Charles J. Hynes, Esq., Kings County District Attorney, by Assistant District Attorney Rachel Schmidt, for the People of the State of New York.
Jake Lasala, Esq., for Defendant, Gurmeet Singh.
Miriam Cyrulnik, J.
Defendant stands indicted for Predatory Sexual Assault, Rape in the First Degree, and other charges. By omnibus motion, defendant moves for a variety of relief. Defendant's requests are decided as follows:
Grand Jury Minutes
Defendant's motion to inspect the Grand Jury minutes is granted. Upon an examination of the minutes of the Grand Jury proceedings, the court finds that the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally sufficient to establish the offenses charged and that the defendant committed said offenses (see CPL §§190.65, 210.20, 210.30; People v Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97 ; People v Calbud, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 389 ; People v Swamp, 84 N.Y.2d 725 ). Additionally, the court finds that the instructions on the law given to the Grand Jury were adequate and legally sufficient (see People v. Calbud, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 389 , supra). Further, no procedural flaws or errors support dismissal or reduction of any count or of the indictment.
To the extent that defendant requests that the Grand Jury minutes be disclosed to him for the purpose of determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support the charges contained in the indictment, the court notes that release of those minutes is authorized only when the court finds that disclosure is necessary to assist it in making a determination (CPL §210.30). That assistance is not required and defendant's application to examine the Grand Jury minutes is denied (see also CPL §190.25 ; People v. Robinson, 98 N.Y.2d 755 ).
Predatory Sexual Assault
Defendant moves, specifically, to dismiss count one of the indictment, Predatory Sexual Assault, advancing several arguments:
1. Legislative Intent
Defendant argues that PL §130.95, Predatory Sexual Assault, does not apply to the case at bar because the Legislature intended it to apply only to "egregious acts of sexual assault" and the instant matter does not satisfy this requirement (Defendant's Affirmation, p.14). Repeating the traditional definition of "egregious" conduct as that which "shocks the conscience" (id., p.14-15 [citations omitted]), he suggests that the conduct alleged "is not of such a heinous character" as to warrant prosecution under this section (id.)  He argues, instead, that since the alleged offense is properly encompassed by PL §130.35 (1), Rape in the First Degree, Predatory Sexual Assault must be dismissed.
Penal Law (PL) § 130.35 (1), Rape in the First Degree, as charged in the instant indictment, reads as follows:
A person is guilty of rape in the first degree when he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person:
1. By forcible compulsion[.] Penal Law (PL) §130.95 (1)(b), Predatory Sexual Assault, as charged in the instant indictment, reads as follows:
A person is guilty of predatory sexual assault when he or she commits the crime of rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree, or course of sexual conduct against a ...