The opinion of the court was delivered by: Glenn T. Suddaby, United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this pro se prisoner civil rights action filed by Mark W. Gantt ("Plaintiff") against the above-captioned correctional employee ("Defendant"), are the following: (1) Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order (Dkt. No. 44); (2) Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 31); and (3) United States Magistrate Judge Therese Wiley Dancks' Report-Recommendation recommending that Plaintiff's motion be denied and Defendant's motion be granted (Dkt. No. 49). For the reasons set forth below, the Report-Recommendation is accepted and adopted in its entirety, Plaintiff's motion is denied, and Defendant's motion is granted.
On January 22, 2010, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this action. (Dkt. No. 1.) Generally, construed with the utmost of liberality, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that in September 2009, while he was incarcerated at Coxsackie Correctional Facility ("Coxsackie"), Defendant filed a misbehavior report against him (charging him with making a false statement) in retaliation for Plaintiff's having filed a grievance against Defendant for charging him $10.49 for a commissary purchase that he never made. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that he was found guilty of the disciplinary charge at a disciplinary hearing, which resulted in the imposition of a $5.00 fine and the loss of commissary privileges for 30 days. (Id.) Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff asserts the following two claims: (1) a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Mielenz for the grievance filing; and (2) a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against the (unnamed) hearing officer who presided over the disciplinary hearing. (Id.)*fn1 For a more detailed recitation of Plaintiff's claims and the factual allegations supporting those claims, the Court refers the reader to the Complaint in its entirety, and to Magistrate Judge Dancks' Report-Recommendation. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 49.)
On September 19, 2011, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 31.) Generally, in his motion, Defendant asserts the following three arguments: (1) based on the current record, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as a matter of law; (2) in the alternative, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting either a retaliation claim or a due process claim, and has failed to adduce admissible record evidence establishing a retaliation claim; and (3) based on the current record, Defendant is protected from liability as a matter of law by the doctrine of qualified immunity. (Dkt. No. 31, at Parts I-III.) Plaintiff opposes the motion through both a response and an untimely "supplemental response" (which was accepted apparently out of special solicitude to Plaintiff as a pro se civil rights litigant). (Dkt. Nos. 33, 40.)
On April 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. (Dkt. No. 44.) Generally, Plaintiff's motion seeks the following relief: (1) an Order of this Court transferring him to a different correctional facility or (22) an Order of the Court restraining Coxsackie correctional staff from future retaliatory acts. (Id.) Defendant opposes the motion. (Dkt. No. 45.)
On July 31, 2012, Magistrate Judge Dancks issued a Report-Recommendation recommending that Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order be denied and that Defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted. (Dkt. No. 49.) More specifically, with respect to Plaintiff's motion, Magistrate Judge Dancks found that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the alleged ongoing retaliatory acts by correctional officers at Coxsackie Correctional Facility are in any way related to the retaliation claim asserted against Defendant Mielenz asserted in his Complaint. (Id. at Part II.B.) With respect to Defendant's motion, Magistrate Judge Dancks found that, while a triable issue of fact (barely) exists with regard to whether Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, Defendant's motion should nonetheless be granted for the following two reasons: (1) because the receipt of a misbehavior report resulting in a five-dollar fine and a 30-day loss of commissary privileges is considered only de minimus punishment, Plaintiff failed to alleged facts plausibly suggesting sufficient adverse action to state a retaliation claim; and (2) because inmates are granted post-deprivation remedies for the loss of property under New York State law, Plaintiff's due process claim also fails. (Id. at Part III.)
Neither party has filed an Objection to the Report-Recommendation, and the deadline by which to do so has expired.
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Standard of Review Governing a Report-Recommendation
When a specific objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to a de novo review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). To be "specific," the objection must, with particularity, "identify  the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which it has an objection and  the basis for the objection." N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.1(c).*fn2
When performing such a de novo review, "[t]he judge may . . . receive further evidence. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, a district court will ordinarily refuse to consider evidentiary material that could have been, but was not, presented to the magistrate judge in the first instance.*fn3
When only a general objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a clear error review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2),(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition.*fn4 Similarly, when an objection merely reiterates the same arguments made by the objecting party in its original papers submitted to the magistrate judge, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation challenged by those arguments to only a clear error review.*fn5 Finally, when no objection is made to a portion of a report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a clear error review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition. When performing such a "clear error" review, "the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Id.*fn6
After conducting the appropriate review, the Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the ...