Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Vw Credit, Inc v. Big Apple Volkswagen

November 29, 2012

VW CREDIT, INC., PLAINTIFF,
v.
BIG APPLE VOLKSWAGEN, LLC,
JOHN KOEPPEL, GZREGORZ SAMBORSKI, AND JULIAN SALIM, DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Paul A. Engelmayer, District Judge:

OPINION & ORDER

On March 15, 2012, this Court granted summary judgment as to liability in favor of plaintiff VW Credit, Inc. ("VCI"), on its contract claim against defendants John Koeppel, Gzregorz Samborski, and Julian Salim (collectively, "defendants"). See Dkt. 65. VCI now moves for summary judgment as to damages on that claim. The Court grants VCI's motion in its entirety.

I. Background and Undisputed Facts*fn1

Defendant Big Apple Volkswagen, LLC ("Big Apple"), not a party to this motion, is a car dealership in the Bronx, New York. VCI, a Delaware corporation authorized to do business in the state of New York, loaned Big Apple money for its inventory of motor vehicles and provided a working capital line of credit, which Big Apple promised to repay. VCI's loan to Big Apple was embodied in two promissory notes.

On June 12, 2006, Big Apple executed a promissory note, in the amount of $3,347,500, and a master security agreement (collectively, "Wholesale Loan Agreement"). Under the terms of the Wholesale Loan Agreement, Big Apple agreed, inter alia, to remit to VCI the portion of each vehicle sale or lease which represented the amount of money that VCI had loaned Big Apple under the loan. Big Apple also agreed to repay VCI $3,347,500, or such lesser sum as might be outstanding under the note, on demand, with interest.

On March 19, 2007, Big Apple executed another promissory note, in the amount of $250,000, and a master security agreement (collectively, "Capital Loan Agreement"). Under the terms of the Capital Loan Agreement, Big Apple agreed to repay the sum of $250,000, plus interest, at a schedule specified therein. Under both the Wholesale Loan Agreement and the Capital Loan Agreement (collectively, "Loan Agreements"), Big Apple granted to VCI a security interest in Big Apple's inventory of vehicles, chattels, and proceeds (collectively, "Collateral"). The Wholesale Loan Agreement and the Capital Loan Agreement are cross-defaulted, meaning that a default under one agreement constitutes a default under the other.

On June 12, 2006, defendant Koeppel signed a continuing guaranty. Under it, Koeppel guaranteed all of Big Apple's obligations to VCI. The guarantee makes Koeppel a primary guarantor under both Loan Agreements. Defendant Samborski signed a similar document on October 19, 2008, as did defendant Salim on October 29, 2008. As a result of these guarantees (collectively, the "Guaranty Agreements"), Samborski and Salim are also primary guarantors under the Wholesale Loan Agreement and the Capital Loan Agreement.

Big Apple sold 78 vehicles from its inventory. However, it did not remit payment to VCI, as required under the Wholesale Loan Agreement, in the amount of $1,237,615.86. In response to Big Apple's failure to pay VCI for this sum, VCI accelerated payment of all amounts due under the Loan Agreements. By letter dated March 17, 2011, VCI notified guarantor defendants Koeppel, Samborski, and Salim of this acceleration. As of that date, the accelerated amount immediately due and payable to VCI from Big Apple was $3,888,059.84 under the Wholesale Loan Agreement and $54,263.45 under the Capital Loan Agreement.

On March 21, 2011, VCI filed its complaint in this action. It brought claims for breach of contract and breach of guarantees, as well as a claim for replevin of the Collateral. On April 1, 2011, the Court stayed the case for 90 days to monitor defendant Big Apple's bankruptcy proceeding. On July 1, 2011, defendants Samborski and Salim filed an answer; on July 8, 2011, defendant Koeppel filed an answer and cross-claims against Samborski and Salim. On July 11, 2011, Samborski and Salim answered the cross-claims. This case remains stayed against defendant Big Apple, which is the subject of an ongoing bankruptcy proceeding.

On March 15, 2012, this Court granted summary judgment in VCI's favor as to liability on its breach of contract claim against defendants Koeppel, Samborski, and Salim. On May 16, 2012, VCI filed its motion for summary judgment as to damages on its breach of contract claim against these three defendants. On June 18, 2012, defendants opposed the motion. On June 25, 2012, VCI filed its reply.

II. Legal Standard

A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) & (c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247--48 (1986); Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 285--86 (2d Cir. 2002). Because summary judgment is an extreme remedy, cutting off the rights of the non-moving party to present a case to the jury, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a material factual question, and in making this determination, the court must view all facts "in the light most favorable" to the non-moving party. Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 740 (2d Cir. 2010).

Once the moving party discharges its burden of proof under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment can defeat the motion for summary judgment "only by coming forward with evidence that would be sufficient, if all reasonable inferences were drawn in [its] favor, to establish the existence of [an] element at trial." Spinelli v. City of N.Y., 579 F.3d 160, 166--67 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)) (additional citations omitted). Rule 56(e) "provides that a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Indeed, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties" alone will not defeat a properly ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.