State of New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Judicial Department
December 27, 2012
IN THE MATTER OF RUSSELL PRAY, PETITIONER,
RESPONDENT, AND JOSEPH GIROUX, AS CLINTON COUNTY TREASURER, APPELLANT.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McGill, J.), entered June 4, 2012 in Clinton County, which granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to, among other things, compel the Clinton County Legislature to act upon petitioner's offer to purchase certain real property.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Egan Jr., J.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Calendar Date: November 15, 2012
Before: Mercure, J.P., Rose, Kavanagh, Stein and Egan Jr., JJ.
In March 2012, respondent Clinton County Treasurer (hereinafter respondent) foreclosed upon two parcels of real property then owned by petitioner and located in the Town of Ausable, Clinton County. Approximately one month after title of the parcels in question was transferred to respondent Clinton County, petitioner learned of the underlying foreclosure and unsuccessfully attempted to redeem the parcels. When petitioner's subsequent efforts to persuade both respondent and the Clinton County Legislature to allow him to purchase the parcels through a private sale failed, he commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking, among other things, to compel respondent and the County Legislature to act upon his purchase offer. In conjunction therewith, petitioner also sought a declaration that the County Legislature had the authority to consider the purchase offer without a formal recommendation from respondent. Supreme Court granted petitioner's application, and this appeal by respondent ensued.
Counsel for respondent advised this Court at oral argument that, during the pendency of this appeal, the parcels in question were sold at public auction to an unrelated third party. Accordingly, the instant appeal is moot (see Matter of County of Albany [Rossi], 94 AD3d 1164, 1165 ). To the extent that respondent suggests that Supreme Court's purportedly erroneous interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions falls within the exception to the mootness doctrine (see Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 714-715 ), we are not persuaded. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
Mercure, J.P., Rose, Kavanagh and Stein, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, as moot, without costs.
Robert D. Mayberger
Clerk of the Court
© 1992-2012 VersusLaw Inc.