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Linda Desmond v. Michael J. Astrue

December 20, 2012

LINDA DESMOND, PLAINTIFF,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, DEFENDANT.



DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

In March of 2008, Plaintiff Linda Desmond applied for supplemental security income ("SSI") benefits and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under the Social Security Act. Plaintiff alleges that she has been unable to work since October of 2006 due to physical and psychological impairments. The Commissioner of Social Security denied Plaintiff's applications.

Plaintiff, by and through her attorneys, Olinsky Law Group, Howard D. Olinsky, Esq., of counsel, commenced this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383 (c)(3). The parties, by and through their respective counsel, consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge on November 29, 2012. (Docket No. 19).

II. BACKGROUND

The relevant procedural history may be summarized as follows: On March 21, 2008, Plaintiff applied for SSI benefits and DIB, alleging that she had been unable to work since October 1, 2006. (T at 74, 199, 205, 231).*fn1 The applications were denied initially and Plaintiff timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). A hearing was held in Syracuse, New York, on April 19, 2010, before ALJ Susan Wakshul.*fn2 (T at 63). Plaintiff appeared with her attorney and testified. (T at 69-94). Testimony was also received via teleconference from Melissa Fass Carlin, a vocational expert. (T at 95-106).

On June 24, 2010, ALJ Wakshul issued a written decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time period and denying Plaintiff's claims for benefits. (T at 20-31). The ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision on May 24, 2011, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (T at 1-6).

Plaintiff, by and through her attorneys, timely commenced this action by filing a Complaint on July 15, 2011. (Docket No. 1). The Commissioner interposed an Answer on January 20, 2012. (Docket No. 7). Plaintiff filed a supporting Brief on April 18, 2012. (Docket No. 13). The Commissioner filed a Brief in opposition on July 5, 2012. (Docket No. 17). As noted above, the parties, through their respective attorneys of record, consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge on November 29, 2012. (Docket No. 19).

Pursuant to General Order No. 18, issued by the Chief District Judge of the Northern District of New York on September 12, 2003, this Court will proceed as if both parties had accompanied their briefs with a motion for judgment on the pleadings.*fn3

For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and, as such, the Commissioner's motion is granted and Plaintiff's motion is denied.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir.1990). Rather, the Commissioner's determination will only be reversed if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it was not supported by substantial evidence. Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir.1987) ("Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal principles."); see Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir.1983); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir.1979).

"Substantial evidence" is evidence that amounts to "more than a mere scintilla," and it has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir.1982).

If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's finding must be sustained "even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court's independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner's]." Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F.Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y.1992). In other words, this Court must afford the Commissioner's determination considerable deference, and may not substitute "its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review." Valente v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir.1984).

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether an individual is disabled as defined under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920, 404.1520. The United States Supreme Court recognized the validity of this analysis in Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-142, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987), and it remains the proper approach for analyzing whether a claimant is disabled.*fn4

While the claimant has the burden of proof as to the first four steps, the Commissioner has the burden of proof on the fifth and final step. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n. 5; Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582 (2d Cir.1984).

The final step of the inquiry is, in turn, divided into two parts. First, the Commissioner must assess the claimant's job qualifications by considering his or her physical ability, age, education, and work experience. Second, the Commissioner must determine whether jobs exist in the national economy that a person having the claimant's qualifications could perform. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(g); 404.1520(g); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 76 L.Ed.2d 66 (1983).

B. Analysis

1. Commissioner's Decision

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2010, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 1, 2006, the alleged onset date. (T at 22).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following impairments considered "severe" under the applicable Social Security Regulations (the "Regulations"): chronic left shoulder sprain,

If the claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who is afflicted with a "listed" impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity.

Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work.

Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner] then determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.

Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir.1982) (per curiam); see also Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir.1999); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920, 404.1520.

back strain, depression, and anxiety. (T at 22-23). However, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments did not meet or equal one of the impairments listed in Appendix I of the Regulations (the "Listings"). (T at 23-25).

After reviewing the medical evidence, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 (b) and 416.967 (b). (T at 25-29). The ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work as a crossing guard, nurse assistant, cleaner, or cashier, as those jobs required the performance of work-related duties precluded by Plaintiff's residual functional capacity. (T at 29).

Considering Plaintiff's age (45 years old on the alleged onset date), education (limited), work experience, and RFC, and considering the testimony provided by the vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (T at 30). Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not been under a "disability," as that term is defined under the Act, from the alleged onset date (October 1, 2006) through the date of the ALJ's decision (June 24, 2010), and was therefore not entitled to benefits. (T at 19). As noted ...


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