objections ("Objections"). (Pl.'s Objections to Report and Recommendation, dated Mar. 27, 2012 ("Pl.'s Obj.").) On May 21, 2012, Defendant filed a response to Plaintiff's Objections. (Def.'s Response to Pl.'s Objections to Report and Recommendation, dated May 21, 2012 ("Def. Resp.").)
For the reasons set forth below, the Report is affirmed. The Court also finds that the ALJ's determination of Plaintiff's non-disability as a child is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
The Court may adopt those portions of a magistrate judge's report to which no objections have been made and which are not clearly erroneous. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see also Grassia v. Scully, 892 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1989); Greene v. WCI Holdings Corp., 956 F. Supp. 509, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The Court makes "a de novo determination of those portions of the report to which objections have been made" and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations of the magistrate. Grassia, 892 F.2d at 19. If the "party makes only conclusory or general arguments, or simply reiterates the original arguments, the Court will review the Report strictly for clear error." Watson v. Astrue, No. 08 Civ. 1523, 2010 WL 1645060, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2010).
A district court reviewing denial of Social Security benefits will set aside an ALJ's decision only where it is based upon legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence. Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1996).
The facts as set forth in the Report are incorporated herein by reference. The Court has conducted a de novo review of, among other things, the record, the Report, Plaintiff's Objections, Defendant's Reply, and applicable legal authorities, and adopts the recommendations of Judge Ellis. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Pizarro v. Bartlett, 776 F. Supp. 815, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).*fn2
(1) Adult Disability Claims
Judge Ellis correctly concluded that the ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff's seizure disorder does not meet the neurological impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 for disability ("Listings"), and that Plaintiff's disorder does not preclude him from working because, among other reasons: (1) Plaintiff's seizures "are well-controlled by his current medication," and "he has not suffered a seizure since 2007"; (2) Plaintiff testified that "there is no reason he would not be able to work if he wanted to"; (3) Dr. Herb Meadow, a consulting psychiatrist, "found no limitations related to [Plaintiff's] condition that would impair his ability to function in a work environment"; and (4) Dr. Justin Willer, a neurological expert, found that "the only limitation on [Plaintiff's] ability to work was that he should not perform work that requires the operation of heavy machinery, driving, or swimming." (Report at 13, 14.); see also 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, §§ 11.02, 11.03.
Plaintiff's Objection based upon his contentions that he had two seizures in 2012 is unpersuasive because Plaintiff's application for SSI covered the time period February 16, 2006, the date the application was filed, through September 25, 2009, the date of the ALJ's decision. (See Pl. Obj. at 1; A.R. at 1--2); Tirado v. Bowen, 842 F.2d 595, 597 (2d Cir. 1988). Plaintiff's Objection that Plaintiff is disabled because his "seizures will occur . . . without medication" (Pl. Obj. at 1) is also without merit. See Castillo v. Barnhart, No. 01 Civ. 9632, 2003 WL 21921269 at * 9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2003) ("Where the medical condition can be controlled through adherence to prescribed ...