The opinion of the court was delivered by: Naomi Reice Buchwald United States District Judge
Petitioner Irshad Ramzan, currently an inmate at the Moshannon Valley Correctional Center, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Ramzan challenges a sentence entered by this Court on June 1, 2010, following his guilty pleas to charges of conspiracy to commit mail and bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. In his petition, Ramzan asserts myriad claims, most notably that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in the negotiation and execution of his plea agreements. For the reasons stated below, Ramzan's petition is denied.
The history of this case is unusual. By Indictment of May 31, 2006, Ramzan and two co-defendants were charged with conspiracy to commit mail and bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. (Resp. Ex. A.) The Indictment charged the three individuals with participation in a conspiracy termed the "Bailout Scheme," in which the defendants conspired to defraud mortgage lenders by arranging for "straw purchasers" to receive loans from the lenders under false pretenses. (Id. ¶ 6.) Ramzan pleaded guilty to the Indictment on October 30, 2007, pursuant to a plea agreement (the "First Plea Agreement"). (Resp. Ex. B.) The stipulated guidelines range under the First Plea Agreement was 87 to 108 months. (Id. at 10:11-14.)
After entering into the First Plea Agreement, Ramzan attempted to provide substantial assistance to the Government, but this effort ultimately proved unfruitful. (Resp. Ex. E at 2:15-3:2.) Contemporaneous to Ramzan's efforts to cooperate, the Government was investigating other criminal activity in which Ramzan was involved. (Id. at 3:3-5.) As a result of information learned through this investigation, the Government filed a Superseding Information against Ramzan on August 5, 2009. (Resp. Ex. C.) The Superseding Information contained a new charge of conspiracy to commit bank fraud in connection with conduct separate from that underlying the original Indictment. (Id.) This new conduct, referred to as the "Stolen Payoff Money Scheme," involved stealing funds in residential real estate transactions that should have been distributed to the lender holding the seller's mortgage. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.)
Ramzan pleaded guilty to the Superseding Information on the same day it was filed, pursuant to a second plea agreement that expressly superseded the first agreement (the "Second Plea Agreement"). (Resp. Ex. E at 3:13-15.) Despite the inclusion of an additional charge in relation to the Stolen Payoff Money Scheme, the Second Plea Agreement contained a stipulated guidelines range identical to that in the First Plea Agreement -- 87 to 108 months. (Resp. Ex. D. at 5.) To reflect Ramzan's efforts to cooperate, the Second Plea Agreement, unlike the First Plea Agreement, granted Ramzan the opportunity to argue for a sentence outside of the stipulated guidelines range. (Resp. Ex. E at 2:20-3:8.) The Second Plea Agreement also contained a provision under which Ramzan expressly waived his right to file a direct appeal or litigate under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255 or 2241 if his sentence was within or below the stipulated range.*fn2 (Resp. Ex. D at 6.)
Several aspects of the calculation of Ramzan's guidelines range under the Second Plea Agreement are relevant to the instant appeal. In entering the plea, the parties agreed that the criminal activity charged in the Indictment and in the Superseding Information would form one group for sentencing purposes, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. (Id. at 3.) Ramzan also agreed to accept: (1) an eighteen-level sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J) for having caused between $2,500,000 and $7,000,000 of loss; (2) a two-level sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(14)(A) (currently codified at U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(15)(A)) for having derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from one or more financial institutions as a result of the offense; and (3) a four-level sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for having been an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. (Id. at 4.)
Following Ramzan's second plea, but prior to his sentencing, Ramzan replaced the counsel who had negotiated both plea agreements, Leonard Ressler, Esq., with two new attorneys. Also in the time prior to his sentencing, Ramzan was asked by the Probation Office to complete a questionnaire regarding his financial status. Ramzan, however, failed to provide this information despite repeated requests. (Resp. Ex. F at 26:9-30:2.) Finally, as discussed at length during Ramzan's sentencing, there is evidence that following his initial plea, Ramzan engaged in further criminal behavior similar to that to which he had pleaded guilty. (Id. at 30:3-34:23.) Ramzan apparently offered to help two individuals restructure their mortgages, charged them for this assistance, and then failed to provide any services in exchange for his fees. (Id.)
Ramzan was sentenced on June 1, 2010. Because of his failure to provide the financial information requested by the Probation Office, as well as his apparent ongoing criminal activity, the Court determined that Ramzan was not eligible for a three-point reduction in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility. (Resp. Ex. F at 38:21-39:7, 39:25-40:4.) The Court also determined that Ramzan's criminal history level had been miscalculated under the Second Plea Agreement, concluding that the appropriate Criminal History Category was III rather than II.*fn3 Based on these adjustments, the Court concluded that the applicable guidelines range was 135 to 168 months. (Id. at 39:16-40:4.)
Notwithstanding this elevated guidelines range, the Court sentenced Ramzan to eighty-four months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release.*fn4 (Resp. Ex. F at 55:12-56:18.) Ramzan was thus sentenced to three months below the low end of the stipulated guidelines range.
On February 14, 2011, Ramzan filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In light of Ramzan's claims concerning the effectiveness of Mr. Ressler -his counsel at the time of the two plea agreements - the Court entered an Order on July 17, 2012, requiring that Ressler submit an affidavit addressing the relevant aspects of Ramzan's claims.*fn5
(Docket No. 9.) Ressler filed the requested affidavit on July 26, 2012. (Aff. of Leonard I. Ressler ("Ressler Aff."), filed July 26, 2012, Docket No. 11.)
A prisoner in federal custody may file a motion for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or federal laws, was issued by a court that did not have jurisdiction, was in excess of the lawful maximum, "or is otherwise subject to collateral attack."
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). This form of collateral attack is therefore generally available "only for a constitutional error, a lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or an error of law or fact that constitutes 'a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" Cuoco v. United States, 208 F.3d ...