The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hurley, Senior District Judge:
Plaintiffs bring this multi-count diversity action seeking damages based on an alleged breach of a settlement agreement. By Memorandum & Order dated March 22, 2012 ("March 2012 Order"), the Court denied, without prejudice to refile, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Presently before the Court is plaintiffs' renewed motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While five causes of action are asserted in the Complaint, plaintiffs moved initially, as they do now, for summary judgment on only their breach of contract claim. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs' motion is DENIED.
In March 2009, plaintiffs entered into a business relationship whereby they "agreed to fund some trading in Collateralized Mortgage Obligation ("CMO") bonds being offered by and through defendants." (Compl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs funded the purchase of its portion of the CMO in the amount of $400,000. (Id. ¶ 11.) After not receiving any funds from the purported sale of the CMO by defendants, plaintiffs presented defendants with a "demand letter" dated May 24, 2010 seeking compensation regarding the CMO. (Id. ¶¶ 13-18; Casolaro Aff., Ex. G ("Settlement Agreement") at 1). To resolve the ensuing dispute, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement on June 11, 2010. (Compl. ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement). Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, defendants agreed to pay plaintiffs $420,000 by June 30, 2010 in exchange for plaintiffs (1) agreeing to "transfer all right, title and interest in the CMO" pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement, which is explicitly incorporated into the Settlement Agreement and attached thereto as an exhibit; and (2) releasing defendants from all liability. (Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 3.1-3.5.). A subsequent amendment to the Settlement Agreement extended the due date for defendants' payment to July 5, 2010. (Casolaro Aff., Ex. G ("First Amendment to Settlement Agreement.")) There is no dispute that defendants have failed to make payment under the Settlement Agreement. In a nutshell, that is the genesis of the present suit.
Summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is only appropriate where admissible evidence in the form of affidavits, deposition transcripts, or other documentation demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and one party's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Viola v. Philips Med. Sys. of N. Am., 42 F.3d 712, 716 (2d Cir. 1994). The relevant governing law in each case determines which facts are material; "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). No genuinely triable factual issue exists when the moving party demonstrates, on the basis of the pleadings and submitted evidence, and after drawing all inferences and resolving all ambiguities in favor of the non-movant, that no rational jury could find in the non-movant's favor. Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1996).
To defeat a summary judgment motion properly supported by affidavits, depositions, or other documentation, the non-movant must offer similar materials setting forth specific facts that show that there is a genuine issue of material fact to be tried. Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir. 1996). The non-movant must present more than a "scintilla of evidence," Del. & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252), or "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Aslanidis v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)), and cannot rely on the allegations in his or her pleadings, on conclusory statements, or on "mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible," Gottlieb v. Cnty. of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). "When no rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party because the evidence to support its case is so slight, there is no genuine issue of material fact and a grant of summary judgment is proper." Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994).
The district court, in considering a summary judgment motion, must also be mindful of the underlying burdens of proof because "the evidentiary burdens that the respective parties will bear at trial guide district courts in their determination of summary judgment motions." Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 211 (2d Cir. 1988). Where the non-moving party will bear the ultimate burden of proof on an issue at trial, "the moving party's burden under Rule 56 will be satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the" non-movant's claim. Id. at 210-11. Where a movant without the underlying burden of proof offers evidence that the non-movant has failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his claim, the burden shifts to the non-movant to offer "persuasive evidence that his claim is not 'implausible.'" Id. at 211 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587).
II. Plaintiffs' First Motion for Summary Judgment
On March 11, 2011, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on their breach of contract claim. Defendants, while acknowledging their non-payment, countered that issues of fact precluded a finding for plaintiffs. First, defendants argued that the Settlement Agreement was contingent on defendant Armstrong completing another transaction with a third party. Second, defendants claimed that the Settlement Agreement was the product of coercion and duress, and therefore unenforceable. Finally, defendants maintained that plaintiffs have not been damaged since title to the financial instruments still rests with them.
Applying the four elements a plaintiff must satisfy to prevail on a breach of contract claim,*fn1 it was determined that plaintiff established the first and third elements, namely the existence of an agreement and that defendants failed to meet their obligations under the agreement. With regard to the existence of an agreement, the Court concluded that "[d]efendants' allegations of coercion and duress  fail to demonstrate a material issue of fact as to whether the settlement agreement constituted a valid and enforceable contract." Casolaro v. Armstrong, 2012 WL 976063, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012). As to the existence of a breach, the Court rejected defendants' contention that the Settlement Agreement was contingent on securing financing from a third party and held that "the plain language of the Agreement, coupled with the defendants' admission that they have not tendered payment, demonstrates that defendants have failed to meet their obligations under the contract."*fn2 Id. at *4.
Nevertheless, the Court was unable to conclude that plaintiffs established the second and fourth elements of a breach of contract claim, namely plaintiff's performance under the contract and damages. In opposing summary judgment, defendants argued that plaintiffs could not establish that it suffered a loss as a result of defendants' non-payment since plaintiffs' release of all title to, and interest in, the CMO was contingent on defendants first tendering payment.*fn3
Plaintiffs countered that defendants' contention was inconsistent with Section 2.3 of the Purchase and Sale Agreement ("PSA"), which as noted earlier, is part of, and attached to the Settlement Agreement. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 1.1.) Section 2.3 of the PSA provides that "[a]s of the Effective Date, Sellers will cease to have any right, title or interest whatsoever in the CMO and all right, title and interest as owner shall be terminated and without any further force and effect." However, the March 2012 Order identified the flaw in plaintiffs' argument ...