The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Glenn T. Suddaby, United States District Judge
Currently before the Court is a motion by defendant and counter-plaintiff, Lehigh Gas Corporation ("Lehigh") for an "order and entry of Judgment valuing the Court's prior award of attorneys' fees for Lehigh and awarding pre- and post-judgment interest on the damages award also previously granted to Lehigh" im this Court's Amended Memorandum-Decision and Order dated October 14, 2011. Plaintiffs and counter-defendants, Jimico Enterprises, Inc. ("Jimico") and Brownson Enterprises, Inc. ("Brownson") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") oppose the motion as untimely, and in the alternative, oppose the motion on the merits. For the following reasons, Lehigh's motion for attorney's fees is granted in part and denied in part, and Lehigh's motion for pre- and post-judgment interest is denied.
On September 30, 2011, this Court issued a Memorandum-Decision and Order, which, among other things, granted Lehigh's breach of contract claim against plaintiff Brownson and Peter Brownson as the guarantor and awarded Lehigh $84,889.72, to be offset by the Court's prior award to Brownson, yielding a net balance due to Lehigh of $33,458.34. The Court also granted Lehigh's request for attorney's fees pursuant to the Temporary Franchise Agreement ("TFA"). (See Dkt. No. 117.) In addition, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees, expert fees, costs, pre-judgment interest and post-judgment interest. (See id.) On October 14, 2011, the Court amended its September 30, 2011 MDO, at the request of the parties, to correct a computational error in the calculation of prejudgment interest awarded to plaintiff Jimico. Thereafter, Lehigh filed a timely notice of appeal regarding this Court's prior orders, including the October 14, 2011 amended MDO, awarding Plaintiffs compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs, and interest.*fn1 (See Dkt. No. 122.) On November 9, 2011, the Court issued an Order staying the enforcement of the October 14, 2011 amended MDO pending outcome of the appeal pending pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d), and directed that Lehigh file and serve its supersedeas bond, which it did on November 15, 2011. On December 14, 2011, Lehigh filed the current motion.
Generally, in support of its motion for valuation of its attorney fee award, Lehigh argues that the Court should award it a total of $21,832.50 for 15.1 hours of a partner's time at $300 per hour and 76.9 hours of an associate's time at $225 per hour, which was spent litigating Lehigh's counterclaims in this action. In support of its motion for pre-judgment interest, Lehigh argues that the Court should award it pre-judgment interest on its net award of $33,458.34 at a compound annual rate of nine percent for the period from the date of termination of the TFA, January 22, 2007, though the date of judgment, September 30, 2011, for a total of $16,705.51. In support of its argument for post-judgment interest, Lehigh argues that the Court should award it post-judgment interest in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1961(b) at the rate of 0.10% compounded annually from the date of judgment, September 30, 2011 through the date that judgment is paid. Finally, Lehigh argues that since the Court previously found that Peter Brownson is liable, as personal guarantor, for Brownson Enterprises breach of contract, he should also be liable for preand post-judgment interest. (See generally Dkt. No. 132-2.)
Generally, in opposition to the current motion, Plaintiffs argue that it is untimely whether it is considered as a motion for attorney's fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) or a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue, even if timely, Lehigh's motion should be denied or reduced as follows: (1) Lehigh is not entitled to outof-district hourly rates, but should instead receive the lowest end of hourly rates awarded for attorneys in the Northern District of New York; (2) the number of hours should be drastically reduced because Lehigh's fee application reflects time entries that are vague; and (3) Lehigh should not be awarded pre-judgment interest at a rate higher than that set forth by statute for post-judgment interest, which in this case is a rate no higher than 0.10%. (See generally Dkt. No. 133.)
Generally, in its reply to Plaintiffs' opposition, Lehigh argues that its motion for attorney's fees is not a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, 59 or 60, but instead is a motion for valuation of its fees pursuant to the TFA. Lehigh does not address Plaintiffs' argument that its motion for pre- and post-judgment interest is untimely. (See generally Dkt. No. 134.)
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d), "[a] claim for attorney's fees and related nontaxable expenses must be made by motion unless the substantive law requires those fees to be proved at trial as an element of damages." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(A). If a claim for attorney's fees must be made by motion, "[u]nless a statute or court order provides otherwise, [a motion for attorney's fees] must . . . be filed no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(i). "Paragraph (2) of Rule 54(d) 'does not[, however,] ... apply to fees recoverable as an element of damages, as when sought under the terms of a contract ... .'" Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Lexico Enterprises, Inc., No. 10-CV-4658, 2012 WL 526716, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2012) (quoting Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1993 Amendment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(A)).
Traditionally, courts have determined a "reasonable attorney's fee" by calculating the lodestar -- the product of the number of hours required by the matter and a reasonable hourly rate. See Millea v. Metro-North R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1673 (2010); Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Assoc. v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir.2008)). A reasonable hourly rate is "what a reasonable, paying client would be willing to pay, given that such a party wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively." Bergerson v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 652 F.3d 277, 289-290 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations and quotations omitted). The reasonable amount of time spent on a matter is dependent in part on the degree of difficulty of the factual and legal issues involved. See Hofler v. Family of Woodstock, Inc., No. 07-CV-1055, 2012 WL 527668, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2012). Courts may reduce from the lodestar calculation hours that are "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary" and consequently are not reasonable. See id. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1939-40 (1983). Finally, it is important to note that the fee applicant bears the burden of documenting the hours reasonably expended and the reasonable hourly rates. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S. Ct. at 1941.
There is a presumption that the reasonable hourly rate is that of the prevailing market rate in the relevant community, otherwise known as the forum rule. See Perdue, 559 U.S. 542, 130 S. Ct. at 1672; Bergerson, 652 F.3d at 290. The Second Circuit has held that when faced with a request for an award of higher out-of-district rates, a district court must first apply a presumption in favor of application of the forum rule. In order to overcome that presumption, a litigant must persuasively establish that a reasonable client would have selected out-of-district counsel because doing so would likely (not just possibly) produce a substantially better net result.
Simmons v. New York City Transit Authority, 575 F.3d 170, 175 (2009). In order to meet this burden, a litigant "must make a particularized showing, not only that the selection of out-of-district counsel was predicated on experience-based, objective factors, but also of the likelihood that use of in-district counsel would produce a substantially inferior result." Id., at 176. "Among the ways an applicant may make such a showing is by establishing that local counsel possessing requisite experience were unwilling or unable ...