Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Filipe Guzman, On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Joesons Auto Parts

May 15, 2013

FILIPE GUZMAN, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
PLAINTIFF,
v.
JOESONS AUTO PARTS, JOESONS AUTO PARTS II, JOESONS AUTO PARTS III, AND PARGIE VISCIANO, INDIVIDUALLY, DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: E. Thomas Boyle United States Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Before the Court is the plaintiff's motion for approval of attorney's fees in connection with the parties' jointly proposed settlement agreement in this FLSA consent case. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

FACTS

The settlement at issue was reached pursuant to a settlement conference before the undersigned. While the parties agreed in principle with the overall amount of the award paid by the defendant to each of the two individuals involved here ($55,000.00), the amount of counsel fees to be awarded was not part of the settlement in principle placed on the record. The settlement, as proposed, provides for attorney fees which amount to 40 percent of the settlement award. In view of the fact that settlement was reached with virtually no discovery or motion practice, I found, by Memorandum Opinion & Order dated January 16, 2013, that the settlement lacked fairness because the legal fees were excessive, and I therefore rejected that portion of the settlement. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). The remainder of the settlement was approved.

Plaintiff's counsel sought leave to brief the issue of counsel fees, which leave was granted. In support of this motion, plaintiffs have argued that case law in this Circuit "support[s] the award of attorney's fees in this case, at least in line with the 30-33a% range" (Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of Attorney's Fees ("Mem. in Supp.") at 5), and that the requested fees are further supported by plaintiffs' counsel's billing records, which show that counsel has incurred total fees of $21,237.50 excluding the time spent on the instant motion (id. at 7). Defendants, relying on the Court's findings in its January 16, 2013 Order, opposed plaintiffs' motion for the reasons set forth therein.

DISCUSSION

When determining the reasonableness of a requested attorney fee award, a court must consider: "(A) the time and labor expended by counsel; (B) the magnitude and complexities of the litigation; (C) the risk of the litigation; (4) [sic] the quality of representation; (5) [sic] the requested fee in relation to the settlement; and (6) [sic] public policy considerations." In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc., No. 08 MDL 1963, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161269, at *28-29 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2012) (citing Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 50 (2d Cir. 2000)). In addition to considering these factors, collectively referred to as the "Goldberger factors," a court may use one of two methods to calculate attorney's fees - the "lodestar" method or the "percentage of the fund" method. McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 2010). Regardless of the method applied, "district courts should continue to be guided by the traditional criteria [the Goldberger factors]" when determining what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees. Baffa v. Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Secs. Corp., No. 96 Civ. 0583, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10732, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2002).

I. Common Fund Method of Calculating the Legal Fee - The Goldberger Factors

A) Time and Labor Expended by Counsel

The first factor to be considered when determining appropriate attorney's fees is "counsel's time and labor." In re Nigeria Charter Flights Litig., No. MD 2004-1613, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155180, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2011) (quoting Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, 473 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2007)). Larger fee awards are warranted where counsel has spent substantial time on a case. Id., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *25. When determining what compensation is warranted, courts will take into consideration whether counsel "conducted pre-filing investigation and interviews, researched and drafted [pleadings], prepared and argued [motions], and engaged in discovery and settlement negotiations." Chavarria v. New York Airport Serv., LLC, 875 F.Supp.2d 164, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).

This action involves a straight-forward, relatively uncomplicated wage and hour dispute involving a single plaintiff, arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York State Labor Law. Although filed as a collective action, there was no conditional collective action certification, no collective action certification, and no class action certification filed. Although the discovery period commenced at the initial conference on January 6, 2012 and the settlement occurred approximately 11 months later on November 13, 2012 there is little indication of any discovery. No document requests and/or interrogatory demands were served in this action. Moreover, with regard to the settling party Meza, he was not even a party to this action prior to the settlement. Counsel submitted no complaint, motion, or pleading of any kind to this Court on his behalf, instead merely showing up with him at the settlement conference. To this date, there is no opt-in or other indication beyond the settlement agreement that Meza is a party to this action. Plaintiff's counsel records 54 hours of attorney time and 26.3 hours of paralegal time in the 18 months that this action has been pending. Given that this case has settled "without formal discovery or any significant litigation," a reduction in the attorney fees requested by counsel is warranted. Monserrate v. Tequipment, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 6090, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164265, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2012). This factor weighs against the 40 percent fee sought by plaintiff's counsel.

B) Magnitude & Complexities of Litigation

Plaintiff's counsel concedes that "[t]he complexities of this matter were commensurate with most FLSA wage and hour matters." (Mem. in Supp. at 6.) Where, as here, "the issues plaintiffs faced were not significantly different or greater than those faced by plaintiffs in other similar...cases," a court may decline to award attorney fees that appear excessive. Monserrate, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164265 at *8 (reducing attorney fees from 20 percent of the total settlement award to 15 percent of the total settlement award).

The instant matter was essentially a single-plaintiff FLSA matter. Although plaintiff's counsel produced the settling party Nestor Meza at the settlement conference, he was not even a party to this action prior to the settlement, and as such, no complaint, motion, or pleading was ever filed on his behalf. No collective action or class action -- not even conditional -- was certified, and no class or merits discovery appears to have been conducted. Although the discovery period lasted approximately 11 months, it appears from counsel's billing records that no discovery occurred during that period. Given the above lack of activity in this action, as well as the small number of involved parties, the issues faced by plaintiff's counsel cannot be said to have been "significantly different or ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.