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Ana Tavarez v. Michael J. Astrue

July 11, 2012

ANA TAVAREZ, PLAINTIFF,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, DEFENDANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Block, Senior District Judge:

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Ana Tavarez seeks review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for benefits under the Social Security Act (the "Act"). Both parties move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed; accordingly, the Commissioner's motion is granted and Tavarez's complaint is dismissed.

I

Tavarez claims that she suffers from a variety of impairments, including lower back problems, hyperthyroid, high cholesterol, frozen right shoulder, and a heart condition.

She first applied for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI) on April 24, 2008, alleging a disability onset date of January 31, 2003. The SSI application was approved because Tavarez became disabled with a back disorder beginning on April 1, 2008. The application for DIB was denied because Tavarez was not disabled through September 30, 2004, her date last insured.*fn1 She did not appeal the denial of DIB. Tavarez filed another application for DIB on October 10, 2008, alleging disability beginning on January 13, 2000. After that application was denied, she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ").

As an initial matter, the ALJ determined that Tavarez was insured through September 30, 2004. To be entitled to DIB, a claimant must establish that she became disabled while she had insured status. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(A), 423(c)(1). The ALJ next began to apply the familiar five-step process, and first found that Tavarez had not engaged in substantial gainful activity between January 13, 2000 and September 20, 2004. Second, the ALJ found that "there were no medical signs or laboratory findings to substantiate the existence of a medically determinable impairment." A.R. at 463. Specifically, the ALJ stated that there "is no supporting documentation in the record that even remotely indicates that [Tavarez] was physically incapacitated as of January 13, 2000 the alleged onset date or at any time up to September 30, 2004 the date last insured. All of the medical records support an onset date in 2008 or 2009." A.R. at 468-69. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Tavarez did not have a disability between her alleged onset date and her date last insured. Because the ALJ determined at step two that Tavarez was not disabled, he did not proceed to the remaining three steps.

On September 29, 2009, the ALJ issued his decision concluding that Tavarez was not disabled within the meaning of the Act prior to her date last insured. On April 27, 2011, the Appeals Council denied her request for review. On June 2, 2011, the Appeals Council set aside the April 27 action to consider new evidence submitted by Tavarez; after considering this additional information, the Appeals Council again denied the request for review, rendering the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits final. Tavarez timely sought judicial review.

II

"In reviewing the final decision of the Commissioner, a district court must determine whether the correct legal standards were applied and whether substantial evidence supports the decision." Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 2004). "Substantial evidence" is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps of the five-step disability inquiry, while the Social Security Administration bears the burden on the last step. See Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2003).

Tavarez challenges the Commissioner's decision on the following grounds: (1) that the 2008 SSI award mandates a finding that Tavarez is also entitled to DIB; (2) that the ALJ failed to develop the record; and (3) that the Appeals Council failed to consider new and material evidence.

A. SSI Award

Tavarez first argues that because the definition of "disability" for the purposes of SSI and DIB is identical, and her 2008 SSI application was approved with an onset date of January 21, 2003, the outcome of her SSI application mandates an approval of the current DIB claim. The Commissioner counters that the approved onset date for the SSI benefits was actually April 1, 2008. The Disability Determination form pertaining to Tavarez's SSI application supports the 2008 onset date. See Decl. of Bryant Wilder, Ex. B. Thus, the challenged ALJ decision, which states that the record supports a 2008 or 2009 onset date, is in fact consistent with the terms of the earlier SSI decision.

Both requiring that a claimant be disabled, DIB and SSI utilize the same definition of "disability" -- that the claimant is unable " to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). Although the programs are substantively identical, however, in practice DIB requires that a claimant show that she became disabled during a period when she was insured; SSI has no such requirement. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381a, 1382(a).

The DIB and SSI programs provide different types of benefits: "Whereas [DIB] establishes an insurance program available to all contributors, SSI is a need-based program available to claimants whose income ...


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