The opinion of the court was delivered by: Glenn T. Suddaby, United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this personal injury action filed by Charles Burns ("Plaintiff") against Stephen S. Dailey and Alaina Richards ("Defendants"), are (1) Defendants' motion to vacate the Clerk's entry of default against them pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) (Dkt. No. 13), and (2) Plaintiff's cross-motion requesting that, should the Court grant Defendants' motion, it require Allstate to post a bond for the value of the insurance policy (Dkt. No. 15). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is granted, and Plaintiff's cross-motion is denied.
Generally, liberally construed, Plaintiff's Complaint claims that Defendant Dailey violated his duty of care to Plaintiff rights by negligently operating a motor vehicle through failing to look ahead, failing to yield and failing to give warning of his intentions. (See generally Dkt. No. 1 [Plf.'s Compl.].) In addition, Plaintiff's Complaint claims that Defendant Richards violated her duty of care to Plaintiff by negligently entrusting her vehicle to Defendant Dailey when she knew or should have known that he was incapable of properly operating that vehicle. (Id.)
Generally, in support of these claims, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges as follows. On January 27, 2011, at approximately 10:57 a.m. in Syracuse, New York, Plaintiff, a citizen of Maryland, was operating a tractor-trailer heading north on Interstate 81. (Id.) Simultaneously, Dailey, a citizen of New York, was operating Richards' 1998 Saturn heading north on the ramp that merged from Route 481 onto Interstate 81. (Id.) The two vehicles collided approximately 100 feet north of the intersection between Route 481 and Interstate 81, causing Plaintiff unspecified personal injuries. (Id.)
Familiarity with Plaintiff's claims, and factual allegations supporting them, is assumed in this Decision and Order, which is intended primarily for review by the parties.
B. Procedural History of Action
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this action on February 3, 2012. (Dkt. No. 1.) On March 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed his Affidavit of Service indicating that, on March 9, 2012, Plaintiff's agent served Defendant Richards with the Summons and Complaint. (Dkt. No. 5.) On April 4, 2012, Plaintiff filed his Affidavit of Service indicating that, on March 23, 2012, Plaintiff's agent served Defendant Dailey with the Summons and Complaint. (Dkt. No. 6.) Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12, Defendants had twenty-one (21) days to serve a responsive pleading within that time period. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). When Defendants failed to file responsive pleadings, Plaintiff filed a Request for Entry of Default on June 4, 2012. (Dkt. No. 7.) On June 5, 2012, the Clerk of the Court ("the Clerk") entered default against Defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). (Dkt. No. 8.)
On July 24, 2012, Plaintiff's attorney notified Defendants' insurance carrier, Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"), of the pending lawsuit and entry of default. Allstate took steps to respond to the pending lawsuit. On August 2, 2012, David H. Walsh, IV, filed a notice of appearance on behalf of both Defendants. (Dkt. No. 10.) That same day, Defendants filed their Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint. (Dkt. No. 11.) On August 21, 2012, Defendants moved to vacate the Clerk's entry of default pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). (Dkt. No. 13.)
C. Parties' Briefing on Defendants' Motion
Generally, in support of their motion to vacate the Clerk's entry of default against them pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c), Defendants assert the following three arguments: (1) defense counsel's failure to file a responsive pleading in this case was not willful, because Allstate was not notified of the lawsuit until July 24, 2012, and thereafter took timely and appropriate steps to obtain a copy of the summons and complaint, interpose an answer and move to vacate default, all of which occurred within 30 days of notification of the claim; (2) Defendants have three meritorious defenses to the claims, including (a) the defense that Plaintiff has not sustained a serious injury as required by New York Insurance Law §§ 3420(f)(i) and 5102(d), (b) the defense that Defendant Dailey was faced with a sudden emergency, namely slippery or icy pavement, which serves as a complete bar to negligence, and (c) the defense that Plaintiff struck Defendant Dailey's vehicle, demonstrating that Plaintiff was the sole cause of the accident; and (3) Plaintiff would not be prejudiced if the Court vacated default because a four-month delay alone is not sufficient basis for establishing prejudice, and Plaintiff has not suffered any disadvantage in discovery, which has not yet begun. (See generally Dkt. No. 13, Attach. 4 [Defs.' Memo. of Law].)
Generally, in response to Defendants' motion to vacate default, Plaintiff asserts the following three arguments: (1) Defendants' failure to file a responsive pleading in this case was willful because (a) there are no assertions that Defendants did not have proper notice, and (b) Allstate was aware of the accident in January 2011, which negates any claim of surprise or good faith inadvertence as an excuse for its dilatory response; (2) Defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing meritorious defenses, because (a) they have not provided any medical records to show that Plaintiff did not sustain serious injury, (b) Defendants cannot overcome binding New York precedent holding that slippery roads do not constitute a sudden emergency, and (c) Defendants make only conclusory allegations that they did not cause the accident, which is contradicted by a police report citing "unsafe speed" as an apparent contributing factor; and (3) Plaintiff is prejudiced because (a) it is uncertain whether Plaintiff will have the same access to discoverable material if default is vacated, and (b) if default is vacated, he is likely to find himself pursuing this claim against absent or missing defendants and an insurance disclaimer. (Dkt. No. 15.) In the alternative, Plaintiff requests that the Court vacate the Clerk's entry of default only on the condition that Allstate file a bond in the amount of Defendants' insurance coverage to preserve the Defendants' insurance coverage status as of the date of service. (Id.)
Generally, in their reply, Defendants reassert the arguments made in their motion to vacate default (Dkt. No. 16 ...