New York Supreme and/or Appellate Courts SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
March 25, 2013
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
Appeal from an order of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Gilbert C. Hong, J.), dated January 18, 2011.
People v Hawkins (Rahkiya)
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.
Decided on March 25, 2013
PRESENT: WESTON, J.P., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ
The order granted defendant's motion to dismiss, on constitutional speedy trial grounds, a count of an accusatory instrument charging him with driving while ability impaired.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed.
On March 8, 2008, defendant was charged with driving while ability impaired (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 ) and two counts of driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 , ). The counts of driving while intoxicated were subsequently dismissed. Thereafter, on November 8, 2010, defendant moved to dismiss, on constitutional speedy trial grounds (CPL 30.20), the remaining count of driving while ability impaired. The Criminal Court granted the motion, finding that defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated based upon the length of the delay, the number of times the People had announced that they were not ready for trial, and the fact that defendant's driver's license had been suspended for almost three years without defendant having been found guilty of the charged offense.
A determination of a defendant's constitutional speedy trial claim (CPL 30.20) requires consideration of the extent of, and the reason for, the delay, the nature of the charge, whether there has been a period of pretrial incarceration, and whether the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay (see People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445 ; see also People v Romeo, 12 NY3d 51 ). In our view, defendant has demonstrated that there was a protracted delay in the prosecution of the case and that she was prejudiced thereby. Consequently, defendant's motion to dismiss the count of the accusatory instrument charging her with driving while ability impaired was properly granted (US Const 6th, 14th Amends; CPL 30.20).
Accordingly, the order is affirmed.
Weston, J.P., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur. Decision Date: March 25, 2013
© 1992-2013 VersusLaw Inc.