The opinion of the court was delivered by: Roslynn R. Mauskopf, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed a complaint pursuant to the Court's federal question jurisdiction raising claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 and various state law claims alleging various claims associated with the termination of his parental rights to his children in New York State court. By Order dated September 12, 2012, plaintiff's claims, purportedly brought on behalf of his children, were dismissed without prejudice and, to the extent plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, the Court abstained from adjudicating plaintiff's claims challenging the ongoing state court proceedings. However, to the extent plaintiff sought to allege claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and/or 1986 seeking damages, the Court afforded plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint that complied with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on October 19, 2012, which completely replaces the original complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the action is DISMISSED.
As with his original complaint, the crux of plaintiff's amended complaint is that he feels disenfranchised by the state court proceedings which have placed his children into foster care and may terminate his parental rights. Plaintiff's children are the subject of permanent removal proceedings pursuant to Section 384-b of the Social Services Law of the State of New York. Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 5) at ¶ 54; 157. Plaintiff anticipates a decision on the permanent removal proceedings on November 9, 2012. Id.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B), a district court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action where it is satisfied that the action is "(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." However, a court must construe a pro se litigant's pleadings liberally, see Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 2010), especially when those pleadings allege civil rights violations. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185, 191-93 (2d Cir. 2008). A pro se complaint should not be dismissed without granting a pro se plaintiff leave to amend "at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
The amended complaint is eighty-nine pages long and is essentially a reiteration of the complaint. Despite the Court's direction to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to provide a short, plain statement of claim against each defendant named so that they have adequate notice of the claims against them and to "provide facts giving rise to his federal claims against each defendant he names in the amended complaint," the amended complaint, like the complaint, has a section listing facts and then a series of conclusions listing defendants or citing to case or statutory law. Plaintiff's only improvement over the complaint is providing a list of names of defendants with some of the allegations. See, e.g., Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 5) at ¶ 121--123, 133--135. Plaintiff has again employed the "kitchen sink" type of complaint, listing dozens of defendants and myriad claims without connecting the claims to the defendants or connecting facts to his claims. On this ground alone, the action could be dismissed sua sponte since the amended complaint does not provide adequate notice of the claims against each defendant. See Twombly v. Bell, 425 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2005) (defining "fair notice" as " 'that which will enable the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial, allow the application of res judicata, and identify the nature of the case so that it may be assigned the proper form of trial.' ") (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)); see Prezzi v. Schelter, 469 F. 2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1972) (where original pro se complaint had been dismissed because it contained prolixity of unrelated and vituperative charges that defied comprehension and second complaint, though somewhat shorter than the first, was equally prolix and for the most part incomprehensible, the second complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted).
B.Plaintiff's Civil Rights Claims
Yet, since plaintiff raises civil rights claims and is proceeding pro se, the Court has exercised extraordinary caution in review of plaintiff's submissions in order to extract the basis for this action. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94; Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 191--93. This is plaintiff's third action in this Court in which he raises his state court conviction and the custody of his children and seeks to have this Court intervene or oversee the happenings in state courts. See Marcel v. Byrne, 11-CV-4695 (RRM), Marcel v. State of New York, 12-CV-2384 (RRM). The Court takes judicial notice of the facts contained in his earlier actions in order to obtain a fuller picture of why plaintiff has returned to this Court for a third time, and to assess whether, giving plaintiff the liberal construction to which his pro se complaint is entitled, he has stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, and § 1986 alleging the violation of a constitutional right.
In 2011, plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court seeking to challenge a 2003 state court conviction that was having an adverse effect on parental rights. The petition was denied because plaintiff was no longer in custody pursuant to that conviction and his Sexual Offender Registration Act designation did not render him "in custody" for the purposes of habeas relief. Marcel v. Byrne, 11-CV-4695, ECF, Entry #4 at p. 2. In 2003, plaintiff was convicted of Sexual Abuse in the First Degree in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County; the victim was Shante Vanessa Pullin, the mother of plaintiff's children and the respondent in the foster care and termination of parental rights proceeding at issue in this case. Id. ECF, Entry #1 at pp. 2, 7--9. In 2004, he was sentenced to one-year incarceration and was added to the New York's Sexual Offender Registry. Id. at 2, 69.
In his subsequent action, plaintiff sought to remove from the Family Court of the State of New York, Kings County, three petitions seeking relief pursuant to Section 384-b of the Social Services Law of the State of New York. In each petition, the New York Foundling Hospital petitioned for the parents' custody and guardianship of their minor child. In each petition, Shante Vanessa Pullin Marcel is identified as the mother of the child and plaintiff is identified as the father. Marcel v. State of New York, 12-CV-2384, ECF Entry #1, p. 7, 32, 43. Each petition also alleged that "[t]he Respondent father is a registered sex offender with the Designation of "Sexually Violent Offender" with the conviction of first degree sexual abuse." Id.,ECF Entry #1, p. 8, 34, 45. The petitions are dated October 31, 2007, February 7, 2011 and February 13, 2012. Id.,ECF Entry #1, p. 10, 36, 47.
In the instant action, plaintiff alleges that he is not a party to the termination of parental rights proceedings, that the state court will not allow him to get involved in the proceedings or give him custody of his children, and that the state court determinations have been pending for six years. Construing the complaint liberally, plaintiff may seek to allege violations of Fourteenth Amendment rights ...