May 15, 2013
Jennifer Silvestri, respondent,
Village of Bronxville, appellant. Index No. 983/11
Morris Duffy Alonso & Faley, New York, N.Y. (Andrea M. Alonso and Anna J. Ervolina of counsel), for appellant.
Andrew C. Risoli, Eastchester, N.Y., for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., REINALDO E. RIVERA, SANDRA L. SGROI, JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Loehr, J.), entered April 23, 2012, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
The plaintiff was injured when she was struck by a motor vehicle while she was attempting to cross a road in Bronxville during the evening of December 14, 2010. She commenced this action against the Village of Bronxville, alleging that the intersection where she was struck was inadequately illuminated. The Village moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the Supreme Court denied the motion.
A municipality has a duty to maintain its streets in a reasonably safe condition (see Lopes v Rostad, 45 N.Y.2d 617, 623). A municipality's obligation to install street lighting, or to maintain existing streetlights, arises only in those situations "in which illumination is necessary to avoid dangerous and potentially hazardous conditions" (Thompson v City of New York, 78 N.Y.2d 682, 684; see Rios v City of New York, 33 A.D.3d 780, 782; Abbott v County of Nassau, 223 A.D.2d 662).
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the Village made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the subject location was maintained in a reasonably safe condition and that the Village neither created nor had actual or constructive notice of any dangerous condition at that location. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the existence of any dangerous or potentially hazardous conditions at the intersection. Accordingly, the Village's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted (see Thompson v City of New York, 78 N.Y.2d at 685; Alvarez v Hee Youn Koo, 16 A.D.3d 442).
MASTRO, J.P., RIVERA, SGROI and COHEN, JJ., concur.