MIDAMERICA PRODUCTIONS, INC. and PETER TIBORIS, Plaintiffs,
IRIS DERKE, individually, JONATHAN GRIFFITH, individually, and DISTINGUISHED CONCERTS INTERNATIONAL, LUC, d/b/a DISTINGUISHED CONCERTS INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK, Defendants. Index No. 601381/08
Paul Wooten Judge:
In motion sequence 018, the defendants Iris Derke (Derke), Jonathan Griffith (Griffith), and Distinguished Concerts International, LLC d/b/a Distinguished Concerts International New York (Distinguished Concerts) move, pursuant to CPLR 3212, for summary judgment dismissing the remaining claims in the complaint for unfair competition, violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 USC §§ 2510 - 2522, and violations of the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications Act (SECA), 18 USC §§ 2701 - 2711. Plaintiffs Mid America Productions, Inc. (Mid America) and Peter Tiboris (Tiboris) cross-move, pursuant to; CPLR 3212, for summary judgment in their favor on these claims. Discovery in this matter is complete and the Note of Issue has been filed.
As the factual background has been discussed in detail in the Court's prior decision, dated December 27, 2010, familiarity is presumed, and the Court will only discuss facts that are relevant for the purpose of these motions. This action arises out of alleged wrongful conduct by defendants, whereby plaintiffs maintain that the defendants, among other things, misappropriated proprietary and confidential materials belonging to plaintiffs and used same in Starting a competing business.
Plaintiffs allege that throughout MidAmerica's 25 year existence, it has collected information, observations, impressions, idiosyncrasies, insights, leads, facts, and notes from its clients and compiled this information onto customer information sheets (the CIS), and that defendants used the CIS in an anti-competitive manner and were able to produce concerts using this information. It is also alleged that defendants solicited MidAmerica's clients from the information in the CIS, as well as frOm contact lists, and diverted business opportunities concerning certain MidArnerica clients.
Plaintiffs also allege that Derke and Griffith downloaded file eraser software onto their desktops at MidArnerica for the purposes of erasing communications, information, and files contained on their work computers, and that they wrongfully accessed Tiboris' email account and intercepted his electronic communications to the plaintiffs'detriment.
In March 2010, plaintiffs served a second amended complaint alleging several causes Of action including injury to reputation and goodwill, breach of a duty of loyalty under the faithless servant doctrine, breach of restrictive covenant, claims for violations of the ECPA.SECA, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, claims for violating privacy laws pf the State of NOw York, conversion, unfair competition, punitive damages, an accounting, a permanent injunction, and statutory damages. On December 27, 2010, this Court dismissed all claims against defendants except those for unfair competition and violations of the ECPA and SECA. The parties now move and cross-move for summary judgment on these remaining claims.
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that should be granted only if no triable issues of fact exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324 ; Andre vPomeroy, 35 N.Y.2d 361, 364 ). The party moving for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence in admissible form demonstrating the absence of material issues of fact (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr, 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853 ; CPLR 3212[b]). A failure to make such a showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see Smalls v AJI Indus., Inc., 10 N.Y.3d 733, 735 ). Once a prima facie showing has been made, however, "the burden shifts to the nonmoying party to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact that require a trial for resolution" (Giuffriday Citibank Corp, , 100 N.Y.2d 72, 81 ; see also Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562 ; CPLR 3212[b]).
When deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court's role is solely to determine if any triable issues exist, not to determine the merits of any such issues (see Siilman v Twentieth: Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395, 404 ). The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and gives the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence (see Negri v Stop & Shop, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 625, 626 ). If there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue, summary judgment should be denied (seeRotuba Extruders v Ceppos, 46 N.Y.2d 223, 231 ).
An unfair competition claim can be based upon allegations of the "bad faith misappropriation of a commercial advantage belonging to another 'by exploitation of proprietary information or trade secrets'" (Beverage Mktg. USA, Inc. v South Beach Bev. Co., Inc., 20 A.D.3d 439, 440 [2d Dept 2005], quoting Eagle Comtronics v Pico Prods., 256 A.D.2d 1202, 1203 [4th Dept 1998]). Here, plaintiffs' claim is predicated on allegations that defendants misappropriated the CIS, and the CIS constitutes a trade secret.
A trade secret is defined as "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it" (Wiener v Lazard Freres & Co., 241 A.D.2d 114, 123 [1st Dept 1998], quoting Restatement of Torts § 757, comment b). To be a trade secret, the information must be secret (see Ashland Mgt. v Janien, 82 N.Y.2d 395, 407 ). This is an essential requisite for legal protection against misappropriation of a trade secret. Where the information at issue could be easily acquired and duplicated, it is not a trade secret (id.). Further, customer lists will not be entitled to trade secret protection "where the names and addresses of customers are readily ascertainable" and "publicly available" (ENV Servs., Inc. v Alesia, 10 Misc.3d 1054[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51947[U], *6 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2005]). While the issue of whether a trade secret is secret is generally a question of fact (see Ashland Mgt. v Janien, 82 N.Y.2d at 407), it is clear from the record before this Court that the CIS does not constitute a trade secret.
There are six factors courts may look at when determining whether information qualifies as a trade secret:
"'(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of [the] business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in [the] business; (3) the extent of measures taken by [the business] to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to [the business] and to [its] competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by [the business] in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or ...