The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., District Judge*fn1
Jocelyn Diaz ("Petitioner") filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence.*fn2 Petitioner raises four claims: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; (3) her guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary; and (4) actual innocence. For the following reasons, this petition is denied.
Upon the death of her husband in 2002, Petitioner took control of her husband's drug business. Petitioner received quantities of cocaine from her late husband's supplier and applied the profits from drug sales against the debt her late husband left behind. On January 24, 2003, Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") agents arrested her at her home. Petitioner waived her Miranda rights and directed the agents to the bedroom where they found, among other things, cocaine and an unloaded handgun in the nightstand. Subsequent admissions provided by Petitioner acknowledged that she sold approximately fifty kilograms of cocaine since 2002 and that she knew of the handgun, though it originally belonged to her husband. On January 28, 2003, Petitioner appeared before United States Magistrate Judge Frank Maas facing charges of distributing cocaine and possession with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). Petitioner was released upon signing, with a cosignatory, a $250,000 recognizance bond. Within days of this appearance Petitioner fled to the Dominican Republic. A bench warrant for her arrest was issued on February 3, 2003.
Prior to Petitioner's return some four months later, a grand jury indicted Petitioner on February 13, 2003, charging her with possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) ("Count 1") and knowing possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) ("Count 2"). After she returned and surrendered, Petitioner pleaded guilty to both counts on October 2, 2004. Thereafter, Petitioner retained new counsel and sought to withdraw her guilty plea as to Count 2, contending that the facts offered during the plea allocution were insufficient to establish the elements charged in Count 2 (that the possession of the gun was in relation to the facilitation of the drug crime). The Court denied Petitioner's motion and sentenced her to 135 months on Count 1 and the requisite 60 months for Count 2, to run consecutively as mandated by § 924(c). The Second Circuit upheld the Court's acceptance of the guilty plea but remanded the case for resentencing on grounds other than those contended for by Petitioner here. United States v. Diaz, 148 F. App'x 9 (2d Cir. 2005). On remand, the Court reduced the sentence to a lower term of 120 months for Count 1 but did not alter the statutorily mandated 60-month sentence for Count
2. This revised sentence was upheld on appeal, United States v. Diaz, 254 F. App'x 13 (2d Cir. 2007), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on March 17, 2008, Diaz v. United States, 552 U.S. 1272 (2008). Post-appeal, Petitioner requested by letter to reopen her case, and the Court denied the request by endorsement on September 3, 2008. On March 26, 2010, Petitioner filed for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582, which the Court denied on May 4, 2010. Petitioner filed the present motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on March 28, 2011, wherein she seeks relief pertaining to Count 2.
To be granted relief, Petitioner must show "that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
A.Petitioner's Claims are Barred by the Statute of Limitations
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), a petition under § 2255 must be brought within one year after a judgment becomes final. In addition to having to meet one of the four requirements stated above, and as established by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), a § 2255 motion filed outside of the one-year time period is barred. In the instant case, Petitioner appealed her resentencing of February 17, 2006, which was affirmed by the Second Circuit on November 13, 2007. Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court on March 17, 2008, at which point the judgment became final. Petitioner filed the present petition on March 28, 2011, well outside the statutorily imposed one-year time frame.
To avoid dismissal of her untimely filing, Petitioner claims that the limitations period should be equitably tolled. Though courts have found that a § 2255 petition can be tolled subject to an equitable showing, a petitioner seeking such a measure must show "'(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way' and prevented timely filing." Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). The instances where courts have granted equitable are few and far between. See, e.g., Harper v. Ercole, 648 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 2011) (petitioner's hospitalization caused him to miss the deadline); Dillon v. Conway, 642 F.3d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 2011) (prisoner directed attorney to file a petition and attorney failed to do so); Diaz v. Kelly, 515 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2008) (state appellate court failed to inform a prisoner that his leave to appeal was denied); Valvedere v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2000) (corrections officer intentionally confiscated a prisoner's petition shortly before the deadline). Petitioner claims that she diligently pursued her rights and that, despite her not satisfying the "extraordinary circumstances" requirement, the statute of limitations should nevertheless be tolled due to equitable principles.*fn3 But the standard that Petitioner asks the Court to depart from is itself an equitable principle; and one that she fails to meet.
To satisfy the first prong of equitable tolling, a petitioner must demonstrate that "he acted with reasonable diligence throughout the period he seeks to toll[.]" Harper, 648 F.3d at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard calls for "reasonable diligence, not maximum, feasible diligence[.]" Id. at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, "'a garden variety claim of excusable neglect' . . . does not warrant equitable tolling." Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564 (quoting Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)). "Courts generally have found that periods of delay lasting for more than a year do not exhibit due diligence." Morton v. Ercole, No. 08 Civ. 0252(RJS)(FM), 2010 WL 890036, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2010) (citing Tineo v. United States, No. 01 Civ. 4511, 2002 WL 1997901, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002); Zapata v. United States, Nos. 90 CR. 943(AGS), 99 Civ. 00085(AGS), 2000 WL 1610801, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2000)). To show diligence, Petitioner maintains that, despite her guilty plea, she has contested the gun count throughout the entire process. Petitioner did attempt to revisit her plea in Count 2 by her appeal of her conviction and her motions to withdraw her guilty plea, reopen her case, and reduce her sentence.
Regardless of whether or not these steps constitute reasonable diligence, Petitioner has not shown that some extraordinary circumstance stood in her way and prevented timely filing. There is a "high bar to deem circumstances sufficiently 'extraordinary' to warrant equitable tolling." Dillon, 642 F.3d at 363. As Petitioner acknowledges, "extraordinary" is not a reference to the "uniqueness of a party's circumstances, but rather to the severity of the obstacle impeding compliance with a limitations period." Harper, 648 F.3d at 137 (citing Bolarinwa v. Williams, 593 F.3d 226, 231--32 (2d Cir. 2010)); see also Diaz, 515 F.3d at 154. Petitioner cites no such severe obstacle that hindered her ability to file a habeas petition. Though Petitioner references her lack of knowledge of the legal system, ignorance of the law is insufficient for consideration under the "extraordinary circumstance" prong. See Giles v. Smith, No. 10 Civ. 5322(PKC), 2010 WL 4159468, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2010) ("[T]he fact that Petitioner did not determine that he had a legal claim earlier, perhaps because he is proceeding pro se or is not ...